

**Deradicalization of the Idea of An Indonesian Islamic State
Through the Website
(A Study of The NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah Website In The
Perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis)**

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Abstract : *This paper will discuss how two media (websites) NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah counteract radicalism in terms of the Islamic state discourse. The post-reform discourse on the Islamic State is not only in seminar forums with a physical presence but has penetrated internet sites, Facebook, WA and others. The purpose of this paper is to answer three main problems, first, what are the radical aspects of the idea of an Islamic state published by the NU Online website and the Suara Muhammadiyah website? Second, how the deradicalization of the concept of an Indonesian Islamic state was carried out by the NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah websites? and third, what is the ideology behind the NU Online website and the Suara Muhammadiyah website in deradicalizing the Islamic state in Indonesia? To answer these three main problems, this paper uses Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis approach. Fairclough was chosen because he has an in-depth study of language as a practice of power. Fairclough's critical discourse analysis focuses on the study of three interrelated things, namely text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice. This paper finds several things. First, the aspects of radicalism discussed by NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah are on intolerance of the subject, An ahistorical concept and symbolic and physical violence. Second, deradicalization of the concept of an Indonesian Islamic state was carried out by the NU Online website and Suara Muhammadiyah through normative theological arguments, arguments on the historical practice of Islamic social politics and Indonesian factual conditions. Third, the ideology of NU Online is al-Shāfi'ī with*

the development of an open Sufism epistemology and the Suara Muhammadiyah ideology which is the ideology of schools without madhhab in the form of progressive Islam.

Keywords: *Deradicalization, Islamic State, Ideology, Historical*

Abstrak : *Tulisan ini akan membahas bagaimana dua media (website) NU Online dan Suara Muhammadiyah menangkal radikalisme dalam hal wacana negara Islam. wacana negara Islam pasca reformasi tidak saja dalam forum seminar dengan kehadiran fisik, tetapi telah merambah dalam situs-situs internet, facebook, WA dan lain-lain. Tujuan tulisan ini adalah menjawab tiga masalah utama yaitu pertama, apa saja aspek-aspek radikalisme dari gagasan negara Islam yang dipublikasikan oleh website NU Online dan website Suara Muhammadiyah? Kedua, bagaimana deradikalisasi konsep negara Islam Indonesia dilakukan oleh Website NU Online dan Suara Muhammadiyah? dan ketiga, bagaimana ideologi balik website NU Online dan Website Suaramuhammadiyah dalam melakukan deradikalisasi negara Islam di Indonesia? Untuk menjawab tiga problem utama tersebut tulisan ini menggunakan pendekatan analisis wacana kritis Norman Fairclough. Fairclough dipilih karena ia memiliki kajian mendalam tentang bahasa sebagai praktik kekuasaan. Analisis wacana kritis Fairclough dititikberatkan pada telaah tiga hal yang saling terkait, yaitu teks, discourse practice (praktik diskursif) dan sociocultural practice (praktik sosiokultural). Tulisan ini menemukan beberapa hal. Pertama, aspek-aspek radikalisme yang dibahas NU Online dan Suara Muhammadiyah adalah pada intoleransi subyek, ahistorisitas konsep dan kekerasan simbolik dan fisik. Kedua, deradikalisasi Website NU Online dan Suara Muhammadiyah tentang konsep negara Islam Indonesia dilakukan melalui argumen teologis normatif, argumen praktik kesejarahan sosial politik Islam dan kondisi faktual keindonesiaan. Ketiga, ideologi NU Online adalah al-Shāfi'ī dengan pengembangan epistemologi tasawuf yang terbuka dan ideologi Suara Muhammadiyah adalah ideologi madzhab tanpa madzhab dalam wujud Islam Berkemajuan.*

Kata Kunci: *Deradikalisasi, Islam, Ideologi, Sejarah*

INTRODUCTION

Radical understanding in Indonesia is at an alarming stage, not only efforts to demand the implementation of Islam in the state system (the results of Ijtima Ulama IV on Monday, August 5, 2019, at Lorin Hotel Sentul Babakan Madang

Bogor, West Java number 3.6. Inviting Muslims to realize a sharia NKRI), but also on acts of violence in the name of religion. In 2017, for example, the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS) recorded 75 cases of violence in the name of religion and belief (East Java 7 cases; West Java 17 cases; Central Java 13 cases; Banten 7 cases) ([http: / /mediaindonesia.com](http://mediaindonesia.com)). As with KONTRAS, the Setara Institute in 2018 also recorded various acts of violence in the name of religion, such as the destruction of the temple in Lumajang, the attack on Ulama in Lamongan, the destruction of a mosque in Tuban, the threat of bombing at Kwan Tee Koen Temple, Karawang, the attack on the Santa Lidwina Church in Sleman, the persecution of monks in Tangerang and others.¹ One of the reasons this happened was because Indonesia, following Bourdieu, was a field open to contestation, including religious understanding. The field is something complex. It consists of interactions between individuals as well as structured and unconscious interactions in managing the positions of both individuals, groups, institutions, power and others.² In the field of various religious ideologies openly contest. Even though Pancasila has been adopted by The Founding Father as a solution ideology that overcomes various understandings and groups,³ still, the struggle for religious ideology has been a fire in the husk to this day.

The contestation of diversity in the era of 4.0 has changed from being paper (books, magazines, newspapers, newsletters, etc.) or oral traditions (lectures, sermons, etc.) to paperless (paperless) contestations. The contest is located in a virtual room via the internet network. Through virtual space, the range of dissemination of religious understanding is no longer public but personal in private spaces. The convergence of religious understanding can also occur in a person, not in the public space of recitation but as a result of learning the virtual

¹ IDNTimes, "Setara Institute: Jabar Dan Jakarta Tingkat Intoleransi Tertinggi," 2019, <https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/dini-suciatiningrum/setara-institute-jabar-dan-jakarta-tingkat-intoleransi-tertinggi/4>.

² Nur Syam, *Model Analisis Teori Sosial* (Surabaya: IAIN Press, 2009), 274.

³ Yudi Latif, *Revolusi Pancasila* (Jakarta Selatan: Mizan, 2017), 37.

world or the internet.⁴ Brauchler explained that the internet has become a potential tool for recruiting members of radical Islam⁵ should be vigilant. Like Brauchler, Coleman and McCahill, as quoted by Winarni, explained that half of Saudi Arabia's radical Muslims are recruited through the internet.⁶ Through the internet, they infiltrate the readers with various ideas, radical ideas and views regarding a problem or problem in life.⁷ It is also through the internet that terrorists radicalize.⁸

The spread of radicalism needs to be combated virtually. The trick is to do counter-understanding or counter radicalism. This is what is done by religious organizations with moderate vision such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Through the website, these two organizations provide reviews of various cases that are developing on problems that are indicated as part of the issue of religious radicalism such as the Islamic state, violence in the name of religion, radical religious organizations, Islam and local culture and others. Among the websites that serve as counter-radicalism are NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah. There are a lot of websites in the NU and Muhammadiyah networks. NU, for example, has around 80 networks, while Muhammadiyah has about 64 networks. The networks of these two organizations are very small when compared to the bombardment of radical sites which in the cyber search of NU and LTNU PBNU totalled 208.⁹ Moreover, the google search engine, if it is called "Islamic media", "Islamic sites and others, will lead to radical Islamic sites

⁴ Achmad Sulfikar, "Swa-Radikalisasi Melalui Media Sosial Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Jurnalisa* 4, no. 1 (January 16, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.24252/jurnalisa.v4i1.5622>.

