



TÜRKİYE WEALTH FUND: A REVIEW

Muhammet Durdu*

¹Assistant Professor, Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya Türkiye; mdurdu@erbakan.edu.tr
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4912-4410>

Abstract: Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are investment funds owned by states to implement various state objectives. SWFs date back to the 19th century, but their modern examples emerged in 1953 with the Kuwait Investment Authority. They have been extensively known in the financial world after the millennium but were not coined until 2005. They reached approximately 14 trillion USD, a paramount capacity for international financial markets. They originally stemmed from fossil fuel revenues with stabilization and saving aims. As states recognize them, their aims and resources have diversified. Currently, they appear to be a varied bulk of investment tools managed by sovereign states. Their sole collective feature is the state ownership. Although they could resemble each other to some degree in a specific group, they are not a homogeneous group of investors. The Türkiye Wealth Fund (TWF) is a distinctive SWFs. Türkiye has not had ample reserves to build an SWF, but it has used its enterprises and borrowing to build an SWFs. There is considerable controversy regarding TWF in Türkiye. In this article, I endeavored to present a general picture of TWF and the controversy surrounding it. Considering the best practices, I attempted to recommend some things to TWF to contribute to its improvement in the right way.

Keywords: IMF, Santiago Principles, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Türkiye Wealth Fund

Abstrak: Dana kekayaan negara (sovereign wealth funds atau SWFs) adalah dana investasi milik negara untuk menjalankan berbagai tujuan. SWFs telah ada sejak abad ke-19, namun bentuk modernnya muncul pada 1953 dengan berdirinya Kuwait Investment Authority. Dana ini mulai dikenal luas setelah pergantian milenium, meskipun istilah "SWFs" baru digunakan pada 2005. Total aset SWFs mencapai sekitar 14 triliun USD, menjadikannya kekuatan besar dalam pasar keuangan internasional. Awalnya, SWFs berasal dari pendapatan bahan bakar fosil untuk stabilisasi dan tabungan. Seiring waktu dan pengakuan negara-negara atas potensinya, tujuan dan sumber pendanaannya menjadi beragam. Kini, SWFs adalah instrumen investasi yang dikelola negara. Satu-satunya ciri kolektif mereka adalah kepemilikan negara. Meskipun dalam kelompok tertentu ada kemiripan, SWFs bukan kelompok investor homogen. Türkiye Wealth Fund (TWF) merupakan SWF yang unik. Türkiye tidak memiliki cadangan devisa cukup untuk membentuk SWF secara konvensional, namun menggunakan perusahaan milik negara dan instrumen utang. Di Türkiye, TWF menjadi subjek kontroversi besar. Dalam artikel ini, saya menyajikan gambaran TWF dan polemik yang mengelilinginya. Dengan mempertimbangkan praktik terbaik internasional, saya mencoba memberikan rekomendasi agar TWF dapat berkembang lebih baik.

Kata Kunci: Dana Kekayaan Negara, Dana Kekayaan Negara Türkiye, IMF, Prinsip Santiago

DOI: [10.21154/invest.v5i1.10470](https://doi.org/10.21154/invest.v5i1.10470)



To cite this article: Durdu, M. (2025). Türkiye Wealth Fund: A Review. *Invest Journal of Sharia & Economic Law*, 5(1), 184-205. <https://doi.org/10.21154/invest.v5i1.10470>.

Corresponding author(s): Muhammet Durdu; mdurdu@erbakan.edu.tr

INTRODUCTION

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have been major actors in international financial markets, notably after the millennium. Their state ownership has given rise to many legal and economic issues. Their role in the economy differs from that of other investors. They could tend to act against other market participants, which sometimes bears beneficial outcomes, for example, by balancing capital flight from the home country, but other times could cause harmful effects on financial markets, for instance, by engendering financial turmoil for the recipient country while leaving and coming. Both the home and recipient countries thoroughly discuss and analyze all aspects before making any decisions or establishing policies about them, as they may have a significant impact on the recipient and home countries.

They originally stem from excessive official reserves, cultivated from fossil fuel revenues or trade surpluses. As the world recognizes them, they are established with other state resources, such as state enterprises or borrowing. In today's world, SWFs could be a special tool for governments to implement various policies, from stabilization against financial turmoil to the necessities of pension system liabilities culminating from the aging population. New types of SWFs have emerged worldwide to accommodate the needs of respective countries. One of them is the Türkiye Wealth Fund (TWF), established mainly with state enterprises to implement various aims of the Turkish economy.

This study employs a critical analysis of relevant literature, parliamentary debates, and secondary data on SWF governance and conducts a policy analysis of the TWF. In this review, SWFs are described and a brief history of them is provided. Subsequently, the paper focuses on the TWF, which was established by legislation in 2016. This work delineates the formal rules of TWF and mentions most of the criticism of TWF not only in parliamentary works but also in the literature. This study agrees with some of the criticisms of the TWF, but argues that completely closing the TWF does not benefit the Turkish economy. Instead, reforming the TWF and improving its management and audit systems could reasonably benefit the Turkish economy.

DISCUSSION

1. Sovereign Wealth Funds

In today's world, where liberalism is the dominant ideology, there are investment and savings funds that are not fully compatible with it.¹ These funds generally emerge as SWFs or rarely as strategic investment funds, each controlled by sovereign states to

¹ Kern, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: New Economic Realities and Political Responses', 31, 32.

make investments. Their state ownership makes them different from other investors in the market.

SWFs' total asset value is approximately 14 trillion USD in 2025.² They are not a homogeneous group of investors. Their sole collective feature is the possession of the state, making them incompatible with the classical rules of liberalism. Other features differ, including investment strategies, management structures, and purposes of establishment.³ This variety makes it difficult to coin and define.⁴ There are different definitions of SWFs because of this variety. Therefore, adding these definitions to this article is unnecessary. Instead, I will provide the main components of their most acknowledged definitions.⁵

1.1. Descriptive Components of the SWF Concept

The first is state ownership.⁶ Although state interference in a marketplace is not pursuant to liberalism canons, there have been plenty of examples of that phenomenon over the decades. State enterprises were an older case of state interference in the marketplace. Their inefficiency and ineffectiveness engendered a privatization movement. Despite the apparent success of this movement, states have begun to intervene in the marketplace again, albeit in different forms. One of these is the SWFs. States commenced wielding SWFs to participate in the marketplace, strengthening state capitalism, a system in which the state heavily influences the market for political purposes.⁷ States back up these investment vehicles because of the power of public force, which is inconsistent with liberalism.⁸

Drawing from the scholarly discourse in political economy, state capitalism denotes a multifaceted and debated economic configuration wherein the state assumes a substantial and direct role in the economic sphere. This involvement frequently manifests through state ownership and control over pivotal industries and enterprises while functioning within the parameters of a global capitalist system. Fundamentally, state capitalism entails the state operating as the principal economic

² SWF Institute, 'Top 100 Largest Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings by Total Assets'.

³ Bahoo, Alon, and Paltrinieri, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: Past, Present and Future', 13.

⁴ Clark, Dixon, and Monk, *Sovereign Wealth Funds: Legitimacy, Governance, and Global Power*, 13.

