

## CORRUPTION IN MOROCCO-A SECTORIAL ANALYSIS

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**Abstract:** Corruption, a pervasive socio-economic problem, has a significant impact on Morocco, reflecting a global challenge that undermines trust in public institutions and hinders development. This phenomenon, often defined as the abuse of public power for private gain, results in widespread citizen distrust of their government and public institutions. Recognizing the critical need to address this issue, Morocco has implemented various strategies and reforms at the institutional and civil society levels to combat corruption. Our study aims to provide a sectorial analysis of corruption in Morocco, assessing the prevalence of corrupt practices and the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures put in place. Using a descriptive methodology, our research relies on secondary data from various databases, including Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 2004 to 2023. This index provides a longitudinal perspective on how perceptions of corruption have evolved in Morocco over the years and serves as a key indicator of the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. Our findings indicate that despite these efforts, corruption remains entrenched in several sectors, suggesting that the strategies adopted have not yet succeeded in significantly changing the corruption landscape. This analysis underscores the complexity of fighting corruption in Morocco and highlights the need for continued efforts and innovative strategies to effectively address this endemic problem.

**Keywords:** *Anti-corruption strategies; Corruption in Morocco; Corruption Perceptions Index; Policy evaluation; Sectorial analysis*

**Abstract:** Korupsi, merupakan masalah sosio-ekonomi yang merajalela dan memiliki dampak yang signifikan di Maroko. Korupsi merefleksikan tantangan global dan meruntuhkan kepercayaan terhadap lembaga-lembaga publik dan menghambat pembangunan. Fenomena ini, yang sering didefinisikan sebagai penyalahgunaan kekuasaan publik untuk keuntungan pribadi, mengakibatkan ketidakpercayaan warga negara terhadap pemerintah dan lembaga-lembaga publik. Menyadari adanya masalah ini, Maroko telah menerapkan berbagai strategi dan reformasi di tingkat kelembagaan dan masyarakat sipil untuk memerangi korupsi. Penelitian kami bertujuan untuk memberikan analisis sektoral tentang korupsi di Maroko, menilai prevalensi praktik korupsi dan efektivitas langkah-langkah antikorupsi yang telah diterapkan. Dengan menggunakan metodologi deskriptif, penelitian kami mengandalkan data sekunder dari berbagai basis data, termasuk Indeks Persepsi Korupsi (IPK) dari Transparency International dari tahun 2004 hingga 2023. Indeks ini memberikan perspektif longitudinal tentang bagaimana persepsi korupsi telah berkembang di Maroko selama bertahun-tahun dan berfungsi sebagai indikator utama efektivitas upaya antikorupsi. Temuan kami menunjukkan bahwa terlepas dari upaya-upaya tersebut, korupsi masih bercokol di beberapa sektor, yang menunjukkan bahwa strategi yang diadopsi belum berhasil mengubah lanskap korupsi secara signifikan. Penelitian ini menegaskan kerumitan dalam memerangi korupsi di Maroko dan menekankan perlunya upaya yang berkelanjutan dan strategi inovatif untuk mengatasi masalah endemik ini secara efektif.

**Kata kunci:** *Analisis sektoral; Evaluasi kebijakan; Indeks Persepsi Korupsi; Korupsi di Maroko; Strategi anti-korupsi*

## INTRODUCTION

Morocco's economic challenges are influenced by a complex interplay of factors such as mismanagement, corruption, lack of resources, and rapid urbanization. The nation faces issues such as a lack of financing sources, risk in implementing small projects, social-economic problems, lack of transparency, and lobbyism<sup>1</sup>. Additionally, Morocco is prone to long-lasting economic challenges due to mismanagement, corruption, and lack of resources<sup>2</sup>.

For this reason, several action plans and reforms have been implemented by successive governments since independence until today. Indeed, like all developing countries, Morocco has worked tirelessly to ensure strong and sustainable economic growth<sup>3</sup>. The overriding aim of this strategy was to resolve all the problems that were mortgaging the country's future. It was therefore imperative to implement comprehensive strategies and plans to achieve a secure economic leap forward. To achieve this, goodwill was the order of the day. From the Moroccanization of companies to the opening of major construction sites, the country showed good faith in achieving sustainable economic growth. Unfortunately, massive corruption was omnipresent<sup>4</sup>.

Corruption is one of the main factors eroding the country's economic development. This scourge, deeply rooted in Moroccan culture, gained further ground after independence. Moreover, the lack of accountability and transparency in public administration and services was also on the agenda, fortifying corrupt behavior<sup>5</sup>.

Corruption is a constant feature of Moroccan society. It is generated by other phenomena that exist in force in the country: such as illiteracy, poverty, unemployment and lack of access to information<sup>6</sup>. This critical situation was at the root of the unrest in Morocco following the demands of the Arab Spring<sup>7</sup>. The government's response was to reform governance and fight corruption<sup>8</sup>. The 2011 constitution clearly demonstrated the country's determination to eradicate corruption and establish the

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<sup>1</sup> Agnė Šimelytė, 'Promotion of Renewable Energy in Morocco', in *Energy Transformation Towards Sustainability* (Elsevier, 2020), 249–87, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-817688-7.00013-6>.