⁵ Birgit Bräuchler, "Islamic Radicalism Online: The Moluccan Mission of the Laskar Jihad in Cyberspace," *Australian Journal of Anthropology* 15, no. 3 (December 1, 2004): 267–85, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1835-9310.2004.tb00098.x>.

⁶ Winarni, Leni. "Media Massa dan Isu Radikalisme Islam", *Jurnal Komunikasi Massa* Vol. 7 No. 2, Juli 2014, 162.

⁷ Radicalism has even entered among students. See, Iswahyudi, Udin Safala, and Umi Kulsum, "The Revivalism of Veiled Female Students: An Account of Their Views of Democracy in Indonesia," *TEOSOFI: Jurnal Tasawuf Dan Pemikiran Islam* 9, no. 2 (December 1, 2019): 380–406, <https://doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2019.9.2.380-406>.

⁸ Zainal Fikri, "Narasi Deradikalisasi Di Media Online Republika Dan Arrahmah," *Jurnal Lektur Keagamaan*, vol. 11, December 28, 2013, <https://doi.org/10.31291/JLK.V11I2.70>.

⁹ IPNUJateng, "Tim Cyber NU: Ini Daftar Website Kelompok-Kelompok Radikal," accessed June 18, 2021, <https://ipnujateng.or.id/tim-cyber-nu-ini-daftar-website-kelompok-kelompok-radikal/>.

such as <https://www.hidayatullah.com/>, <https://www.nahimunkar.org/>, <https://www.eramuslim.com/> and others, and not on moderate Islamic sites.

This paper will examine how these two media (websites) counteract radicalism in terms of the Islamic state discourse. This issue is important for several reasons, namely first, the issue of an Islamic state continues to roll until today and is even considered as a solution to various national problems. This can be seen for example in Ijtima Ulama IV on Monday, August 5 2019. Second, the issue of the Islamic system is used as political ammunition in winning political contestation both in the Ahok case in 2017 and the choice of the president in 2019. Third, the strengthening of religious group identities with symbols- a symbol that is different from the Indonesian identity (way of dress, language, lifestyle, etc.) which is more Islamic. Fourth, the proliferation of Islamic sites that uproot public reasoning that loves local culture and plurality of religions as a system that is considered un-Islamic. Fifth, the ongoing public discussion about the Islamic state, not only in seminar forums with a physical presence but has penetrated internet sites, Facebook, Whats App and others.

The purpose of this paper is to answer three main problems: first, what are the radical aspects of the idea of an Islamic state published on the NU Online website and the suaramuhammadiyah website? Second, how are the deradicalization of the NU Online website and the Suaramuhammadiyah website in the issue of an Islamic state in Indonesia? and third, what is the ideology behind the NU Online website and the Suaramuhammadiyah website in deradicalizing the Islamic state in Indonesia? To answer these three main problems, this paper uses Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis approach. Fairclough was chosen because he has an in-depth study of language as a practice of power. Fairclough's critical discourse analysis focuses on studying three interrelated things, namely text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice. Text is a reflection of how

reality is presented and defined. Text is seen based on its coherence and cohesiveness to form a fabric of meaning.¹⁰

Radicalism and the Islamic State

1. Construction of Radicalism

The work of mass media, including online media such as websites, is to construct reality. Media tells events and shapes reality according to what it chooses. The depiction of reality that is inconsistent with the facts is part of symbolic violence.¹¹ As a social construction actor, website work cannot be separated from what Peter L. Berger said with externalization, internalization and objectification. The website exists to show itself outside of its world as part of a social interpretation that is shown to the outside. In this area, the website has externalized its meaning. Meanwhile, internalization is a person's effort to perceive meaning from outside himself that has been externalized by a reality outside himself to be processed based on his meaning. The processed product is then extended by someone outside himself. Meanings that have been understood collectively in social reality both physically and mentally are part of objectification.¹² The radical Islamic movement is part of social construction that is accepted by a person through the process of internalization. Among other things, radical Islamic internalization is obtained through internet media such as websites. The website, therefore, is a medium from the externalization of its creators. When a radical Islamic meaning has been institutionalized in a community, this meaning has been objectified. Based on this objectification, the subjective meaning of the individual with other individuals can be understood together. The objectification, therefore, can be constructed by the website media. This construction eventually becomes the realm of public meaning.

¹⁰ Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (London: Longman, 1995), 98; Eriyanto, *Analisis Wacana, Pengantar Analisis Teks Media* (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2011), 285.

¹¹ Alex Sobur, *Analisis Teks Media* (Bandung: Rosdakarya, 2009), 88-90.

¹² Peter L. Berger, *Langit Suci: Agama sebagai Realitas Sosial* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1991), 4-5.

Radical Islam is the result of meaning and construction. Therefore, religion in this perspective is sociological. Peter L. Berger's theory above actually complements the views of previous sociologists such as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Emile Durkheim, for example, when explaining religion as a system of belief and ceremony, emphasized the effect of religion, namely the existence of groups (congregations) who have the same belief system in carrying out the ceremony with agreed rules. In contrast to Durkheim who considered religion as an objective phenomenon, Weber was the opposite. Religion according to Weber is subjective or individual subjective meaning. It is not a group action like Durkheim. However, if religion is connected with Protestant ethics, according to Weber, religion can be said to be something objective. So Weber considers religion to be an objective social fact when linked to Protestant ethics as Durkheim does, and considers it a subjective social act for others.¹³

Horace M. Callen reinforces the thesis that radicalism is part of the social construction. According to him, radicalism is characterized by three things, namely as a response to certain conditions, both resistance and resistance; the result of the response, usually followed by an offer of a new model or system as a substitute for the opposing aspects; and the response comes from a very strong ideological viewpoint. Callen's view, almost similar to Marty's expression that radicalism is an opposition to the current system, rejects hermeneutics and intellectualism, rejects sociological and historical approaches).¹⁴ Abdurrahman Wahid mentioned two reasons for radicalism, first because of the form of disappointment or alienation for the defeat he felt from the West. This defeat is shown apologetically by assuming that the Islamic system is sufficient for everything. Second, because of a superficial understanding of religion. Religion is only understood from its source textually and literally.