⁵ Alhashel, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Literature Review', 2; Sun and Hesse, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds and Financial Stability: An Event Study Analysis', 174; Allen and Caruana, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Work Agenda', 4.

⁶ Bahoo, Alon, and Paltrinieri, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: Past, Present and Future', 8.

⁷ Bremmer, 'State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?', 41.

⁸ Ouni, Bernard, and Plaisent, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds Definition: Challenges and Concerns', 367; Dedekoca, 'Devlet Yoluyula Kapitalizm', 75–77, 84, 85.

agent, transcending the functions of mere regulation or facilitation. Türkiye is one of the states heading for state capitalism in recent years.⁹

The second is the lack of clear and precise liability. Unlike other public institutions, SWFs do not have strict liability. They are controlled separately from official reserves by government bodies, which gives them some freedom. They tend to be long-term investors, and they can take more risks because of that freedom. Overall, they are beneficial to recipient countries. SWFs can bring stability to their investments. There were several examples of this argument during the 2008 economic crisis.¹⁰ However, after the 2008 crisis, SWF investment strategies changed slightly. They had to realize the hips of losses due to their home country's needs in the crisis.¹¹ These losses led them to reconsider their investment strategies. Although the number of investors remained substantially the same, their investment strategy switched from developed markets to emerging markets, home countries, and commodities.¹² Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, their investment strategies have remained considerably unchanged.¹³ Owing to this consistency, they are mainly beneficial investors, but recipient countries should consider how to manage large capital movements from SWFs, particularly in small markets. When entering or leaving, SWFs may engender herd behavior among other investors, which means extraordinary volatility.¹⁴

The last is their extraordinary purpose, which is incompatible with the state or market structure. Until the 2010s, SWFs were known as saving, reserve investment, and stabilization funds.¹⁵ As the world recognizes these funds, other forms of SWFs have emerged. Development and contingent pension funds are two prominent examples. These aims are incompatible with state theory in classical liberalism. Moreover, market participants do not recognize any state as an investor. Therefore,

⁹ Ricz, 'The Anatomy of the Newly Emerging Illiberal Model of State Capitalism: A Developmental Dead End?', 1253; Alami and Dixon, *The Spectre of State Capitalism*, 23.

¹⁰ Baker, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds', 260, 261; Das, 'Sovereign-Wealth Funds: The Institutional Dimension', 90; Allen and Caruana, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda', 10.

¹¹ Das, Mazarei, and Der, *Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds Issues for Policymakers*, xviii.

¹² Klitzing et al., 'Demystifying Sovereign Wealth Funds', 9, 10; Lu, Mulder, and Papaioanou, 'From Reserve Accumulation to Sovereign Wealth Fund: Policy and Microfinancial Considerations', 19; Shields and Villafuerte, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds and Economic Policy at Home', 52; Kunzel et al., 'Investment Objectives of Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Shifting Paradigm', 144; Rozanov, 'Long-Term Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Sovereign Wealth Funds', 245, 246.

¹³ IFSWF, 'Annual Review 2020', 2.

¹⁴ Allen and Caruana, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda', 13; Kern, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: New Economic Realities and Political Responses', 31; Sun and Hesse, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds and Financial Stability: An Event Study Analysis', 173; Hacıhasanoğlu and Soytaş, 'Yeniden Tasarlanan Finansal Mimaride Ulusal Varlık Fonlarının Rolü', 107.

¹⁵ Beck and Fidora, 'The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets', 349, 350.

they began to worry about SWFs' existence of SWFs in competition because of their state ownership.¹⁶

Some writers have added several features in addition to the foregoing components. For example, some allege that SWFs must invest entirely or mostly outside their home country.¹⁷ Others only include those generated from fiscal surpluses cultivated from fossil reserves or foreign trade.¹⁸ Keeping the definition of SWF flexible is a more favorable choice for the future. Thus, we encompass most state-owned investment funds.¹⁹ Increasing SWF's number of SWFs is useful for international collaboration and deals regarding SWFs. Otherwise, many state funds may be outside the scope of international deals or agreements.

SWFs can be subdivided according to their objectives. The first is stabilization funds, established to preserve the general economic conditions of the home country from fluctuations in commodity prices. The second is saving funds, which aims to transfer current wealth to the next generation and refrain from the Dutch disease. The third is reserve investment corporations, which attempt to increase the returns of home country reserves. The fourth is development funds, which contribute to the development of home countries by investing in their strategic and prolific sectors. The last is contingent pension reserve funds, which are responsible for adding resources to state balance sheets to help accommodate contingent pension liabilities. This group of SWFs is different from pension reserve funds stemming from individual contributions. SWFs can have multiple aims. In addition, their aims can be switched from one to another.²⁰

1.2. Short History of SWFs

SWFs have existed for decades, or even for more than a century, according to a minority opinion. According to most writers, they date back to 1953, when the Kuwait Investment Authority was established. Some writers trace it back to 1854, when the Texas Permanent School Fund was established.²¹ Others even go back to 1816 when

¹⁶ Truman, *Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation*, 3; Kayıran, 'Türkiye Varlık Fonu'nun Kuruluş Amaçları ve Yapısı Üzerine Bir İnceleme', 81.

¹⁷ Klitzing et al., 'Demystifying Sovereign Wealth Funds', 4, 5; Das, Mazarei, and Stuart, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Santiago Principles', 60; Güzel, Acar, and Şekeroğlu, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Comparison of the Turkish Sovereign Wealth Fund with the World Samples', 166.

¹⁸ Kern, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: State Investments on the Rise', 2.

¹⁹ Clark, Dixon, and Monk, *Sovereign Wealth Funds: Legitimacy, Governance, and Global Power*, 16.

²⁰ Allen and Caruana, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda', 5, 6; Shields and Villafuerte, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds and Economic Policy at Home', 47; Das, Mazarei, and Stuart, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Santiago Principles', 60; Klitzing et al., 'Demystifying Sovereign Wealth Funds', 7.

²¹ Bahoo, Alon, and Paltrinieri, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: Past, Present and Future', 7.

Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations was established in France.²² When we look at the establishment of an SWF or the establishment series of an SWF group, we see that they are a result of a fundamental economic issue: in 1816, France wanted to manage surpluses coming from saving banks and post offices and build a fund, which is the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations.²³ In 1854, the Texas State intended to benefit education and formed the Texas Permanent School Fund.²⁴ Except for these, the fundamental part of SWFs began to be established thanks to commodity revenues. Fluctuations in the price of fossil fuels were used to influence the finances of the exporting countries. After World War II, the increase in oil prices gave them a chance to design a fund raised by fossil revenues to buffer the economic crisis effect stemming from the fluctuations in prices. When the fluctuations subside, they begin to use these funds for saving purposes.²⁵

The 1970s witnessed another surge in the number of SWFs due to high oil prices.²⁶ In the 2000s, high commodity prices and a favorable balance of payments in Asian countries, which were the result of policies implemented after the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis, increased official reserves.²⁷ This provides some states with excessive reserves, some of which were used to establish SWFs.²⁸

In other parts of the world, the aging population has threatened future pension budget balances in some countries. To prevent an excessive burden on the pension system in the future, they established contingent reserve pension funds that are fed with other than individual pension liabilities.²⁹ The last decade has witnessed another type of SWF. These are established by countries with insufficient reserves to build an SWF. They are called SWFs without wealth. Their aims vary from country to country. Some intend to build national infrastructure with funds raised by their SWF, while others want to plug balance of payments deficits by wielding resources attracted by their SWFs.³⁰

²² Yi-chong, 'The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds', 1.