<sup>2</sup> Osama F. Al Kurdi, 'A Critical Comparative Review of Emergency and Disaster Management in the Arab World', *Journal of Business and Socio-Economic Development* 1, no. 1 (17 June 2021): 24–46, <https://doi.org/10.1108/JBSED-02-2021-0021>.

<sup>3</sup> Martine Gozlan and David A Andelman, 'Morocco: In the Kingdom of Illusions', *World Policy Journal* 28, no. 3 (2011): 101–12; Daniel Paracka, 'The Year of Morocco: An Introduction', *Journal of Global Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective* 14, no. 2 (2019): 2; Delphine Perrin, 'Country Report: Morocco', 2011.

<sup>4</sup> Taoufik Ait Bouchgour, 'La Marocanisation Des Banques Au Maroc: Esquisse d'une Histoire Économique Du Temps Présent', 2022.

<sup>5</sup> Guilain P Denoeux, 'Corruption in Morocco: Old Forces, New Dynamics and a Way Forward', *Middle East Policy* 14, no. 4 (2007): 134.

<sup>6</sup> Sanjeev Gupta, 'Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?', *IMF Working Papers* 1998, no. 076 (May 1998): 1, <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451849844.001>.

<sup>7</sup> Annabelle Houdret and Astrid Harnisch, 'Decentralisation in Morocco: A Solution to the "Arab Spring"?', *The Journal of North African Studies* 24, no. 6 (2 November 2019): 935–60, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2018.1457958>.

<sup>8</sup> Marcus Bauer, 'Public Anticorruption in Morocco and Tunisia: A Comparative Study', 2019.

foundations of good governance<sup>9</sup>. In fact, sustainable economic development cannot be achieved without good governance, which in turn cannot be achieved without the eradication of corruption. Our objective in this article is to analyze the phenomenon of corruption in Morocco within each sector, using available secondary data, and evaluate the efforts made to combat this phenomenon.

Early theoretical research emphasised the favourable contribution of corruption by describing it as "beneficial fat". Examples include Leff<sup>10</sup>, Huntington<sup>11</sup>, Acemoglu and Verdier 1998<sup>12</sup>. Corruption, by virtue of its omnipresence, acts as a lubricant for economic growth, since it facilitates the circumvention of bureaucratic obstacles that could hinder investment. The arguments of these functionalist theories do not seem to be well-founded, and this has led to the emergence of other theories.

Founded by James Buchanan in the first half of the twentieth century, Public Choice theory was a response to the failure of market theory<sup>13</sup>. It emerged in the wake of the Great Depression of the 1930s, and is intended to be a vital tool for dealing with the market failure that persists to this day. This theory constitutes an "economic analysis of politics"<sup>14</sup>. For this reason, it is defended in the name of government regulation of the market. Indeed, this analysis adheres to the methodology of general economics<sup>15</sup>. It also highlights the involvement of politicians and their constituents in decision-making. It aims to explain the behaviour of political entities, notably politicians, civil servants and voters, at the level of the political market. Under the pretext of protecting the public interest, politicians aim to control and above all protect their own interests. Functionalist theories have overlooked the fact that individuals can choose not to become involved in corruption<sup>16</sup>. They have also neglected the impact of this choice on economic growth<sup>17</sup>. Given the shortcomings of these theories and the oscillation between the positive and negative effects of corruption, the literature has seen the expansion of microeconomic theories.

This so-called principal-agent theory Klitgaard 1988<sup>18</sup> is the result of two important factors, namely the divergence of interests between the "principal" (the superior) and the "agent" (the subordinate) and the asymmetry of information between

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<sup>9</sup> Mohamed Madani, Driss Maghraoui, and Saloua Zerhouni, *The 2011 Moroccan Constitution: A Critical Analysis* (International IDEA Stockholm, 2012).

<sup>10</sup> Nathaniel H Leff and Arnold I Heidenheimer, 'Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption 1', in *Political Corruption* (Routledge, 2017), 307–20.

<sup>11</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale university press, 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Daron Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier, 'Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach', *The Economic Journal* 108, no. 450 (1998): 1381–1403.

<sup>13</sup> James M Buchanan and Robert D Tollison, *The Theory of Public Choice--II* (University of Michigan Press, 1984).

<sup>14</sup> Buchanan and Tollison.

<sup>15</sup> Buchanan and Tollison.

<sup>16</sup> Fran Osrecki, 'Fighting Corruption with Transparent Organizations: Anti-Corruption and Functional Deviance in Organizational Behavior.', *Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization* 15, no. 2 (2015).

<sup>17</sup> Osrecki.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Klitgaard, *Controlling Corruption* (Univ of California Press, 1991).

the two protagonists. Indeed, the lack of monitoring and control leaves the door wide open to corruption<sup>19</sup>. In other words, civil servants benefit from the delegation relationship, which they use to maximise their personal interests through discretionary abuse of power. This agency theory offers an explanatory framework for corruption and its effect on economic growth.