¹³Al-Ngatawi Ng, *Gerakan Islam Simbolik: Politik Kepentingan FPI* (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2006), 12-16.

¹⁴ Kung & Moltmann *Fundamentalism as an Ecumenical Challenge* (London: Routledge, 1992) 3-13.

Once the strength of the internet media in the form of websites bombarded radical Islamic discourse into the area of people's reasoning, then social construction work in the objectification of religion occurred. Berger and Lucmann call it an institutionalization process that is constructed based on *habitualization*. Habit is carried out by continuous and repeated news so that it experiences sedimentation. The deposition occurs in the area of individual consciousness so that it becomes a tradition. Traditional character is the desire to be transmitted from one individual to another or from one generation to another. The transmission of this tradition includes using language as a container for the expression of the sediment of consciousness. From this, both Durkheim, Weber and Berger acknowledge that the meaning of religion, in this case, Islamic radicalism, is the result of construction as well as a determinant factor for social construction.

2. Discourse on the Islamic State: Seeds of Radicalism

Martin Van Bruinesen explained that the roots of radicalism in Indonesia originated from the Darul Islam or Islamic State movement which was promoted by several people in Indonesia. The Masyumi Party (Majlis Shura Muslimin Indonesia), according to Bruinesen, also gave the seeds of radicalism. This was shown by the communication of several Party figures with the Middle East such as the Wahhabi sect, the *Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* movement in Egypt and the *Ḥizbu al-Tahrīr* Jordan.¹⁵ Mbai also said that the terrorists who hit Indonesia were a movement in the religiously motivated category, namely terrorism motivated by religious fervour. They are carrying out acts of radicalism to uphold an Islamic State in Indonesia. The works of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, *Tazkirah I* and *Tazkirah II* were read by the hope of the Islamic state.¹⁶

¹⁵Martin Van Bruinesen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post Soeharto Indonesia" dalam *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 10, 117–154

¹⁶ Ansyaad Mbai, *Dinamika Baru Jejaring Teror di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Squad Publishing, 2014), 22-23.

Discussing the Islamic state movement in Indonesia, one cannot forget the name Kartosoewirjo (1905-1962) and the important role of M. Natsir.¹⁷ Kartosoewirjo is one of the efforts to establish an Islamic state in West Java in 1949. In South Sulawesi, the Kahar Muzakkar movement emerged in 1950, Ibnu Hajar in South Kalimantan in 1950 and Daud Beureueh in Aceh in 1953. When tracing the Indonesian national movement above, The inspiration of the Islamic state of Kartosoewirjo can be traced. The tracing still came from the first national organization, namely Sarekat Islam (SI) under the leadership of Cokroaminoto. Sarekat Islam (SI) because of a split that began with ideological problems. SI Merah, which was located in Semarang, was more inclined towards communist ideology, so in 1923, Cokroaminoto founded the Sarekat Islam Party (PSI), a party which was expected to match the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which was spawned by SI Merah figures. PSI then changed its name to Partai Syarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) in 1929. On several occasions, PSII argued a lot about the concept of nationalism and even attacked it as not the concept of God.

On the other hand, M. Natsir is said to be the architect of a moderate Islamic state.¹⁸ He is an activist of the Islamic Union (Persis), a reformist organization in Islamic teachings. A. Hasan, an important figure Persis is a literal Muslim socialist, so he seems stiff in understanding the teachings. M. Natsir is a student of A. Hasan.¹⁹ M. Natsir was famous when he led the Islamic Defenders Magazine. This magazine was very harsh on Christianization by the colonialists. No doubt, this magazine was then banned from publication by the Dutch.²⁰ For M. Natsir, the relationship between religion and the state is integralists, inseparable. After the Masyumi Party disbanded, M. Natsir founded the DDII (Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council) in 1967. Through the DDII organization, M. Natsir took

¹⁷Herbert Feith et.al. (Eds.), *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965* (Cornell University Press, London, 1970), 203.

¹⁸ Termasuk tokoh yang menyebut M. Natsir seperti ini adalah Herbert Feith. Ahmad Suhelmi, *Polemik Negara Islam* (Teraju: Jakarta, 2002), 2-12.

¹⁹ A. Hasan is commonly known as A. Hasan Bangil or A. Hasan Bandung because he lived in these two places for a long time. The famous Persis Islamic boarding school is currently in Bangil.

²⁰ Rusli Kustiaman Iskandar, "Polemik Dasar Negara Islam antara Soekarno dan Mohammad Natsir" dalam *Mimbar*. Volume XIX No. 2 April - Juni 2003, 206-209.

steps, first, sending students, because funds from Saudi Arabia, especially from Rabitah ah Alam al- Islamiċ, to the Middle East. Second, DDII translated the works of figures such as the works of Hasan al-Banna, Abdullah bin Baz, Abul A'la al-Maududi and others. These figures are known as Salafist figures who are rigid in seeing religion. This started with the well-known Wahabi figure of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah bin Baz, sending an envoy, Abdul Aziz Abdullah a-Amar to meet M. Natsir. The results of the meeting included establishing universities in Indonesia which became known as LIPIA (Islamic and Arabic Institute of Sciences). LIPIA uses the Saudi Arabian curriculum. It is not surprising, then, that LIPIA has become the basis for the spread of Wahhabi ideas in Indonesia. LIPIA forged figures such as Ja'far Umar Thalib, Yazid Jawwas, Yusuf Usman Baisa and others.

Radicalism aspects and the weakness of the concept of an Indonesian Islamic state

1. Aspects of Radicalism

NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah saw that the idea of an Islamic state promoted by organizations such as HTI to ISIS and even DI / TII in the past contained elements of radicalism. The element of radicalism can be seen in several ways, such as the existence of intolerance of the subject, An ahistorical concept and the existence of symbolic violence and physical violence.

First, intolerance of the subject. NU Online sees that tolerance is one of the characteristics that are not radical. This intolerance can be seen from the expression raised by NU Online below.

"First, the Prophet Muhammad did not establish an Islamic state. Medina was not made an Islamic state. Second, which Khalifah (Islamic leader) is? Syria, Iraq, or Libya which claimed many lives due to civil war? Or, Saudi Arabia, which is currently at war with Yemen," he said. According to him,

the most important thing is that a sense of security must take precedence before faith.²¹

Similar to the article from NU Online, Suara Muhammadiyah proclaimed Yunahar Ilyas' statement that Muhammadiyah rejects all forms of intolerant extremism. Such extremism, for example, is the extreme left such as the PKI and the extreme right such as the caliphate system. Another extremity that Muhammadiyah opposed was liberalism. Yunahar Ilyas's expression was conveyed by Suara Muhammadiyah.