²³ Yi-chong, 1.

²⁴ Alhashel, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Literature Review', 2.

²⁵ Dönmez and Ereğ, 'An Evaluation With Regarding to Turkish Wealth Fund: Aims, Activities and Legal Status', 62, 63.

²⁶ Ouni, Bernard, and Plaisent, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds Definition: Challenges and Concerns', 366.

²⁷ Wijnholds and Søndergaard, 'Reserve Accumulation: Objective or By-Product', 31; Ouni, Bernard, and Plaisent, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds Definition: Challenges and Concerns', 366, 367.

²⁸ IFSWF, 'The Origin of Santiago Principles: Experience from the Past; Guidance for the Future', 32; Lu, Mulder, and Papaioanou, 'From Reserve Accumulation to Sovereign Wealth Fund: Policy and Microfinancial Considerations', 15.

²⁹ Clark, Dixon, and Monk, *Sovereign Wealth Funds: Legitimacy, Governance, and Global Power*, 21, 22.

³⁰ Reuters, 'A New Breed of Sovereign Wealth Fund - without the Wealth | Reuters'.

1.3. Santiago Principles and International Works

Due to their state ownership, SWFs induce much worry in the countries in which they invest.³¹ This worry has been exacerbated by the deficiency of corporate governance principles in the management of some SWFs.³² To address these problems, 24 principles were introduced under the aegis of the IMF, also called Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) or Santiago Principles, in 2008. In 2009, the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds was established with the voluntary membership of SWFs.³³ The purposes of these initiatives are to adjust the sentiment of recipient countries about SWFs and improve SWFs' corporate governance implementations.³⁴

The Santiago Principles are implemented voluntarily by SWFs. SWFs show their adherence to economic aims by declaring their intention to implement the rules. Overall, with the Santiago Principles, the free movement of capital and investments might be assured.³⁵ If there were no actions in that direction, there would be utter protectionism in recipient countries against SWFs.³⁶ The OECD also supports liberal capital movements for SWFs.³⁷

Several scoreboards aim to assess SWFs performance in different areas, including the Truman, Linaburg-Maduell, and GSR indices. The Truman Index was created under the responsibility of Edwin M. Truman. The index assesses SWFs in terms of structure, governance, transparency, accountability, and behavior using various metrics. It has been updated five times: in 2007, 2009, 2012, 2015, and 2019.³⁸ The GSR Index was developed by Global SWF. This index also assesses SWFs according to various metrics by obtaining answers to their questions. The GSR Index was conducted in 2020 and 2021. The findings of the two scoreboards were strongly

³¹ Wang et al., 'Leviathan as Foreign Investor: Geopolitics and Sovereign Wealth Funds', 1250, 1251.

³² Allen and Caruana, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda', 4; Bernstein, Lerner, and Schoar, 'The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds', 231, 232; Ackah, 'No African Country Is Norway! A Perspective on Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Energy Transition', 5, 6; Truman, 'A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices', 438.

³³ IFSWF, 'The Origin of Santiago Principles: Experience from the Past; Guidance for the Future', 8, 9.

³⁴ Das, Mazarei, and Stuart, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Santiago Principles', 64.

³⁵ IFSWF, 'The Origin of Santiago Principles: Experience from the Past; Guidance for the Future', 34.

³⁶ Allen and Caruana, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda', 16; Bossu et al., 'Legal Underpinnings of Capital Account Liberalization for Sovereign Wealth Funds', 81.

³⁷ OECD, 'Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security'.

³⁸ Maire, Mazarei, and Truman, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds Are Growing More Slowly, and Governance Issues Remain'.

correlated.³⁹ Finally, the Linaburg-Maduell Index is a transparency index created by the SWF Institute.⁴⁰

As the world recognizes these funds, many states have established SWFs for different reasons. Even states lacking the necessary reserve resources have established these funds. It is recommended that a country accumulate enough official reserves before establishing an SWF.⁴¹ Some SWFs have purposes that differ from the original aims of SWFs. They intend to determine the needs of their states, from development to strategic investment. One of them is the Türkiye Wealth Fund (TWF), which is the subject of the remainder of this article.

2. The History and General Characteristics of TWF

2.1. Establishment and Aims of TWF

In August 2016, roughly one month after the coup attempt in Türkiye, the wealth fund was established in a short time by legislation of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. At that time, the country was wholly busy with the controversy over the coup attempt. The public opinion of Türkiye could not properly pay attention to the establishment of the TWF. There were some debates in the parliamentary work of the legislation, but they did not attract public attention. In addition, there were few studies relating to SWFs in the Turkish academic world before the establishment of the TWF.⁴² In other words, there was little knowledge of and recognition of the SWF concept in Türkiye when the TWF was established.

The first article of the Code mentions the purposes of TWF, which consist of contributing to the diversity and depth of instruments in capital markets, bringing public assets into the economy, getting funds from outside the country, and participating in strategic and large-scale investments of the country. There are many purposes for implementing a single SWF in the Code of TWF.⁴³ However, the Code and its rationale do not explain how TWF can achieve these purposes.⁴⁴ According to Kavcıoğlu, the TWF can carry out all its mandates if it is managed appropriately.⁴⁵

³⁹ Global SWF, '2021 GSR Scoreboard'.

⁴⁰ SWF Institute, 'Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index | SWFI'.

⁴¹ Lu, Mulder, and Papaioanou, 'From Reserve Accumulation to Sovereign Wealth Fund: Policy and Microfinancial Considerations', 17.

⁴² Yalçınar and Sürekli, 'Ekonominin Çeşitlendirilmesinin Bir Aracı Olarak Ulusal Refah Fonu Modelinin Türkiye Ekonomisi Açısından Uygulanabilirliği'; Akbulak and Akbulak, 'Ulusal Varlık Fonları'; Hacıhasanoğlu and Soytaş, 'Yeniden Tasarlanan Finansal Mimaride Ulusal Varlık Fonlarının Rolü'.

⁴³ Alagöz and Ceylan, *Türkiye Varlık Fonu (Dünya Örnekleriyle Karşılaştırma)*, 199.

⁴⁴ Kayıran, 'Türkiye Varlık Fonu'nun Kuruluş Amaçları ve Yapısı Üzerine Bir İnceleme', 74.

⁴⁵ Kavcıoğlu, 'Ulusal Varlık Fonları ve Türkiye', 107.