The theory of rent-seeking is an essential branch of the public-choice theory of the Virgine school. This theory focuses on the analysis of rent-seeking<sup>20</sup>. It highlights the tendency of companies to prefer to influence decision-makers in their investments. In other words, entrepreneurs offer 'bribes' to politicians in return for more profitable advantages, such as a licence or the award of a public contract. The theory of "rent-seeking" has taken as its subject of study the relationship between politicians in decision-making positions and entrepreneurs eager to make a profit far from any competition or control.

Thirdly, the Becker crime theory<sup>21</sup> is based on the analysis of corruption according to the economic model of criminal behaviour, which is also based on the correlation between the costs and benefits of the act of corruption. In particular, the cost of the benefits must be carefully calculated in relation to the potential penalties incurred. The former must take precedence over the latter. To combat corruption, the theory of crime requires salaries to be revalued and penalties to be increased.

Around the 1960s, neo-institutionalism by Bakker and Schulte<sup>22</sup> emerged as an analytical and explanatory trend in economic theory. This new concept was developed to compensate for the lack of an institutional framework in neo-classical economics. Henceforth, such a theory attempts to analyse the economic and extra-economic aspects of corrupt behaviour. With this in mind, we have argued that institutions determine all formal and informal economic, political and social rules. Thus, neo-institutionalism advocates the integration of institutions in order to better analyse corruption. Such an analysis provides opportunity to develop effective tools for combating this phenomenon.

It is clear that the proliferation of economic theories has been accompanied by empirical studies designed to test earlier hypotheses. Indeed, the 90s saw numerous econometric studies on corruption. The demonstrations and findings of these studies highlighted the negative impact of corruption on economic growth<sup>23</sup>, particularly in

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<sup>19</sup> Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption: A Study in Political Economy* (Academic press, 2013).

<sup>20</sup> Robert D Tollison, 'The Rent-Seeking Insight', in *Public Choice Essays in Honor of a Maverick Scholar: Gordon Tullock* (Springer, 2000), 13–28.

<sup>21</sup> Gary S Becker, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach', *Journal of Political Economy* 76, no. 2 (1968): 169–217.

<sup>22</sup> Kempe Ronald Hope Sr, 'The Corruption Problem in Swaziland: Consequences and Some Aspects of Policy to Combat It', *Journal of Developing Societies* 32, no. 2 (2016): 130–58.

<sup>23</sup> Shang-Jin Wei, 'How Taxing Is Corruption on International Investors?', *Review of Economics and Statistics* 82, no. 1 (2000): 1–11.

developing countries. If development programmes are to be effective, tackling corruption and establishing good governance must therefore be a priority. However, there is no denying that some empirical studies have demonstrated the positive effect of corruption on economic growth<sup>24</sup>.

To achieve this goal, we have chosen a descriptive methodology to analyze the graphs from national and international corruption databases. Our study will primarily focus on global corruption indicators. Analyzing corruption by sector makes sense in our context, as Morocco has a strong sectoral culture and corruption manifests differently in each sector. To gain a comprehensive understanding of corruption in Morocco, we will analyze the country's efforts to combat corruption and the results of those efforts. This approach will allow us to provide a complete quantitative and qualitative portrait of corruption in Morocco.

## DISCUSSION

### 1.1 Numerical Analysis of Corruption and Growth in Morocco: Global Indicators

In Morocco, corruption was once a taboo subject, but it has now become a topic of national debate. There has been extensive research on the extent of corruption and its impact on governance and economic growth. National surveys and international polls have provided ample data to expose the phenomenon of corruption in Morocco. Examples of anti-corruption efforts in Morocco include the Moroccan Integrity Surveys<sup>25</sup> and the work of organizations such as the Open Budget Initiative and Africans Education Watch<sup>26</sup>.

In 1996, the World Bank Group's (WBG's) presented a strategy for governance and the fight against corruption<sup>27</sup>. The main focus was on reducing poverty and promoting growth. According to the WB, good governance and the control of corruption are corollaries to development<sup>28</sup>. It is in this perspective that corruption, in all its dimensions and facets, must be meticulously measured and translated into figures.

Therefore, corruption in all its forms must be accurately measured and quantified. To combat corruption and establish a foundation for good governance, numerous national and international surveys have been conducted in Morocco. Global

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<sup>24</sup> Leila Ali Aga and Patrick Villieu, 'Évasion Fiscale et Croissance: Un Cadre Théorique Simple', *Revue Française d'économie* 31, no. 2 (2016): 27-57.

<sup>25</sup> Transparency International, 'National Integrity System Study Overview Morocco 2009', Survey (Transparency International, 7 April 2020), [Transparency.org, https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/national-integrity-system-study-overview-morocco-2009](https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/national-integrity-system-study-overview-morocco-2009).

<sup>26</sup> Hady Fink and Karen Hussmann, 'Addressing Corruption through Sector Approaches: Exploring Lessons from the Moroccan Anticorruption Strategy for the Health Sector', *U4 Practice Insight*, 2013.

<sup>27</sup> Mariangeles Sabella, 'Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption: One-Year Progress Report', 2008.