...Third, Muhammadiyah positions itself as moderate Islam or *wasatīyah*. Muhammadiyah is not radical and illiberal. Muhammadiyah upholds the principles of *tawāṣut* (middle), *tawāzūn*, (balanced) and *ta'adul* (fair).²²

Second, An ahistorical concept. The ahistorical of the concept of an Islamic state can be seen from the writing of NU Online as follows.

"First, the Prophet Muhammad did not establish an Islamic state. Medina was not made an Islamic state. Second, which Khalifah (Islamic leader) is? Syria, Iraq, or Libya which claimed many lives due to civil war? Or, Saudi Arabia, which is currently at war with Yemen, "he said.

"Prophet Muhammad did not establish an Islamic state" is a keyword pointed out by NU Online. Suara Muhammadiyah made this statement clear by quoting Din Syamsuddin's view.

The establishment of the Khilafah as a political institution and system, continued Din, has long been criticized, including by Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), Abduh (d. 1905), and Ali Abd Raziq (d. 1960), that the historical khilafat that existed after the Khulafaur period Rashidun is a kingdom, and

²¹ See, "This is the reason Indonesia is not an Islamic country, according to PBNU's Rais", Saturday, April 14 2018 14:15 in <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/88796/ini-alasan-indonesia-bukan-negara-islam-menurut-rais-pbnu>.

²² See "The Summary of Muhammadiyah Ideology According to Yunahar Ilyas", May 6 2017 in <https://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2017/05/06/begini-ringkasan-ideologi-muhammadiyah-menurut-yunahar-ilyas/>

Islam does not carry the concept of a particular form/system of government. So there is no obligation to establish the caliphate as a power-politics institution. "If the concept of the Hizb ut-Tahrir caliphate is meant as a power-politics institution, then it is not an agreement among scholars."²³

Third, symbolic violence and physical violence. Quoting Bourdieu, Musarrofa explained how symbolic violence works, namely the way of *euphemization* and censorship. *Euphemization* is the refinement of something so that it is invisible, very subtle, difficult to recognize and an unconscious selection process. *Euphemization* can operate in areas such as obligation, loyalty, politeness, friendship, cohesiveness, trustworthiness and others. Meanwhile, censorship is a form of displaying preservation of values which is considered as honour, such as generosity, holiness and others. These values of honour are often contrasted or contrasted with values of low moral values such as immorality, violence, crime and others.²⁴

Symbolic violence can be seen from the desire to carry out the Prophet's hadith regarding the caliphate *'ala minhaj al-nubuwwah* (prophetic leadership model). By upholding the caliphate, the bearers feel that they have practised Islam and therefore they can be classified as *mujāhid* (fighters in the path of Allah SWT). This struggle is the mode of censorship. Other propositions about *jihād* are then presented to affirm the action. *Mujāhid* eventually became a very high sacrifice in Islam. The struggle to establish an Islamic state has become a form of heroism that has resulted in the reward of heaven and angels for men. NU Online presents Fathoni Ahmad's article as follows.

It can be seen here that the meaning of the caliphate is not in the sense of establishing an Islamic state or *daulah Islamiyah*. It is more about the meaning of a government system. If a government system can bring the

²³See "Din Syamsuddin's Full Clarification and Explanation, Between the Modern Caliphate and the Vatican", July 15 2017 in <https://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2017/07/15/klarifikasi-dan-penjelasan-utuh-din-syamsuddin-antara-khilafah-modern-dan-vatikan/>

²⁴ Ibid., 472.

people to a safe, just, prosperous and prosperous condition, then whatever the form of the government system is, it is included in the caliphate '*ala minhajin nubuwwah*'.²⁵

Suara Muhammadiyah expressed the need to fight symbolic violence by holding training for preachers and preachers and also publishing sermon books to maintain a dynamic and complex nationality. Suara Muhammadiyah reported the series of socializing Darul 'Ahdī Wa Asy-Syahadah (DAWS) as follows.

One of the series of DAWS activities is the publication of the book Collection Khuthbah Jumah: Spirit Darul Ahdī Wasy-Syahadah in Building the Mental Children of the Nation which is distributed to preachers, preachers, Mubaligh Muhammadiyah and generally for the Indonesian people as part of an effort to enrich our treasures amid public life. and a dynamic and complex nationality.²⁶

Besides symbolic violence, there is also physical violence resulting from radicalism. NU Online proclaims Musthofa's views as follows.

Second, which Khalifah (Islamic leader) is? Syria, Iraq, or Libya which claimed many lives due to civil war? Or, Saudi Arabia which is currently at war with Yemen, "

As a result of this violence, the Islamic state failed. Suara Muhammadiyah proclaimed.

What, for example, Kartosuwirjo's struggle to establish an Indonesian Islamic State for Muhammadiyah was unrealistic for various reasons

²⁵ Fathoni Ahmad, "Gagal Paham soal Khilafah" Sunday March 31 2019 17:45 in <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/104256/gagal-paham-soal-khilafah>

²⁶ Pancasila dan NKRI Sudah Islami, October 14, 2019 in <https://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2019/10/14/pancasila-dan-nkri-sudah-islami/>

including historical, sociological, political and religious doctrinal reasons. Therefore, the idea failed.²⁷

1. Against an Islamic State

A movement that is oriented towards enforcing an Islamic state for Oliver Roy can be categorized as a fundamentalist group. Examples of such fundamentalist movements are the Muslim Brotherhood, Jama'ah Islamiyah and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).²⁸ These movements often carry out radicalism that threatens Islamic moderatism. The methods used are often extreme, revolutionary and want to get results quickly. Radical movements, according to Amin Rais, are carried out by carrying out anti-values in a revolutionary manner, even through violence.²⁹ The references of radical actors are past sources. They, therefore, often refer to themselves as followers of the salaf group. However, these references are separated from critical analysis from both the historical and sociological perspectives of Islamic society. Naturally, if the radical group is also referred to as the *scriptualist* group.³⁰

NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah, as the media under the national guard organization, also provide counters against infiltration and ideological efforts through the media. The ideology counter is the most important part of the way for similar ideas. Radicalization must be countered with deradicalization. Radicalization via the internet must be countered by deradicalization via the internet as well. Deradicalization is important because many radical movements in Indonesia are caused by the influence of the internet. The group that supports the Islamic State, ISIS, for example, uses various internet features and facilities to spread its ideas. Candra Sari mentioned BNPT's research which found the fact that ISIS budgeted fifty percent of funding for the benefit of socialization in the media.

²⁷ Ideologi Kebangsaan Muhammadiyah, June 8, 2016 in <https://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2016/06/08/ideologi-kebangsaan-muhammadiyah/>

²⁸ Olevier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1994), 2.

²⁹ M. Amin Rais, *Cakrawala Islam* (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), 4.

³⁰ Mark Woodward (ed), *Jalan Baru Islam, Memetakan Paradigma Mutakhir Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 1998), 45.