In addition to the Code, the purposes of the establishment of the TWF are also counted in the rationale of the Code. One of the reasons, which was stated in the rationale, for the establishment of the TWF is that Türkiye was the only country which did not have any SWF in the G-20 countries. However, this argument was incorrect because Germany did not have an SWF at that time. In 2017, Germany established KENFO to finance the safe storage of nuclear waste.⁴⁶

Other reasons stated in the rationale are being a stabilizer in financial turmoil, expanding the use of Islamic financial assets, providing additional employment to the Turkish economy, making investments in fossil fuels to sustain supply security, and, interestingly, contributing to the political power of Türkiye in international relations. In particular, the last one is the most contestable. Recipient countries of SWFs are mostly worried about investments coming from SWFs due to possible political aims. They generally suspect that the home countries of SWFs may intend to gain political power over themselves.⁴⁷ Therefore, the Santiago Principles state that SWFs should transact only for economic purposes. Naturally, recipient countries sometimes hinder SWF investments, particularly in strategic sectors. For example, in 2006, the Dubai Ports World Company, a state-owned company in the United Arab Emirates, wanted to take over six ports in the USA. Despite the approval by the executive branch of the USA, foreign ownership of US ports was heavily criticized in public opinion and blocked by the relative branch of the US Congress. Similar incidents have occurred not only in the USA but also in other parts of the world.⁴⁸ Therefore, declaring the political aim of the SWF in the official rationale of the SWF Code is not the most sensible thing to do. However, there are few opinions supporting this aim in the Turkish literature.⁴⁹ One of them accentuated TWF's diplomatic aim in the title of the article.⁵⁰ Another stated that TWF should be wielded to gain political power against Türkiye's opponent countries and countries from which Türkiye imports.⁵¹

In the Turkish literature, one of the aims of TWF has been emphasized repeatedly. The aim is to finance large public projects without increasing the burden

⁴⁶ KENFO, 'German Nuclear Waste Management Fund - KENFO'.

⁴⁷ Allen and Caruana, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda', 15; Kern, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: New Economic Realities and Political Responses', 32.

⁴⁸ Alhashel, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Literature Review', 3, 4; Truman, *Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation*, 2.

⁴⁹ Karagöl and Koç, 'Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Varlık Fonu', 7; Yalçınar and Sürekli, 'Ekonominin Çeşitlendirilmesinin Bir Aracı Olarak Ulusal Refah Fonu Modelinin Türkiye Ekonomisi Açısından Uygulanabilirliği', 16.

⁵⁰ Yamak and Saygın, 'Türkiye'nin Ekonomik Güç Potansiyeli: Bir "Ekonomi Diplomasisi" Enstrümanı Olarak Türkiye Varlık Fonu Uygulaması', 88.

⁵¹ Doruk, 'Yeni Finans Savaşları Bağlamında Varlık Fonlarının Yatırım Stratejisi ve Türkiye Varlık Fonu'nun Potansiyelinin Değerlendirilmesi', 149.

on the public sector.⁵² However, it must be stated that the TWF's burden is also a public burden. As it is possible, all public expenditures must be made through the budget process to grant the power of the purse of the Turkish Parliament. It was also stated that it could be aimed at hiding the borrowing rate of the Turkish public sector with TWF. Because TWF borrowing is not counted as public borrowing due to international public accounting standards.⁵³ There are various arguments in the Turkish literature regarding the purpose of the TWF. Karacaova stated that TWF was a new law technology and a new method of privatization.⁵⁴ According to Uysal Şahin, the main purpose of the TWF is to find borrowing from outside the country.⁵⁵ Reuters reported that the TWF was established to plug the gap in Türkiye's balance of payments.⁵⁶

The TWF was established to contribute to the growth of Türkiye and stabilize its financial market. Scientific evidence corroborates SWFs' contributions to the development and stabilization of the home country. However, it is up to the management of TWF whether it can contribute to Türkiye in terms of stabilizing and growth aspects. It must be managed according to corporate governance principles and, as far as possible, corruption to benefit the Turkish economy.⁵⁷ It was said that, however, TWF's main establishment aim was to be a new tool for the government intended to wield for distributing public resources among supporters of the incumbent.⁵⁸

2.2. Structure and Management of TWF

The TWF was established as a two-layer formal structure. There is a fund that has all the assets transferred to the TWF. In addition, there is a public corporation that is subject to private law but is exempt from many related responsibilities. Because of its exemption from responsibilities, which other private and public institutions are subject to, the TWF public corporation is called the most preferential corporation in Türkiye.⁵⁹ This corporation is formally responsible for fund management and is managed by the Board of Directors and the general manager. Article 2 of the Code

⁵² Karagöl and Koç, 'Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Varlık Fonu', 20; Üstün, 'Ulusal Varlık Fonları ve Türkiye Varlık Fonu', 12.

⁵³ Dedeoğlu, 'Kamu Mali Yönetiminde Neler Oluyor? Varlık Fonu ve Tamalayıcı Ödenek', 4; Alagöz and Ceylan, *Türkiye Varlık Fonu (Dünya Örnekleriyle Karşılaştırma)*, 219.

⁵⁴ Karacaova, 'Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Yeni Hukuki Teknolojisi: Usule Bağlı Olmayan Bir Özelleştirme Yöntemi Olarak Türkiye Varlık Fonu', 20, 21.

⁵⁵ Uysal Şahin, 'Kamu Maliyesi-Varlık Fonu İlişkisi Türkiye İçin Fırsat Mı Tehdit Mi?', 367.

⁵⁶ Reuters, 'A New Breed of Sovereign Wealth Fund - without the Wealth | Reuters'.

⁵⁷ Albayrak and Akyol, 'Ulusal Varlık Fonları ve Ekonomik Büyüme Arasındaki İlişki: Panel GMM Analizi', 377, 378; Yaman and Yereci, 'Ulusal Varlık Fonlarının Politik Boyutu', 269.

⁵⁸ Acabay, 'The Political Economy of Turkey Wealth Fund', 57.

⁵⁹ TBMM, 'Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu Raporu', 27.

authorizes the President of Türkiye to appoint the Board of Directors and a general manager. Currently, the chairman of the board is the President of Türkiye, according to executive order no. 2018/162. There are five other members on the Board, one of whom is also the general manager. The main reason for this two-layer structure is to ensure that the TWF is not considered in public management. Owing to the private corporation owned by the state, the TWF is not considered in public accounting. In this way, the government can borrow without revealing it in public accounts.⁶⁰

The TWF is subject to private law provisions. It can compete with private investors. However, it has many exemptions from the rules that other investors are subject to, giving TWF an unfair advantage. It could even become a monopoly in any sector of the economy. There has also been an outcome in that direction in the telecommunications sector, with the TWF taking over the majority stakes of the two biggest corporations. When it comes to the unilateral transactions, made by TWF, should be subject to public law provisions.⁶¹

Article 4 of the Code authorizes the President of Türkiye to transfer several types of assets from public institutions to the TWF. After the establishment of the TWF, the biggest and most important state-owned enterprises, many real estate properties that had belonged to the State, and some borrowed money from other public institutions were transferred to the TWF with several executive orders. TWF also have the authority to borrow from outside or inside the country without any legal limitations. These authorizations are criticized because of the intrusion of the power of the purse of the Parliament.⁶² It was also stated that borrowing without legal limitations could unbalance the public debt management.⁶³ The Constitutional Court of Türkiye adjudicated that these authorizations were not inconsistent with the power of the purse of the Parliament.⁶⁴ In addition, the literature states that giving the power to manage such large assets to the executive branch could engender corruption. With this authorization, the TWF could be defined as a secret treasury belonging to the Presidency of Türkiye.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Uysal Şahin, 'Kamu Maliyesi-Varlık Fonu İlişkisi Türkiye İçin Fırsat Mı Tehdit Mi?', 367, 368.