<sup>28</sup> Sabella.

indicators have been used to provide quantifiable results for an accurate analysis of the current state of affairs. What are these results?

**1.1.1 Corruption Perception Index (CPI)**

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is calculated by weighting the results of various surveys of experts and business people. These surveys measure the perception of corruption in areas such as the acceptance of bribes by public officials, the obligation of companies to pay bribes to obtain public contracts, and the likelihood of judges making decisions influenced by bribes. The countries with the highest scores are considered to be the least corrupt, while those with the lowest scores are considered to be the most corrupt. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a crucial tool for governments, businesses, and citizens to measure corruption trends worldwide and compare countries<sup>29</sup>.




Figure 1. Evolution of the corruption perception index score: 1999-2016<sup>30</sup>




Figure 2. Morocco's ranking: 1999-2018<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Transparency.org., '2023 Corruption Perceptions Index: Explore the Results.' (Transparency International, 30 January 2024), <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023>.

<sup>30</sup> Transparency.org.

<sup>31</sup> Transparency.org.



An analysis of [Figure 1](#) and [Figure 2](#) shows that corruption perception scores remained stagnant from 1999 to 2018. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score was 4.1 out of 10 in 1999 and only marginally increased to 4.3 out of 100 in 2018<sup>32</sup>.

In 1999, LCC in Morocco made a definitive commitment to combat corruption, which marked a pivotal moment of significant importance. The state demonstrated this commitment through numerous initiatives, advocating for support for ethics in the public sector. Additionally, the PAS and GFCF strategies have had a positive influence on the Moroccan economy<sup>33</sup>. The introduction of VAT, corporation tax, and general income tax has also had a favorable effect on economic growth. In addition, the improvement of non-agricultural activities and industry have also contributed to this rise. In 2000, these measures resulted in a rise in the corruption perception score to 4.7 out of 10. As a result, Morocco climbed 9 places to 37th in the world rankings<sup>34</sup>.

In 2002, despite the enactment of Law 03/01<sup>35</sup> on the obligation to give reasons for administrative decisions, and despite the 162 recommendations of the "Moroccan administration faced with the challenges of water 2010"<sup>36</sup> symposium held on May 7 and 8, 2002, Morocco lost 15 places in the IPC world ranking. It fell to 52<sup>ème</sup> with just 3.7 points. This can be explained by the absence of any new effective measures in terms of the CLC<sup>37</sup>, other than those of a theoretical nature emphasizing, among other things, the call for the moralization of public life and the modernization of the administration.

In 2003, the situation worsened with the loss of 18 places, and Morocco plummeted to 70<sup>ème</sup> with 3.3<sup>38</sup>. Thereafter, the situation stabilized almost completely until 2016<sup>39</sup>, despite the various plans drawn up during this period. Admittedly, the 2011 Constitution brought about a slight improvement, but it was insignificant. Indeed, Morocco was ranked 90<sup>ème</sup> with 3.7 points. These results reveal how deeply rooted corruption is in the Moroccan ecosystem.

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<sup>32</sup> Transparency.org.

<sup>33</sup> 'The World Bank in Morocco/Overview', World Bank, 15 November 2023, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/morocco/overview>.

<sup>34</sup> 'The World Bank in Morocco/Overview'.

<sup>35</sup> RoYAUME Du MARoc, 'Bulletin Officiel', Available On-Line at [Http://Www. Sgg. Gov. Ma/BO/Bulletin/Fr/2004/BO\\_5178\\_fr. Pdf](Http://Www. Sgg. Gov. Ma/BO/Bulletin/Fr/2004/BO_5178_fr. Pdf) (Last Accessed 16 December 2010), 2017.

<sup>36</sup> Sophie Louargant, Emmanuel Matteudi, and Emmanuel Roux, 'L'action Aménagiste Au Maroc Entre Héritages, Permanences et Bifurcations:', *L'Information Géographique* Vol. 75, no. 4 (1 December 2011): 15-38, <https://doi.org/10.3917/lig.754.0015>.

<sup>37</sup> 'Présentation de l'Instance Nationale de La Probité de La Prévention et de La Lutte Contre La Corruption', n.d., <https://www.inppc.ma/fr/Pages/244-presentation-de-linstance-nationale-de-la-probite-de-la-prevention-et-de-la-lutte-contre>.

<sup>38</sup> Transparency.org, 'Corruption Perception Index 2004' (Transparency International, 2 June 2020), <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2004>.

<sup>39</sup> Transparency.org, 'Corruption Perception Index 2005' (Transparency International, 2 June 2020), <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2005>.

The years 2017<sup>40</sup> and 2018<sup>41</sup> will see a slight change in the CPI score, with successive achievements of 4 and 4.3 points. Morocco will climb from 90<sup>ème</sup> place in 2016 to 81<sup>ème</sup> in 2017 and 73<sup>ème</sup> in 2018. On the other hand, the best score achieved remains that of 2000, with 4.7 points.