It was informed that in 2014, ISIS was the most active radical organization on social media for propaganda and recruiting new members.³¹ The social media used include Twitter, Website, Facebook and others. Among the things done by NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah in deradicalizing the idea of an Islamic state are as follows.

First, theological-normative argument. Normative arguments are arguments taken from the basis of Islamic teachings that guide Muslims to act, namely the Qur'an and Hadith. In an argument, the normative argument occupies the top position which is the reason for the Islamic State in addition to other reasons such as economic, political and socio-cultural reasons. As the ultimate reason, NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah can't leave this study. In addition to touching theological aspects, normative reasons touch other aspects of life, including state institutions. This is the legality aspect from the perspective of the *kāffah* (or holistic Islamic teachings). This theological aspect relates to the justification of *kāfir* or *mu'min* (as the Khawarij opinion about *ḥakimiyah*) or the opinion in Shi'ah, for example, which makes *imāmah* part of the pillars of Iman. Because of this kind of theological justification, a person is willing to die in attaining and fighting for faith and fighting disbelief.

NU Online quotes Syamsuddin's article, which cites Wahbah al-Zuhaili's opinion as follows.

الخلافة العظى أو الخلافة أو إمارة المؤمنين كلها تؤدي معنى واحداً، وتدل على وظيفة واحدة هي السلطة الحكومية العليا. وقد عرفها علماء الإسلام بتعاريف متقاربة في ألفاظها، متحدة في معانيها تقريبا، علما بأنه لا تشترط صفة الخلافة، وإنما المهم وجود الدولة ممثلة بمن يتولى أمورها، ويدير شؤونها، ويدفع غائلة الأعداء عنها .

³¹ Benedicta Dian Ariska Candra Sari, "Literacy Media In The Counter Of Radicalism Propaganda And Terrorism Through Internet Media" dalam *Jurnal Prodi Perang Asimetris* April 2017, Volume 3, Nomor 1, 17.

This means, "The terms of titles such as al-Khilafatu al-'Udhma, Al-Khilafah, Imaratu al-Mu'minin, essentially all denote one meaning, pointing to one task, namely to control the highest governmental position. Islamic intellectuals have provided many definitions, all of which show almost the same meaning (*mutaqaribah*), both in *lafaz* and in meaning. These are all signs that the Khilafah has no conditions in the form of what it is like. The most important of all is the existence of a state followed by a leader who wants to take care of it, regulate its citizens, and reject all threats that come from enemies of the state "(Syekh Wahbah Al-Zuhaili, *al-Fiqhu al-Islamy Wa Adillatuhu*, Damascus: Dar al -Fikr, 2008, juz. 6, pages: 573).³²

NU Online raises the writing of Fathoni Ahmad in explaining the hadith about *khilāfah 'alā minhāj al-nubuwwah* narrated by Imām Aḥmad.

That apart from the differences between the hadith experts regarding the status of the hadith above, the caliphate *'ala minhaj al-nubuwwah* cannot be interpreted literally or as it is, that a caliphate will emerge by the manhaj of prophethood. However, the caliphate here is a form of state that is practised by Muslims, both in the form of *Imāmat*, *Imārah*, as well as *mamlakah* (kingdom) and *shūrā* (republic). It can be seen here that the meaning of the caliphate is not in the sense of establishing an Islamic state or *daulah Islāmiyah*. It is more about the meaning of a government system. If a government system can bring the people to a safe, just, prosperous and prosperous condition, then whatever the form of the government system is, it is included in the caliphate *'ala minhaj al-nubuwwah*.³³

Just like NU Online, Suara Muhammadiyah quoted the statement of the Muhammadiyah Secretary Mu'ti as follows.

³² Antara Negara Kebangsaan dan Khilafah Ahad 3 November 2019 19:00 WIB in <https://islam.nu.or.id/post/read/113032/antara-negara-kebangsaan-dan-khilafah>.

³³ Fathoni Ahmad, "Gagal Paham soal Khilafah" Ahad 31 Maret 2019 17:45 WIB in <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/104256/gagal-paham-soal-khilafah>.

According to Mu'ti, Darul Ahdi Wasy-Syahadah emphasized Muhammadiyah's support for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution which had three reasons. First, the theological reason that Pancasila and NKRI are Islamic and following Islamic teachings and do not contradict Islamic teachings even though they are called Pancasila.³⁴

For NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah there is no theological obligation to form an Islamic state. Defending the Republic of Indonesia and the Pancasila state, therefore, will not make someone a *kāfir*. The prophet for 'Abd al-Rāziq is a human being as an apostle.³⁵ Quraish Shihab views democracy as part of the implementation of the caliphate because democracy is an attempt to uphold Islamic values (*shūrā*), the principle of deliberation.³⁶ For Quraish Shihab running a democratic system such as the Pancasila state cannot be condemned as *kāfir* and *ṭāghūt*. In other words, acceptance of Pancasila does not destroy one's theology, the faith of Muslims in God. In general, it can be said that the arguments regarding Islamic politics are not *Qaṭī* (certainty) but *ḍannīal-dilālah* (possible clues) which allow the presence of an interpretation according to the conditions of the Muslim community.

Second, the historical argument of socio-political Islam. NU Online sees that the Islamic political history of a good caliphate is as diverse as the four caliphs. After that, the Islamic government was a kingdom. Syamsudin quoted the statement of Imām Nawāwī Banten in *Tijān al-Ḍaraṭī* published by NU Online as follows.

وأفضلهم على حسب ترتيبهم في الخلافة وهي النيابة عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم في عموم مصالح المؤمنين فأفضلهم أبو بكر ثم عمر ثم عثمان ثم علي. ولهؤلاء الأربعة في مدة الخلافة ثلاثون سنة كما قال صلى الله

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ainun Rofiq al-Amin, *Membongkar Proyek Khilafah Hizbut Tahrir di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2012), 17.

³⁶ Quraish Shihab, *Membumikan Al-Qur'an*, Jilid 2 (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2010), 399-400.

عليه وسلم الخلافة بعدي ثلاثون ثم تصير ملكا عضوا أي ذا عض
وتضييق لأن الملوك يضربون بالرعية حتى كأنهم يعضون عضا

This means, "In order, the most important caliphs as a substitute for the role of the Prophet SAW in safeguarding the general benefit of the believers are Caliph Abu Bakr, Caliph Umar, Caliph Uthman and Caliph Ali. 30 years, as said by the Prophet SAW:' that the caliphate period after me is 30 years. Then turned into a kingdom, which is '*adludlan*.' The meaning of this *adludlan* is to have the power to bite and oppress. because the kings (generally) implemented a system of paying taxes/tribute (*dlarbat*) which was imposed on the people until they felt pressured/oppressed." (Syekh Nawawi Banten, Syarah Tījan al-Durārī, Kediri: Maktabah al-Risālah, tt .: 15).³⁷

Suara Muhammadiyah also expressed the same thing.