⁶¹ Aktaş, '6741 Sayılı Kanun Kapsamında Türkiye Varlık Fonu Yönetimi AŞ ve Türkiye Varlık Fonu Hakkında Bir İnceleme', 56, 58.

⁶² TBMM, 'Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu Raporu', 25; Güzel, Acar, and Şekeroğlu, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Comparison of the Turkish Sovereign Wealth Fund with the World Samples', 172.

⁶³ Kayıran, 'Türkiye Varlık Fonu'nun Kuruluş Amaçları ve Yapısı Üzerine Bir İnceleme', 83.

⁶⁴ Anayasa Mahkemesi, E. 2016/180, K. 2018/4 at § 32.

⁶⁵ Karacaova, 'Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Yeni Hukuki Teknolojisi: Usule Bağlı Olmayan Bir Özelleştirme Yöntemi Olarak Türkiye Varlık Fonu', 24.

An example of corruption is the abuse of management authority over the SWF in Malaysia.⁶⁶ The TWF must be managed as far as possible from political influence to be beneficial for the future of the Turkish people. Otherwise, it could impoverish future generations, unlike other SWFs.⁶⁷ Some potential revenue sources for TWF have been suggested in the literature. One of them is the duty on Turkish citizens.⁶⁸ Levying a duty on citizens to provide capital to the SWF is inconsistent with the SWF concept. SWFs should add wealth to their citizens, not ask for wealth from them.

The asset allocations of TWF imply that it is not a classical SWF stemming from reserve surpluses. Instead, its assets mostly consist of state-owned enterprises, mostly from the financial sector.⁶⁹ With this asset structure, it resembles Temasek, one of Singapore's SWFs. Therefore, the definition of SWFs made by the TWF is different from the most accepted definitions. According to the TWF, SWFs are special-purpose investment funds that aim to manage diverse public assets with corporate governance principles and add value to public assets.⁷⁰ In Turkish literature, the TWF is generally accepted as a development fund.⁷¹ Another opinion states that TWF resembles stabilization funds because of its purposes.⁷² Besides, it is called a holding wealth fund because of its similarities with holding companies.⁷³

2.3. Audit and Scores of TWF

The TWF audit has a three-layer structure. One of these is the independent audit implemented according to capital market law. Second, the TWF is audited by three state audit staff appointed by the President of Türkiye. This group is supposed to send its report to the Presidential Office of Türkiye by the end of August every year.

The President of Türkiye is also the chairman of the Board of Directors of the TWF. The audit of an SWF should be independent of its management.⁷⁴ Appointing auditors is not suitable for the President of Türkiye unless he or she leaves the position at the TWF. Otherwise, this implementation opens up to misconduct in audits.⁷⁵ The

⁶⁶ Reuters, 'Exclusive: Former Malaysia Government Used Money Raised from Khazanah to Pay 1MDB Dues - Sources | Reuters'.

⁶⁷ Dönmez and Erek, 'An Evaluation With Regarding to Turkish Wealth Fund: Aims, Activities and Legal Status', 74; Kayıran, 'Türkiye Varlık Fonu'nun Kuruluş Amaçları ve Yapısı Üzerine Bir İnceleme', 85; Konukman and Şimşek, 'Ulusal Varlık Fonları', 1942.

⁶⁸ Yalçınar and Sürekli, 'Ekonominin Çeşitlendirilmesinin Bir Aracı Olarak Ulusal Refah Fonu Modelinin Türkiye Ekonomisi Açısından Uygulanabilirliği', 23, 24.

⁶⁹ TVF, 'TVF | Türkiye Varlık Fonu | Tvf.Com.Tr'.

⁷⁰ TVF, 'Faaliyet Raporu 2017', 3.

⁷¹ Konukman and Şimşek, 'Ulusal Varlık Fonları', 1941, 1942.

⁷² Alagöz and Ceylan, *Türkiye Varlık Fonu (Dünya Örnekleriyle Karşılaştırma)*, 221.

⁷³ Durdu, *Türkiye'de Bütçe Dışı Fon Uygulamaları ve Varlık Fonu*, 207.

⁷⁴ Truman, 'A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices', 442.

⁷⁵ Güzel, Acar, and Şekeroğlu, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Comparison of the Turkish Sovereign Wealth Fund with the World Samples', 172.

doctrine suggests that the authority to appoint auditors must be granted to the Parliament.⁷⁶ Lastly, the independent audit report, state staff audit report, and financial statements of the TWF are supposed to be sent to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye every year in September. The Turkish Parliament has no decisive authority over audit reports. Therefore, its audit authority only receives TWF reports.⁷⁷ The TWF is not subject to the audit of Sayıştay, the Supreme Audit Institution of Türkiye. This situation is criticized not only in parliamentary work but also in doctrine.⁷⁸

TWF has been scored on several scoreboards that assess SWFs' performance in various areas. One of them is the Truman Index, which scored SWF as 68 in 2019 when the average score was 66.⁷⁹ In 2021, Global SWF appraised TWF at 36 out of 100, which was a decrease of 12 points compared to 2020. They also recommended that TWF should have solid governance implementation to raise capital from outside Türkiye.⁸⁰ The Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index also evaluates TWF's transparency and scored it 6 out of 10. The SWF Institute, which implements the Index, recommends a score of at least 8 to be accepted as transparent.⁸¹

2.4. Activities of TWF

Because TWF did not have any activity in 2016, it began publishing annual reports in 2017. The total value of TWF assets was 219.343 million Turkish Lira (TL) (roughly 58 billion USD) at the end of 2017; 1.175.661 million TL (roughly 222 billion USD) at the end of 2018; 1.457.608 million TL (roughly 245 billion USD) at the end of 2019; 2.169.306 million TL (roughly 292 billion USD) at the end of 2020. The total TWF value has steadily increased since its inception. The main reason for this increase is the steady transfer of new assets to the TWF from other public institutions and borrowing.

In the 2017 annual report of the TWF, it was stated that the three-year strategic investment plan was sent for approval to the Prime Minister of Türkiye.⁸² However, this plan has not yet been published. From its establishment to the end of 2017, the TWF made a few transactions. For instance, it sold airplanes, transferred to it by executive order no. 2017/10443, to Turkish Airlines Technical Stock Company for 4,6

⁷⁶ Durdu, 'Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin Görüşü Çerçevesinde Türkiye Varlık Fonu'nun Hukukiliği', 3319.

⁷⁷ Kayıran, 'Türkiye Varlık Fonu'nun Kuruluş Amaçları ve Yapısı Üzerine Bir İnceleme', 77.

⁷⁸ TBMM, 'Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu Raporu', 12; Aktaş, '6741 Sayılı Kanun Kapsamında Türkiye Varlık Fonu Yönetimi AŞ ve Türkiye Varlık Fonu Hakkında Bir İnceleme', 64; Üstün, *Türkiye'de Vergi ve Bütçe Hakkı*, 355.

⁷⁹ Maire, Mazarei, and Truman, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds Are Growing More Slowly, and Governance Issues Remain', 5.

⁸⁰ Global SWF, '2021 GSR Scoreboard', 10, 17.