A closer look at the graphs reveals the systemic and preponderant corruption that is undermining growth in Morocco. The [table 1](#) illustrates this state of affairs:

Table 1. Summary of scores and Morocco's world ranking.

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
Ranking	45	37	-	52	70	77	78	79	72	80	89	85	80	88	91	80	88	90	81	73	
Score	4,1	4,7	-	3,7	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,2	3,5	3,5	3,3	3,4	3,4	3,7	3,7	3,9	3,6	3,7	4,4	4,3	
Number of countries	99	-	90	91	102	103	104	105	106	108	108	107	108	107	107	107	106	106	107	108	108

The scores indicate a concerning level of ineffectiveness in the legal and institutional systems. The results suggest a lack of coordination between sectors and a need for a global, integrated vision with better monitoring, steering, and evaluation tools.

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a valuable indicator for measuring corruption in the public sector, but it is important to recognize its limitations. One criticism of the CPI is that it measures the perception of corruption rather than corruption itself. This means that the CPI can be influenced by factors such as culture, the media, and political events. For instance, a country that has recently been the subject of a corruption scandal may see its CPI score decrease, even though corruption in that country has not necessarily increased. Another criticism of the CPI is that it is based on a limited number of surveys. The CPI can be sensitive to variations in the surveys used. If a survey suffers from a methodological error, it can significantly impact a country's CPI score. Additionally, the CPI is a composite indicator that combines the results of several surveys, making it challenging to interpret a country's score.

<sup>40</sup> Transparency.org, '2017 Corruption Perceptions Index - Explore the Results' (Transparency International, 20 January 2022), <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2017>.

<sup>41</sup> Transparency.org, '2018 Corruption Perceptions Index - Explore the Results' (Transparency International, 20 January 2022), <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2018>.



### **1.1.2 Global Corruption Barometer**

The Global Corruption Barometer is a survey that measures experiences of corruption in everyday life among the general public. A representative panel of the population is asked a number of questions to reveal the direct impact of corruption on their lives<sup>42</sup>.

The collected answers reflect the extent to which public services and institutions are affected by corruption. In essence, the barometer is a survey that facilitates direct contact with the general public to identify the most corrupt public services. The TI Barometer is widely regarded as the only large-scale survey on corruption, and its results are generally reliable. It provides comprehensive information that aids in effectively addressing the issue, including the quality and quantity of bribes<sup>43</sup>.

Participants' answers are then weighted according to their age, gender, level of education and place of residence. The result is a corruption perception score for each country, on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 means very high corruption perception and 100 means very low corruption perception<sup>44</sup>.

It should be pointed out that while the CPI is based on the opinions of experts, the barometer, on the other hand, focuses on the opinions of ordinary people based on their personal experiences. Thus, the barometer studies individual experiences, while the CPI is a reflection of well-informed observers.

The BMCC and the CPI are two indicators of corruption, but they differ in nature. The BMCC is a public opinion survey, while the CPI is a composite indicator based on the results of several surveys. This difference in nature translates into differences in perceptions that influence the scores of these two indicators. The BMCC is more likely to be influenced by the perceptions of citizens, while the CPI is more likely to be influenced by the perceptions of experts and business people. In terms of criticism, the BMCC and CPI face the same limitations. Both indicators measure perceptions of corruption, not corruption itself. This means that they can be influenced by factors such as culture, the media and political events.

### **1.1.3 Doing Business**

Doing Business is a global indicator scrutinized every year by the World Bank. It ranks countries in terms of attractiveness and the ease of setting up investments. Its aim is to

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<sup>42</sup> Alexander James Hamilton and Craig Hammer, 'Can We Measure the Power of the Grabbing Hand?: A Comparative Analysis of Different Indicators of Corruption', *A Comparative Analysis of Different Indicators of Corruption* (January 9, 2018). *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 8299 (2018).

<sup>43</sup> Alexander James Hamilton and Craig Hammer, 'Can We Measure the Power of the Grabbing Hand?: A Comparative Analysis of Different Indicators of Corruption', *A Comparative Analysis of Different Indicators of Corruption* (January 9, 2018). *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 8299 (2018).

<sup>44</sup> Hamilton and Hammer.

measure the relevance of procedures for launching new projects and attracting investors<sup>45</sup>.

According to this indicator, Morocco has made considerable progress since 2012, when it was ranked 97<sup>ème</sup>, moving up to 60<sup>ème</sup> in 2019 out of 190 countries. Its score has therefore improved significantly, from 71.02 points in 2012 to 68.56 points in 2019. Morocco's goal of being among the top 50 in 2012 is said to be achievable. Morocco will only have to climb 10 places to reach its target<sup>46</sup>. It is the top-ranked country in North Africa and second in the MENA region.

#### **1.1.4 World Economic Forum (WEF)**

To assess a country's economic competitiveness, the Swiss Klaus Schwab created the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report in 1979. The recently accredited WEF is a reliable reform for investors. It makes it possible to rank countries in terms of their attractiveness to foreign direct investment<sup>47</sup>.