The establishment of the Khilafah as a political institution and system, continued Din, has long been criticized, including by Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), Abduh (d. 1905), and Ali Abd Raziq (d. 1960), that the historical khilafat that existed after the Khulafaur period Rashidun is a kingdom, and Islam does not carry the concept of a particular form/system of government. So there is no obligation to establish the caliphate as a power-politics institution.³⁸

The fact that this method is different shows several things. *First*, great friends like Abu Bakr, 'Uthmān,' Alī, 'Umar understood very well that there was no guidance from the Prophet about the state format and rigid political mechanisms. *Second*, if asked, which way is more Islamic among all these models, you will find a different answer. Is it the way Abu Bakr was chosen, the

³⁷ See, "Antara Negara Kebangsaan dan Khilafah", Sunday November 3 2019 19:00 WIB in <https://islam.nu.or.id/post/read/113032/antara-negara-kebangsaan-dan-khilafah>.

³⁸ See, "Klarifikasi dan Penjelasan Utuh Din Syamsuddin, Antara Khilafah Modern dan Vatikan," July 15 2017 in <https://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2017/07/15/klarifikasi-dan-penjelasan-utuh-din-syamsuddin-antara-khilafah-modern-dan-vatikan/>

way 'Umar bin Khaṭṭāb was chosen, the way he was chosen' Uthmān or the royal model? An intellectual can say that the method chosen by Mu'awiyah was the demand of his era to maintain political stability as the Roman and Persian empires so that answer implies that Mu'awiyah is adjusting the state based on the situation and demands of his era. This means that if later Muslims do not choose the Mu'awiyah and Abbasid models and switch to the concept of a nation-state or an agreed state model like Muhammadiyah, this will be valid and permissible. *Third*, if you take the essence of the spirit of the various models, it is that Abu Bakr was chosen because Abu Bakr was the most senior, most understanding, a credible friend who knew the ins and outs of Muslims and others. Pulungan said that Abu Bakr was a person who knew (broad knowledge), integrity (high integrity) and skills (superior ability).³⁹ Likewise what happened to 'Umar bin Khaṭṭāb. Meanwhile, the election of 'Uthmān was through a democratic system in which the balance of ethnicity was strictly maintained by' Umar so that he did not appoint his son to the drafting board. Fourth, differences in political mechanisms have not dampened them in several ways, such as the expansion of Islamic territory, the formation of state administration, the pattern of central and regional relations and other policies. Fifth, in terms of titles, friends are different. If Abu Bakr is called *Khalīfat al-Rasūl*, then 'Umar calls himself *Amīr al-Mukminīn* (the Leader of the Believers). The title of Amīr was followed by two of his successors. However, Mu'awiyah made the title khalīfah in another meaning, namely *khalīfat Allāh* (a leader appointed by Allah SWT). *Sixth*, the difference in succession and difference in titles is the clearest evidence that Islamic governance is *ijtihādī*, the result of *ijtihād* by Muslims in regulating themselves. Muslims have been equipped with the Prophet Muhammad SAW with cosmopolitan and universal values so that they can be applied anywhere and in any situation, such as *tawḥīd*, *al-adālah* (justice), *hurriyah* (freedom), *mushāwarah* (musawarah), *taqwā* (takwa), *tawassuṭ* (moderate), *tawāzun* (balance) and others.

³⁹ J. Suyuthi Pulungan, "Relasi Islam dan Negara: Studi Pemikiran Politik Islam dalam Perspektif *al-Qur'an*" dalam *Intizar*, Volume 24, Nomor 1, 2018, 189.

Third, the Indonesian factual argument. Indonesia is a large country with a large population. Indonesia consists of various tribes and cultures. Indonesia is a plural country. Indonesia is a country with the largest plurality in the world. There are about 17,000 islands, both large and small, both inhabited and uninhabited. Indonesia has around 400 ethnicities and languages. Indonesia is one of the largest archipelagic countries in the world.⁴⁰ The area of Indonesia stretches from a very wide and long stretch from Sabang to Merauke. If equated, then the extent of Indonesia is the same as from London to Tehran.⁴¹ Indonesia has many religions, Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian as well as various faiths.

Pancasila is a *melting pot* for the history and plurality of Indonesian nationality. For Sukarno, the melting pot was like the “Kejakartaan” or the Jakarta area, a modern and cosmopolitan area. In Jakarta, various ethnicities, traditions, languages and different interests are gathered. Soekarno said that the melting pot was not like Yogyakarta, which tended to be Java-centric. Indonesian culture is a culture that is currently “becoming” (in the process of becoming). The process of “becoming” shows that there is a dynamic and positive interaction between various cultures. Jakarta is a picture where each tradition takes and gives. Each cultural participant meets in dynamic interaction.⁴² Pancasila is a national identity that is formed from the dynamics and long interactions of the nation. Pancasila contains the sublimation of the values of Indonesian society which are not only characteristic of the nation's culture but are a reflection of the religiosity of the Indonesian nation. The strong urge to make Belief in God Almighty as a value giver (inspiration) for the following precepts is a reflection of the religiosity of the Indonesian nation. This religiosity is also one of the reasons for the failure of

⁴⁰ Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam: Doktrin dan Peradaban: Sebuah Telaah Kritis tentang Masalah Keimanan, Kemanusiaan, dan Kemodernan* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2000), lv; Nurcholish Madjid, “Mencari Akar-akar Islam bagi Pluralisme Modern: Pengalaman Indonesia” dalam Mark R. Woodward (ed.), *Jalam Baru Islam: Memetakan Paradigma Mutakhir Islam Indonesia*, ter. Ihsan Ali Fauzi (Bandung: Mizan, 1998), cet. 91.

⁴¹ Nurcholish Madjid, *Tradisi Islam: Peran dan Fungsinya dalam Pembangunan Indonesia*. Cet I. (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997), 193; Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan, Membangun Tradisi dan Visi Baru Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), 206.

⁴² Nurcholish Madjid, “Beberapa Pemikiran ke Arah Investasi Demokrasi”, in Mun'im A. Sirry (ed.), *Islam, Liberalisme, Demokrasi* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2002), cet. I, 279.

communism to carry out a revolution in Indonesia, even though it has been experimenting with it three times (1926/1927, 1948 and 1965). When Soekarno proposed that the foundation of the state be built on the first, *kebangsaan* (nationality) ; second, *internasionalisme* (internationalism); third; *dasar mufakat-dasar perwakilan-dasar permusyawaratan* (basis for consensus-basis of representation-basis for deliberation); fourth, *kesejahteraan* (welfare); dan fifth, *ketuhanan* (devinity).⁴³ The founders of the nation did not agree that divinity was the last basic element. The founders of the nation agreed to make divinity the very first and foremost basis that animates all the precepts under it.

NU Online reports that Pancasila has been able to unite and become an element of peace for the Indonesian nation for a long time until the formulation of the spirit of the nation-state by youth at the 2nd Congress on October 28, 1928, as follows.