⁸¹ SWF Institute, 'Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index | SWFI'.

⁸² TVF, 'Faaliyet Raporu 2017', 4.

million USD plus VAT. In May 2017, it was accepted as a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSFW). The Board of Directors of TWF held 20 meetings in 2017.⁸³

In the 2018 annual report, it was stated that the TWF aimed to be fully pursuant to the Santiago Principles. To this end, the general manager of TWF and other managers convened with representatives of the IFSWF. In that meeting, the TWF assured the completion of the self-assessment work of the IFSWF by 2019. In addition, the TWF Board of Directors convened 18 times in 2018 to make 61 decisions and oversee the companies that it has.⁸⁴

In 2019, TWF engaged in important business activities. The first was amalgamating public insurance companies belonging to the TWF. By doing this, TWF had the biggest insurance company in Türkiye, Türkiye Sigorta (Türkiye Insurance). In addition, the TWF aimed to encourage the growth of the insurance sector in Türkiye through this amalgamation. The second was the investment in the Istanbul Financial Center, a project aiming to bring together the biggest Turkish financial corporations and the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye. TWF purchased roughly 1/3 of the project for 1.67 billion TLs (roughly 292 million USDs).⁸⁵ This purchase was criticized. The seller company was unable to complete this project. It was stated that TWF might act as rescuers of politically privileged companies.⁸⁶ The third is the beginning of a new investment in the petrochemical sector for 10 billion USD. The fourth is the privatization of public lottery services for ten years with the procurement of services. The deal was worth 28 billion TL (approximately 5 billion USD).⁸⁷ Lastly, TWF borrowed 1 billion euros for the first time. The interest rate of the borrowing was Euribor plus %2.5 yearly. There were other activities, such as establishing a new joint investment fund with the Russian SWF (Russian Direct Investment Fund) to back public banks' capital structures in 2019.⁸⁸

In 2020, TWF continued its business activities. It bought %26,2 of Turkcell shares, the biggest telecommunication company in Türkiye, for roughly USD 545 million.⁸⁹ Mining activities for several metals have commenced in Turkish soils. There are also plans to build a thermal reactor near the lignite mine in southeast Türkiye. In addition, there was a %10 share sale of BIST, the only stock exchange in Türkiye, to the Qatar Investment Authority, which is another SWF. In its 2020 annual report, TWF

⁸³ TVF, 29, 36.

⁸⁴ TVF, 'Faaliyet Raporu 2018', 5.

⁸⁵ Bloomberght, 'Varlık Fonu İstanbul Finans Merkezi'ne ortak oluyor'.

⁸⁶ Alagöz and Ceylan, *Türkiye Varlık Fonu (Dünya Örnekleriyle Karşılaştırma)*, 244.

⁸⁷ Gazete Duvar, 'Milli Piyango Demirören-Sisal'in'.

⁸⁸ TVF, '2019 Faaliyet Raporu'.

⁸⁹ Anadolu Ajansı, 'Turkcell Artık Türkiye Varlık Fonu Portföyünde'.

pointed out its adherence to sustainability. It stressed its intention to implement environmental, social, and governance (ESG) principles. To improve its institutional structure, TWF got a credit note from Fitch Ratings which is BB- and stable.⁹⁰

In 2021, TWF borrowed 1.250 million euros again with Euribor plus %2.25 yearly interest rates. It bought %55 shares of Türk Telekom, another big Turkish communication company, for 1.650 million USDs. The purchase transactions started in 2021 and were completed in March 2022. These purchases in the telecommunications sector are considered a contribution to Türkiye's technological development.⁹¹ In 2024, the TVF successfully issued Islamic borrowing instruments such as sukuk and other Sharia-compliant bonds worth 750 million USD and 100 million USD. Backing up public banks' capital structures and establishing joint 300 million USDs funds with the Abu Dhabi Developmental Holding Company (ADQ) to improve the Turkish technological ecosystem are other activities the TWF has undertaken.⁹²

CONCLUSION

SWFs have become one of the most important actors in international financial markets since the millennium, with their roughly 10 trillion USD asset size. They have engendered many controversies, mainly due to their state ownership. States have wielded SWFs for various purposes, particularly after the millennium, with Asian countries' involvement. Recipient countries of SWF investments have been concerned about the purposes of these investments. To subside those worries, IMF instigated an initiative with home countries of TWF from 2008 onwards, culminating in Santiago Principles and International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. As the world recognizes SWFs, many countries, including those without excessive reserves, have commenced establishing SWFs for their respective purposes. In countries that do not have sufficient reserves to establish an SWF, state enterprises and borrowing are used to structure the assets of the respective SWFs. The TWF is one of the SWFs established using state enterprises and borrowing.

Türkiye does not have sufficient official reserves. It has neither trade surpluses nor fossil fuels to use when establishing an SWF. Instead, it used its state enterprises to build TWF's asset structure. TWF's main objective of the TWF is to contribute to the development of Türkiye. In addition, there are many aims counted in the Code of TWF and its rationale, which range from stabilization to investment in strategic sectors of Türkiye. The attempt to implement many aims in an SWF is one of the criticized aspects of TWF. In addition, its establishment time, which was immediately after the

⁹⁰ TVF, '2019 Faaliyet Raporu'.

⁹¹ TVF, 'TVF | Türkiye Varlık Fonu | Tvf.Com.Tr'.

⁹² TVF.

coup attempt in 2016, management and audit system, and some of the activities it has done are other criticized aspects of TWF. In particular, the audit and management systems of TWF seem improper to benefit the Turkish economy. Currently, the management and audit of the TWF are under the control of the same place, the Presidency of Türkiye. The management of TWF should be granted to independent professionals appointed by the collaboration of the President and Parliament of Türkiye. The President, together with the Parliament, which should take the report from the Supreme Audit Institution of Türkiye (Sayıştay) about the TWF, should be responsible for the audit. Task distribution should be organized in the management of TWF according to corporate governance principles, which could maximize the benefits for Türkiye. By doing these things, TWF will be able to increase its scores on international scoreboards, which will benefit it immensely at the international level.

This study does not agree with all criticisms of TWF. Some allege that the TWF should be completely shut down. However, if managed properly, it can reasonably contribute to various aspects of the Turkish economy. For instance, the Turkish public pension system is heavily dependent on the general government budget. The TWF could be used as a tool to strengthen the public pension system. Moreover, there has been a significant economic gap between the upper and lower classes of Turkish people, which has worsened in recent years. TWF could pay dividends to the lower class of Turkish society from some parts of its profit every year, helping to correct economic injustice in society.

TWF should not use borrowing as a source to do what it needs to do. Although there are other SWFs that also use borrowing as a source, the TWF should not prefer this. The TWF must endeavor to improve the general situation of the Turkish economy. Borrowing is not a solution. In addition, borrowing must be elaborately overseen, which can only be done in the general budget process. The TWF may sell some of its assets, especially those that are less strategically important, and should use dividends that it receives from its enterprises to perform its tasks, but should not borrow.