According to the 2018 WEF report, Morocco ranks 75<sup>ème</sup> out of 140 countries with a score of 58.5 points<sup>48</sup>. Although this result is above the average of 60 points, Morocco is at the top of the ranking in North Africa. It also ranks 5<sup>ème</sup> on the African continent. In the MENA region, it ranks 8<sup>ème</sup>. The same report reveals that Morocco's weak points remain the inefficiency of the labor market and the falling standard of education. In addition, corruption is highlighted as the driving handicap to Morocco's business climate.

#### **1.1.5 World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index<sup>49</sup>**

Each year, the World Justice Project publishes its report ranking 113 Moroccan countries in terms of the rule of law. The assessment in question is based on several household surveys. It seeks to highlight countries' commitment to the process of establishing the rule of law.

Morocco is ranked 60<sup>ème</sup> out of 113 countries in the World Justice Project report. As a result, it ranks 4<sup>ème</sup> in the MENA region.

The aforementioned measurement tools reveal the critical state of the Moroccan economy. The results reveal the impact of corruption on growth. It is therefore time to

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<sup>45</sup> Stephen Knack, 'Measuring Corruption: A Critique of Indicators in Eastern Europe and Central Asia', *Journal of Public Policy* 27, no. 3 (2007): 255-91.

<sup>46</sup> Issam Kouhad and Brahim Dinar, 'Les Institutions et La Croissance Économique: L'indicateur Doing Business et La Croissance Économique de La Région MENA', *International Journal of Accounting, Finance, Auditing, Management and Economics* 1, no. 3 (2020): 298-318.

<sup>47</sup> Klaus Schwab and Nicholas Davis, *Shaping the Future of the Fourth Industrial Revolution* (Currency, 2018).

<sup>48</sup> Hamza Guessous, 'World Economic Forum Ranks Morocco 75th in Competitiveness', [www.morocoworldnews.com](http://www.morocoworldnews.com), 19 October 2018, <https://www.morocoworldnews.com/2018/10/255718/world-economic-forum-morocco-competitiveness>.

<sup>49</sup> WJP Rule of Law Index, 'The Global Rule of Law Recession Continues', 2023, <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/>.

act to put an end to this alarming situation. Could good governance be a good solution?

## 1.2 Sectoral analysis of corruption in Morocco

After reviewing the classifications of corruption by international institutions, it is necessary to analyze corruption using a sectoral approach to identify the most corrupt sectors.

The Global Corruption Barometer indicates that all sectors are corrupt, but perception trends vary among them<sup>50</sup>. However, four sectors appear to be the most affected. These categories include national security, health, justice, and administration.

[Figure 3](#) illustrates this observation.




Figure 3. Perception of citizens' level of corruption by sector according to the Global Corruption Barometer

On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 non-corrupt and 5 highly corrupt, the graph above shows that the national security sector is the most corrupt. This bad trend unfortunately remains unchanged between 2006 and 2013. The justice sector occupied the 2<sup>ème</sup> position in 2006. This year, according to the graph above, the health sector is in 3<sup>ème</sup> position. In 2006, a survey of 1,000 households in the health sector on the subject of corruption revealed that 40% of respondents said they had resorted to paying a bribe in order to benefit from health services and supplies, which are naturally free under current law. 85% confirmed that they had had to pay a bribe to be examined or to be admitted to free healthcare<sup>51</sup>.

In 2013, the healthcare sector became the 2<sup>ème</sup> most corrupt sector. This represents a clear deterioration compared to perceptions in 2006. The administration and justice sectors rank 3<sup>ème</sup> and 4<sup>ème</sup> respectively.

<sup>50</sup> John Gill, 'Global Corruption Report: Education', *Canada: Routledge*, 2013.

<sup>51</sup> Transparency.org., '2023 Corruption Perceptions Index: Explore the Results.'

On the other hand, some sectors have a lower average level of corruption than the four mentioned above. Among the sectors least affected are religious organizations and NGOs.

One of the observations we can make for the case of Morocco is that there has been no improvement in the situation between 2006 and 2013. In other words, we observe almost the same trends in perceived corruption at sector level.

A second remark that seems interesting, we think, is the fact that these trends are characteristic of developing countries. Indeed, Afrobarometer 2015 states that the police sector is the most corrupt sector. This is particularly true of Indonesia and Ghana. According to the same report, in less corrupt countries such as Denmark and Finland, the police sector is the one likely to be affected first.

The data presented in [Figure 4](#) provides a more detailed understanding than previous analyses. It shows that citizens perceive a higher level of corruption when interacting with services in various sectors, including the commune (both rural and urban), local authority sectors (such as caïdat, municipality, and expanded caïdat/pacha areas), the health sector, and the police sector. Based on [Figure 5](#), 15.1% of the surveyed population reported encountering corruption within the commune, municipality, and caïdat sector, which represents 64.7% of cases. Additionally, 21.3% of respondents experienced corruption in the health sector, accounting for 57.3% of reported incidents.




Figure 4. Corruption Perception Levels in Various Public Service Sectors




Figure 5. Level of corruption encountered by citizens: sectors concerned

The statistics presented in [Figure 5](#) underscore that corruption is a significant issue for the Moroccan population. The data below highlight that among the socio-economic challenges encountered by the population, corruption is ranked fifth, following unemployment, health services, the quality of education and training, and housing conditions.