Pancasila as a common consensus has been proven to unite the people and bring about peace. The national movement has long been carried out by pesantren circles, including galvanizing youths to love their nation. This struggle was then followed up by the struggle of the youth in strengthening the country based on the principle of nationality. The placement of the nation-state was carried out by the youth at the Second Youth Congress on October 28, 1928, which gave birth to the Youth Pledge.⁴⁴

In line with NU Online, Suara Muhammadiyah informed what was conveyed by the Muhammadiyah Secretary, Mu'ti, that first, Indonesia is plural country. This plurality inspires the creation of a country based on an agreement, not an Islamic state. Plurality is *the reason d'etre* from the Pancasila state. This plurality makes NKRI the most likely form of state among existing forms of state. Second, the Pancasila State, as an effort to protect diversity, is not against Islam.

⁴³ Aminudin "Pancasila Dalam Bingkai Pemikiran Soekarno (Fondasi Moral Dan Karakter Bangsa)" dalam *Jurnal Al-Harakah*, Volume 03. Number 01 Jan-Jun 2020, 66-67.

⁴⁴ See, "Argumentasi Penerimaan Konsep Negara Bangsa," Wednesday October 31 2018 10:45 in <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/98311/argumentasi-penerimaan-konsep-negara-bangsa>

Because Pancasila does not conflict with Islam, Muhammadiyah figures have been involved in its formulation. Among the Muhammadiyah administrators and members were Kasman Singodimejo, Kahar Muzakir and Soekarno.

Second, the historical reason is that Muhammadiyah through its figures and movements has shown extraordinary contributions and has been decisive in formulating the basis of the Pancasila state. One of them was Ki Bagus Hadikusumo who at that time was chairman of the Muhammadiyah Board of Directors. Other figures are Kasman Singodimejo, Kahar Muzakir, and Soekarno, the First President of the Republic of Indonesia. Third, for empirical reasons, NKRI is a form of state that is most likely to become a pluralistic and diverse state.⁴⁵

The long history of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila is very easy to know. First, from the symbol of the bird "Garuda", a mighty mythological vehicle belonging to Lord Vishnu and the second from the sentence under the the bird "Garuda", *Bhineka Tunggal Ika*, a sentence taken from *Kakawin Sutasoma*, the work of Mpu Tantular in the Majapahit era. Indonesia, therefore, is both "past" and "future". The past means that the history of Indonesia is the history of a great nation. Its power reaches Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Thailand, the Philippines, East Leste and Singapore today. Majapahit rule lasted around 1293 to 1500 AD. Majapahit rule lasted almost 300 years, a long reign. Before Majapahit, Indonesia's history once stood the Buddhist kingdom, Sriwijaya, which was founded from 650 AD to 1377. Part of the Sriwijaya region is Malaysia, Thailand and also Singapore. Like Majapahit, Sriwijaya's rule lasted for more than 500 years. Sriwijaya was even known at that time as a well-known place to study Buddhism in addition to its home area. Slamet Mulyana told the report of the wandering Chinese I-ts'ing that in Palembang during the Srivijaya era there were around 1000 Buddhist priests who worked for Buddhist science, practice and research. Srivijaya is second India in terms of Buddhism. Sriwijaya is an Indian duplication. I'tsing even suggested Buddhist priests from China study in Sriwijaya

⁴⁵ Ibid.

a few years before deepening Buddhist teachings in their native India.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, "future" means that Indonesia through Pancasila is the right choice by the growing awareness of plurality and the spirit of tolerance in all aspects of life. Pancasila has a future perspective because of its universal and cosmopolitan character.

1. Media Ideology: An Analysis of Practices of Power

Soerjanto Poespowardojo as quoted by Nuswantoro explained the ideological functions as follows. First, as a cognitive building for understanding and interpreting the world and the events that occur. Second, as basic instructions to give meaning and give direction to the purpose of life. Third, as a norm that can be used as a guide in action. Fourth, as a way for individuals to find their identity. Fifth, as a force that encourages individuals to achieve the desired goals. Sixth, as an individual educational process in understanding and constructing their actions by the direction of existing norms.⁴⁷ Ideology, therefore, has an inward as well as an outward orientation. The inward orientation is shown by the function of ideology as the identity of its personality. Ideology directs individuals to certain actions. Inwardly, ideology is used to interpret all events that occur. Outwardly, ideology can differentiate itself from other people or groups. With ideology, one can understand who are friends and who are opponents. In life, a person will usually join the community in one ideology. To find out the ideology of NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah, look at media production and content ideology.

First, media production. NU Online is produced by the Nahdlatul Ulama organization and Suara Muhammadiyah by the Muhammadiyah organization. The NU organization was founded on January 31, 1926. The NU organization was founded by a group of ulama who practice Islamic teachings inherited from Walisongo. In the field of fiqh, this organization follows one of the 4 Imams of madhhab namely Imām al-Shāfi'i, Imā m Abū Ḥanifah, Imām Mālik and Imān

⁴⁶ Slamet Mulyana, *Sriwijaya* (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2011), cet. IV, 47-48.

⁴⁷ Nuswantoro, *Daniel Bell, Matinya Ideologi* (Yogyakarta: Indonesia Tera, 2001), 13.

Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal. Meanwhile, in the field of theology, it follows two imām, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī and Abū Maṣṣūr al-Maturidī. As for Sufism, following Imām al-Ghazālī and Junaid al-Baghdāī.⁴⁸ There are several facts about this religious pattern. *First*, NU follows a religious pattern. Even though there are four schools of thought, in reality, NU residents follow one of the schools, namely Imām al-Shāfi'i. It is only under certain conditions that the transfer of madhhab is carried out⁴⁹ for example when performing the pilgrimage (moving to the madhhab Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal or Imām Māli who argues that touching the skin does not invalidate wudhu) or willing to pay zakat using money (following the school of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah). *Second*, as a follower of the Sufism tradition, NU is more appreciative of local cultures. Sufism's open epistemology and tolerant practices, NU ritual traditions are often accused of being heretics, heretics and even mushrik actors. *Third*, as a follower of the school of thought, NU has studied a lot of books by past scholars called the yellow book. NU's scientific epistemology can be traced from the yellow book.

Meanwhile, Suara Muhammadiyah was produced by the Muhammadiyah organization. This organization is included in the category of modernist-purification. These two words are mentioned by Yunahar Ilyas as one of the five pillars of the progressive Islam of Muhammadiyah. Those two words are the development of *tajdid*. According to Ilyas, *Tajdid* is translated into a purification movement in the fields of faith, worship and morals, and modernization (dynamism) in various fields of life such as economy, social, political, health and culture.⁵⁰ The presence of Muhammadiyah was earlier than NU. Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan. Ahmad Dahlan founded Muhammadiyah for several reasons, including the development of the world and Indonesia which was under imperialism or colonialism and the desire to save Indonesian Muslims from the practices of TBC (*Takhayul*, *Bid'ah* and *Churafat*). Not only are these

⁴⁸ <https://www.nu.or.id/static/7/paham-keagamaan>. See also, As'ad Said Ali, *Pergolakan di Jantung Tradisi: NU yang Saya Amati* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008), 29-30.