In summary, TWF is not an unnecessary tool for the Turkish economy. However, it has certain deficiencies in achieving its objectives that can be addressed through targeted efforts. If these deficiencies are corrected, there may be numerous potential benefits for the Turkish economy, from the public pension system to the development of Türkiye to the income distribution of the Turkish people. The relations between TWF and the power of the purse of the Turkish Parliament, borrowing rate and limit of TWF, audit and management systems of TWF, and aims and roads to achieve those aims of TWF should be scrutinized further in the literature to understand TWF and to give advice it.

DISCLOSURE

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this study.

Funding Statement

This study did not receive any external funding.

Authorship and Level of Contribution

All stages and parts of the document were prepared by the author, Dr. Muhammet Durdu.

Authors' Bionote

Dr. Muhammet Durdu received his Ph.D. in 2023 from Selçuk University (Turkey), Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Public Law, Turkey. He currently works as an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law, Necmettin Erbakan University (Turkey).

BİBLİOGRAPHY

- Acabay, Sevde. 'The Political Economy of Turkey Wealth Fund: A Case Study Within the State-Business Relations in Turkey', 2019. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2652591101/abstract/67D846E8D2B14187PQ/1>.
- Ackah, Ishmael. 'No African Country Is Norway! A Perspective on Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Energy Transition'. *Energy Research & Social Science* 75 (2021): 1–8.
- Akbulak, Sevinç, and Yavuz Akbulak. 'Ulusal Varlık Fonları'. *Marmara Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi* 15 (2008): 237–362.
- Aktaş, Batuhan. '6741 Sayılı Kanun Kapsamında Türkiye Varlık Fonu Yönetimi AŞ ve Türkiye Varlık Fonu Hakkında Bir İnceleme'. *İstanbul Kemerburgaz Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 2 (2017): 41–70.
- Alagöz, Mehmet, and Onur Ceylan. *Türkiye Varlık Fonu (Dünya Örnekleriyle Karşılaştırma)*. Ankara: Gazi Kitabevi, 2020.
- Alami, Ilias, and Adam D Dixon. *The Spectre of State Capitalism*. Oxford University Press, 2024. <https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198925224.001.0001>.
- Albayrak, Tuğba, and Mehmet Akyol. 'Ulusal Varlık Fonları ve Ekonomik Büyüme Arasındaki İlişki: Panel GMM Analizi'. *The Journal of International Scientific Researches* 5 (2020): 368–70.
- Alhashel, Bader. 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Literature Review'. *Journal of Economics and Business* 78 (2015): 1–13.
- Allen, Mark, and Jaime Caruana. 'Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Work Agenda'. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 2008.

- Anadolu Ajansı. 'Turkcell Artık Türkiye Varlık Fonu Portföyünde'. Accessed 12 June 2025. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/isdunyasi/finans/turkcell-artik-turkiye-varlik-fonu-portfoyu/660268>.
- Anayasa Mahkemesi. E. 2016/180, K. 2018/4, No. E. 2016/180 K. 2018/4 (n.d.).
- Bahoo, Salman, Ilan Alon, and Andrea Paltrinieri. 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: Past, Present and Future'. *International Review of Financial Analysis* 67 (2020): 1-17.
- Baker, Colleen. 'Sovereign Wealth Funds'. In *Finance Ethics : Critical Issues in Theory and Practice*, edited by John R. Boatright, 253-73. New Jersey: USA: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2010.
- Beck, Roland, and Michael Fidora. 'The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets'. *Intereconomics* November/December (2008): 349-58.
- Bernstein, Shai, Josh Lerner, and Antoinette Schoar. 'The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds'. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 27 (2013): 219-38.
- Bloomberght. 'Varlık Fonu İstanbul Finans Merkezi'ne ortak oluyor'. Bloomberght. Accessed 12 June 2025. <https://www.bloomberght.com/varlik-fonu-istanbul-finans-merkezi-ne-ortak-oluyor-2233737>.
- Bossu, Wouter, Obianuju Ezejiofor, Thomas Laryea, and Yan Liu. 'Legal Underpinnings of Capital Account Liberalization for Sovereign Wealth Funds'. In *Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Issues for Policymakers*, edited by Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei, and Han van der Hoorn, 75-85. Washington: USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010.
- Bremmer, Ian. 'State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?' *Foreign Affairs* 88 (2009): 40-56.
- Clark, Gordon L., Adam D. Dixon, and Ashby H.B. Monk. *Sovereign Wealth Funds: Legitimacy, Governance, and Global Power*. New Jersey: USA: Princeton University Press, 2013.
- Das, Dilip K. 'Sovereign-Wealth Funds: The Institutional Dimension'. *Int Rev Econ* 56 (2009): 85-104.
- Das, Udaibir S., Adnan Mazarei, and Hoorn Han Van Der. *Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds Issues for Policymakers*. Washington: USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010.
- Das, Udaibir S., Adnan Mazarei, and Alison Stuart. 'Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Santiago Principles'. In *Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Issues for Policymakers*, edited by Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei, and Han van der Hoorn, 57-75. Washington: USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010.
- Dedekoca, Ersin. 'Devlet Yoluyla Kapitalizm'. 21. *Yüzyılda Sosyal Bilimler*, 2012, 73-89.
- Dedeoğlu, Emin. 'Kamu Mali Yönetiminde Neler Oluyor? Varlık Fonu ve Tamalayıcı Ödenek'. TEPAV Değerlendirme Notu, 2016.

- Dönmez, Gökhan, and Mustafa Selim Erek. 'An Evaluation with Regarding to Turkish Wealth Fund: Aims, Activities and Legal Status'. *Bitlis Eren University Journal of Academic Projection* 3 (2018): 58-77.
- Doruk, Ömer Tuğsal. 'Yeni Finans Savaşları Bağlamında Varlık Fonlarının Yatırım Stratejisi ve Türkiye Varlık Fonu'nun Potansiyelinin Değerlendirilmesi'. *Sayıştay Dergisi* 33 (2020): 133-52.
- Durdu, Muhammet. 'Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin Görüşü Çerçevesinde Türkiye Varlık Fonu'nun Hukukiliği'. *Legal Mali Hukuk Dergisi* 14 (2018): 3289-3322.
- — —. *Türkiye'de Bütçe Dışı Fon Uygulamaları ve Varlık Fonu*. Ankara: Adalet, 2018.
- Gazete Duvar. 'Milli Piyango Demirören'. Text. <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/ekonomi/2019/08/09/milli-piyango-demiroren-sisalin>. Gazete Duvar, 9 August 2019. <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/ekonomi/2019/08/09/milli-piyango-demiroren-sisalin>.
- Global SWF. '2021 GSR Scoreboard.' Global SWF, 2021.
- Güzel, Fatih, Melek Acar, and Gamze Şekeroğlu. 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Comparison of the Turkish Sovereign Wealth Fund with World Samples'. *Periodicals of Engineering and Natural Sciences* 5 (2017): 165-75.
- Hacıhasanoğlu, Erk, and Uğur Soytaş. 'Yeniden Tasarlanan Finansal Mimaride Ulusal Varlık Fonlarının Rolü'. *Sosyal Bilimler* 8 (2010): 97-114.
- IFSWF. 'Annual Review 2020'. IFSWF, 2021.
- — —. 'The Origin of Santiago Principles: Experience from the Past; Guidance for the Future'. International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2018.
- Karacaova, Ezgi Nur Türkoğlu. 'Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Yeni Hukuki Teknolojisi: Usule Bağlı Olmayan Bir Özelleştirme Yöntemi Olarak Türkiye Varlık Fonu'. *ViraVerita E-Dergi: Disiplinlerarası Karşılaşmalar*, 2019, 1-29.
- Karagöl, Erdal Tanas, and Yusuf Emre Koç. 'Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Varlık Fonu'. İstanbul: SETA, 2016.
- Kavcıoğlu, Şahap. 'Ulusal Varlık Fonları ve Türkiye'. *Finansal Araştırmalar ve Çalışmalar Dergisi* 10 (2018): 87-109.
- Kayran, Meltem. 'Türkiye Varlık Fonu'nun Kuruluş Amaçları ve Yapısı Üzerine Bir İnceleme'. *Eğitim Bilim Toplum Dergisi* 14 (2016): 55-90.
- KENFO. 'German Nuclear Waste Management Fund - KENFO.' Accessed 12 June 2025. <https://www.kenfo.de/en/start>.
- Kern, Steffen. 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: New Economic Realities and Political Responses'. In *Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Issues for Policymakers*, edited by Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei, and Han van der Hoorn, 25-43. Washington: USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010.