Figure 6. Ranking of corruption among the concerns presented

Sectoral analysis presented in [Figure 6](#) indicates that corruption is widespread across numerous sectors, exhibiting significant variations in its degree of prevalence. The study's focus on a select group of sectors is necessitated by the limited availability of data, which inherently constrains the breadth of analysis and precludes a comprehensive understanding of intersectoral dynamics. Corruption's ripple effects can originate within a specific sector and propagate to others through various

channels. The findings underscore the substantial impact of corruption on the sectors examined and call for a closer review of Morocco's initiatives to combat this pervasive issue.

### **1.3 Prospects for the fight against corruption in Morocco**

In Morocco, people didn't even dare tell their neighbors about corruption. People suffered, submitted or profited from it on the sly. However, in December 1995, the Ribat-Alfath Association took the first step towards breaking this taboo. Indeed, the organization of the "Ethics, Deontology and Growth" symposium was the spark that ignited the flame around a subject long considered taboo<sup>52</sup>. Although corruption was not explicitly discussed at the time, the use of the word "Ethics" did indeed accomplish the task. The same word was used eight months later, in July 1996, at the seminar "The ethical imperative within the company" organized by Maroc 2020. On the other hand, the use of a subtitle as bold as it was revealing - "Being aware of the consequences of unethical behaviour and organizing the fight against corruption" - was, without doubt, the first word in a public debate on the subject of corruption.

What then are the founding factors behind the metamorphosis of corruption from a taboo subject to one of public debate? To answer this question, we propose a triadic vector made up of NGOs, the CGEM and donors.

#### ***1.3.1 Civil society and corruption***

Moroccan NGOs<sup>53</sup> present themselves as the first stimulus for the debate on corruption. Indeed, it was the early action-oriented efforts of TM and Maroc 2020 that lifted the subject of corruption out of the abyss of taboo. Formed in 1995 and 1996 respectively, the two organizations achieved considerable success despite the problems they encountered at the outset. They had succeeded in bringing together a good number of associations, eradicating the approbatory idea of corruption by raising public awareness of its adverse impact on growth, and initiating serious debate around the issue. No one can deny that civil society is the main catalyst for any reform. Morocco has been no exception.

In fact, as a result of their diverse and intense activities, NGOs have been able to assert themselves and increase their power as advocates of the priority of law, transparency and citizenship.

One NGO success followed another, following a workshop organized in May 1996 by AMDH (the Moroccan human rights association) on the theme "The role of

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<sup>52</sup> Kamal El Mesbahi, 'La Prévention de La Corruption Au Maroc, Entre Discours et Réalité', *Pouvoirs*, no. 2 (2013): 83-97.

<sup>53</sup> Béatrice Hibou and Mohamed Tozy, 'La Lutte Contre La Corruption Au Maroc : Vers Une Pluralisation Des Modes de Gouvernement?', *Droit et Société* n° 72, no. 2 (29 September 2009): 339-57, <https://doi.org/10.3917/drs.072.0339>.



civil society in the fight against corruption". The snowball became even bigger in 1997 with the creation of CIACC (le collectif inter-associatif contre la corruption) or Network of associations for the fight against corruption<sup>54</sup>.

This newborn civil society organization, initially formed by six NGOs, now has over forty members, including: TM, Maroc 2020, Alternatives, Afak, AMDH, OMDH, ADFM, UFM, etc. CIACC, as coordinator of NGO activities, organizes the annual "National Anti-Corruption Day" on January 6.

### *1.3.2 The entry of the economic elite*

The Moroccan economic elite consisted mainly of a minority of families, who had enjoyed a number of privileges that enabled them to monopolize the Moroccan economy. They dominated the most important economic sectors, such as sugar production, real estate, fishing, agro-industry and textiles. Their economic power increased considerably with the "Moroccanization" of the economy in 1973. It should also be noted that this economic strength was consolidated by political power. In other words, the economic players were themselves political players or close to them.

However, around 1983, with the adoption of the PAS, a new economic elite came to the fore. With a modernist vision and well-defined objectives to generate transparency and overhaul the Moroccan economic structure, a group of medium-sized business leaders created the CGEM (Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc). This confederation has taken full advantage of the new national and international economic realities brought about by globalization. In a short space of time, and from the 1990s onwards, it emerged as a decision-making force on both the economic and political fronts. Indeed, today, its political proposals are taken too seriously, as long as they promote the modernization of the private sector. In other words, the CGEM's demands on the State are becoming increasingly firm. They can be summed up as administrative reform to promote transparent competitiveness and cut through the corruption that undermines economic activity.

The "ethical imperative" is omnipresent in CGEM's activities. With this in mind, the confederation updated a "declaration for business ethics" in 1998. This declaration affirms the confederation's readiness to work side by side with its partners: government, trade unions, civil society, donors and the general public.