⁴⁹ Mohamad Sobary, *NU dan Keindonesiaan* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2010), 226.

⁵⁰ <https://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2020/01/28/lima-pondasi-islam-berkemajuan/>

practices considered deviant, but also because they hinder the progress of Islam. In its activities, Muhammadiyah has three interrelated identities; namely, *First*, Muhammadiyah as an Islamic movement; *second*, Muhammadiyah as an Islamic missionary movement, *amr ma'rūf nahy munkār*, and *third*, Muhammadiyah as a *tajdid* movement. Muhammadiyah's teaching of Islam is the principle of moderatism, as one of the foundations of progressive Islam. It is understood if Muhammadiyah rejects various violence in the name of religion.

Second, content ideology. NU Online presents content sourced from several references. Among the references cited to strengthen the decision that the Indonesian state is an Islamic state is the book *Bughyat Mustashidīn*, a book by al-Habīb `Abd Rahmān bin Muḥammad bin Husāin bin` Umar al-Mashūr. Through this book, NU decided that the nation-state it aspired to do was not against Islam. Based on this book, NU took part in the Indonesian national movement which was not an Islamic state. NU Online proclaims the book as follows. Our country Indonesia is called an Islamic State because it has been completely controlled by Muslims. Even though it was seized by the infidels (the Netherlands), the name of the Islamic state is still forever, as *Bughyat Murtarshidīn* explains: Every area where Muslims can occupy it at a certain time, then this area becomes an Islamic area marked by the enactment of Islamic law in its time.⁵¹

On the other hand, NU Online also published Syamsuddin's articles citing several yellow books, including the book *Ihya'Ulūm al-Dīn* by Imām al-Ghazālī.⁵² and the book *Tījan al-Ḍararī* by Imām Nawāwī al-Bantani.⁵³ From these and other contents, it appears that the ideology of NU Online in deradicalizing the issue of an Islamic state is to use the ideology of al-Shāfi'ī. The implication of this ideology is the acceptance of Sufism ala al-Ghazālī. The study of Sufism, a study that is open to various epistemologies, allows followers of the Shāfi'ī ideology to

⁵¹ See, "Status Negara Hindia Belanda Menurut NU Tahun 1938," Tuesday 26 June 2018 19:00 in <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/92182/status-negara-hindia-belanda-menurut-nu-tahun-1938>.

⁵² See, "Antara Negara Kebangsaan dan Khilafah" Sunday, November 3 2019 19:00 in <https://islam.nu.or.id/post/read/113032/antara-negara-kebangsaan-dan-khilafah>.

⁵³ Ibid.

think pluralistically. Sufism is an umbrella for thinkers at NU Online to adopt differences to be accepted. In defending the Republic of Indonesia, for example, NU Online figures such as Savic Ali are not awkward in defending Ahmadiyah. This is the same as Sufi practices such as al-Rūmī which had students from various religions, or Gus Dur who defended Confucianism, and others. Iswahyudi found that Sufism was based on the philosophy of neo-platonism. As a result, various things have emerged, including the existence of an epistemology of pluralism which contains views such as the existence of one essence of many realities, one scattered truth and hermeticism.⁵⁴

Chosen by Muhammadiyah, namely the concept of Darul 'Ahdī Wasy-Syahadah (state of agreement and testimony). It is very difficult to find the ideology behind the content raised by Suara Muhammadiyah about the Islamic state. This is because Muhammadiyah claims to be an organization without schools, but not anti-schools. Muhammadiyah is more focused on methodology than results. Muhammadiyah then formulated its method. Muhammadiyah in this framework can be called a "madhhab without madhhab", in that without it, it is actually building a school that is followed by millions of followers. This is what is called ideology. The ideology of "madhhab without madhhab" is translated into advanced Islamic terminology. Yunahar Ilyas makes five indicators of progressing Islam. First is monotheism; second, the understanding of al-Qur'an and Hadith independently, comprehensively and integratively and is not bound by any flow of either theology, jurisprudence or *taṣawuf*. Third, *tajdid* which operates in two ways, namely purification and modernization which run in a balanced manner; fourth, moderate, that is, the middle between two extreme points, the middle between the radical and the liberal; fifth, love to do good.⁵⁵

The ideology of "madhhab without madhhab" in the form of progressive Islam is explained by Zuly Qodir as follows.

⁵⁴ Iswahyudi, "Implikasi Neoplatonisme dalam Pemikiran Islam dan Penelusuran Epistemologis Paham Pluralisme", dalam *Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Desember 2015, 377-403.

⁵⁵ <https://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2020/01/28/lima-pondasi-islam-berkemajuan/>. See also, *Majalah SM Edisi 19 Tahun 2016*.

Advancing Islam as an idea of thought and practice Islam has references taken from the teachings of Islam contained in the Qur'an and the sunnah *maqbullāh*, as well as from the history of Islam in the prophetic era. Apart from that, progressed Islam too referring to the historical traces of the establishment of Muhammadiyah below KH. Ahmad Dahlan has been formulated theologically, ideologically, systematically, and historically.⁵⁶

CONCLUSION

Through Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis approach, this study finds several findings. First, the aspects of radicalism that are counted by the NU Online Website and Suara Muhammadiyah are intolerance, ahistorical concepts and symbolic and physical violence. Second, the deradicalisation of the concept of an Indonesian Islamic state was carried out by Website NU Online and Suara Muhammadiyah carried out with various arguments, namely normative theological arguments, arguments on Islamic social and political history practices, and arguments on Indonesia's factual conditions. Third, the ideology of NU Online is al-Sha'fi'i which is marked by the development of an open epistemology of Sufism. meanwhile, Suara Muhammadiyah ideology is a school ideology without one in the form of progressive Islam.

This study is flawed in several ways. First, the aspects of radicalism that are the material objects of this research are radicalism in the Islamic state. Of course, this material object reduces various things that become the elements and causes of radicalism in general. Another material object that is important to research is religious laws or fiqh law on various issues. Another theme is about theological elements and ritual practices of the life cycle. Second, this study only takes one point of view, namely the viewpoint of Fairclough's critical discourse analysis. Advanced research can fill it with different formal objects in text studies, such as content analysis, semiotics, hermeneutics and others. These various approaches will enrich the treasures of radical aspects in each text.

⁵⁶ Zuly Qodir "Islam Berkemajuan Dan Strategi Dakwah Pencerahan Umat", in *Sosiologi Reflektif*, Volume 13, NO. 2, April 2019, 219-220.

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