- Kern, Stephen. 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: State Investments on the Rise'. Deutsche Bank Research, 2007.
- Klitzing, Espen, Diaan-Yi Lin, Susan Lund, and Laurent Nordin. 'Demystifying Sovereign Wealth Funds'. In *Economics of Sovereign Funds Issues for Policymakers*, edited by Han van der Hoorn Udaibir S. Das Adnan Mazarei, 3–15. Washington: USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010.
- Konukman, Aziz, and Orhan Şimşek. 'Ulusal Varlık Fonları'. *Çalışma ve Toplum*, 2017, 1913–44.
- Kunzel, Peter, Yinqiu Lan, Iva Petrova, and Jukka Pihlman. 'Investment Objectives of Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Shifting Paradigm'. In *Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Issues for Policymakers*, edited by Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei, and Han Van Der Hoorn, 137–51. Washington: USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010.
- Lu, Yinqiu, Christian Mulder, and Michael Papaioanou. 'From Reserve Accumulation to Sovereign Wealth Fund: Policy and Microfinancial Considerations'. In *Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Issues for Policymakers*, edited by Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei, and Han Van Der Hoorn, 15–25. Washington: USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010.
- Maire, Julien, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman. 'Sovereign Wealth Funds Are Growing More Slowly, and Governance Issues Remain'. Washington: USA: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2021.
- OECD. 'Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security'. OECD Legal Instruments, 2022.
- Ouni, Zeineb, Prosper Bernard, and Michel Plaisent. 'Sovereign Wealth Funds Definition: Challenges and Concerns'. *Advances in Economics and Business* 8 (2020): 362–76.
- Reuters. 'A New Breed of Sovereign Wealth Fund - without the Wealth | Reuters'. Accessed 12 June 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/article/business/a-new-breed-of-sovereign-wealth-fund-without-the-wealth-idUSKBN16O20J/>.
- — —. 'Exclusive: Former Malaysia Government Used Money Raised from Khazanah to Pay 1MDB Dues - Sources | Reuters'. Accessed 12 June 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-former-malaysia-government-used-money-raised-from-khazanah-to-pay-1md-idUSKCN1IP0GK/>.
- Ricz, Judit. 'The Anatomy of the Newly Emerging Illiberal Model of State Capitalism: A Developmental Dead End?' *International Journal of Public Administration* 44, no. 14 (2021): 1253–63. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2021.1874984>.
- Rozanov, Andrew. 'Long-Term Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Sovereign Wealth Funds'. In *Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds Issues for*

- Policymakers*, edited by Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei, and Han van der Hoorn, 245–59. Washington: USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010.
- Shields, Jon, and Mauricio Villafuerte. ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Economic Policy at Home’. In *Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Issues for Policymakers*, edited by Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei, and Han van der Hoorn, 43–57. Washington: USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010.
- Sun, Toa, and Heiko Hesse. ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Financial Stability: An Event Study Analysis’. In *Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Issues for Policymakers*, edited by Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei, and Han van der Hoorn, 173–87. Washington: USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010.
- SWF Institute. ‘Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index | SWFI’. Accessed 12 June 2025. <https://www.swfinstitute.org/research/linaburg-maduell-transparency-index>.
- — —. ‘Top 100 Largest Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings by Total Assets’, 12 January 2025. <https://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/sovereign-wealth-fund>.
- TBMM. ‘Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu Raporu’. TBMM, 2016.
- Truman, Edwin M. ‘A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices’. *Revue d’économie Financière (English Ed)* Special Issue (2009): 429–51.
- — —. *Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation*. Washington: USA: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010.
- TVF. ‘2019 Faaliyet Raporu’, 2020.
- — —. ‘Faaliyet Raporu 2017’. TÜRKİYE VARLIK FONU YÖNETİMİ AŞ, 2018.
- — —. ‘Faaliyet Raporu 2018’. TÜRKİYE VARLIK FONU YÖNETİMİ AŞ, 2019.
- — —. ‘TVF | Türkiye Varlık Fonu | Tvf.Com.Tr’. Accessed 12 June 2025. <https://www.tvf.com.tr/>.
- Üstün, Nazlı. ‘Ulusal Varlık Fonları ve Türkiye Varlık Fonu’. Konya: KTO Araştırma Raporu, 2017.
- Üstün, Ümit Süleyman. *Türkiye’de Vergi ve Bütçe Hakkı*. Ankara: Nobel Yayıncılık, 2019.
- Uysal Şahin, Özge. ‘Kamu Maliyesi-Varlık Fonu İlişkisi Türkiye İçin Fırsat Mı Tehdit Mi?’ *Journal of Awareness* 2 (2017): 349–80.
- Wang, Di, Robert J. Weiner, Quan Li, and Srividya Jandhyala. ‘Leviathan as Foreign Investor: Geopolitics and Sovereign Wealth Funds’. *Journal of International Business Studies* 52 (2021): 1238–55.
- Wijnholds, J. Onno de Beaufort, and Lars Søndergaard. ‘Reserve Accumulation: Objective or By-Product’. Frankfurt: GERMANY: European Central Bank, 2007.
- Yalçın, Kürşat, and Ali Murat Sürekli. ‘Ekonominin Çeşitlendirilmesinin Bir Aracı Olarak Ulusal Refah Fonu Modelinin Türkiye Ekonomisi Açısından

Uygulanabilirliği'. *Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi* 17 (2015): 1-29.

Yamak, Tahsin, and Emre Saygın. 'Türkiye'nin Ekonomik Güç Potansiyeli: Bir "Ekonomi Diplomasisi" Enstrümanı Olarak Türkiye Varlık Fonu Uygulaması'. *Fiscaoeconomia* 3 (2019): 88-114.

Yaman, İlker, and Ahmet Burçin Yereli. 'Ulusal Varlık Fonlarının Politik Boyutu'. *Sosyoekonomi* 27 (2019): 263-83.

Yi-chong, Xu. 'The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds'. In *The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds*, edited by Xu Yi-chong and Gawdat Bahgat, 1-26, 2010.



© 2025 by the authors. Published as an open-access publication under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>).