### *1.3.4 A third ally against corruption*

Donors made a significant contribution to changing the way corruption was perceived in Morocco<sup>55</sup>. Indeed, as soon as the SAP was adopted in 1983 under the aegis of the

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<sup>54</sup> Guilain P Denooux, "The Politics of Morocco's Fight against Corruption", *Middle East Policy* 7, no. 2 (2000): 165-89.

<sup>55</sup> Hibou and Tozy, 'La Lutte Contre La Corruption Au Maroc'.

WB and the IMF, new rules of transparency were demanded. In addition, these donors imposed the approval and even legitimacy of corruption as a subject for public debate.

Indeed, since corruption is one of the priorities of international organizations, the Moroccan authorities have been subjected to this new state of affairs. In fact, any regime wishing to convince donors and international public opinion that it is likely to attract foreign investment must demonstrate a commitment to human rights and freedom of expression, and encourage public debate on all issues, including corruption. Moreover, since 1995, donors have never tired of pointing out the considerable economic and social cost of corruption<sup>56</sup>.

The Moroccan authorities have recognized the necessity of confronting corruption head-on, moving the issue from being a taboo to a subject of public discourse. This shift has led to the implementation of various procedural strategies aimed at eradicating this scourge. With the adverse effects of corruption on economic growth now widely acknowledged, the focus shifts to understanding its causes and consequences, as well as exploring effective measures to combat it. In the subsequent discussion, we aim to shed light on these questions, offering insights into potential solutions.

### ***1.3.5 Government anti-corruption programs since 1998***

Following royal directives, successive governments since 1998 have shown a strong determination to fight corruption. To this end, a number of action plans have been drawn up.

Under the alternation government, the USFP's mandate was marked by two imminent declarations: that of April 17, 1998 and that of August 1<sup>er</sup> 2002. The first was motivated by a "desire for change", and focused on three essential aspects: ethics, rationalization and communication based on listening to citizens. As for the second declaration, dated August 1<sup>er</sup> 2002, which was presented to the members of the House of Representatives of Parliament, it was a superficial assessment of the government's actions with regard to ethics and the LCC<sup>57</sup>.

However, it is worth reviewing the procedures put in place under the Yousoufi government. First and foremost, we would like to mention the PBG (pact for good management), which constitutes the frame of reference for the values and principles that should govern the citizen-public service relationship. The purpose of this pact is to serve the general interest and meet the expectations of citizens, thereby reviving their confidence in the administration. With this in mind, the PBG was structured around three fundamental axes: the moralization of administrative life, the

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<sup>56</sup> Négib Bouderbala, 'La Lutte Contre La Corruption: Le Cas Du Maroc', *Critique Économique*, no. 4 (2000).

<sup>57</sup> Transparency.org, 'Corruption Perception Index 2014' (Transparency International, 2 June 2020), <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2014>.

rationalization of public management, and the reinforcement of communication, consultation and openness of the administration to its environment<sup>58</sup>.

Secondly, the participation of civil society, political parties, trade unions and the media was strongly emphasized at the national symposium on "Supporting ethics in the public sector" held on October 29 and 30, 1999. While the education of citizens in ethical values is the responsibility of associations, political parties and trade unions have taken on the task of guiding the behavior of citizens, while the media have had an obligation to disseminate the culture of ethics<sup>59</sup>.

Thirdly, there was the 1<sup>er</sup> national symposium on administrative reform in Morocco, on the theme of "Moroccan administration facing the challenges of 2010", held on May 7 and 8, 2002. The symposium produced 161 recommendations aimed at strengthening ethics in the public service.

Other LCC procedures include the enactment of law 03.01<sup>60</sup> on the obligation to state the reasons for administrative decisions taken by public administrations, local authorities and public establishments, and the law on freedom of pricing and competition.

### *1.3.6 Approaches to the government mandate*

The measures adopted by this government in terms of LCC and the moralization of public life are simply a continuation of those undertaken by the previous government. Indeed, with the exception of administrative information, the new government has set itself the objective of working on the same three axes concerning the moralization of administrative life by ensuring its proximity to the citizen as well as its modernization, as clearly underlined in the 1<sup>ère</sup> government declaration of November 21, 2002. As for the declaration of May 23, 2005, it targeted ministers in particular, who were asked to submit reports on measures taken to combat corruption in their departments. They were also urged to declare their assets and economize on mission expenses. Among the key measures of this second declaration was the creation of the Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption (ICPC) on March 13, 2007<sup>61</sup>. In addition, and in the spirit of the administration's openness to civil society and NGOs, a partnership was signed between the Ministry of National Education (MEN) and Transparency Maroc (TM).

The measures adopted by the El Fassi government in terms of the LCC focused primarily on strengthening the institutional framework for the fight against

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<sup>58</sup> Laurids Sandager Lauridsen, 'Good Governance-A Good Development Strategy?', in *DIIS 2010-2011* (Institut for Internationale Studier/Dansk Center for Internationale Studier ..., 2011), 42-43.

<sup>59</sup> 'Principes d'administration Publique' (OCDE, June 2019), <https://www.sigmaxweb.org/publications/Prestation-services-administratifs-Maroc-Juin-2019.pdf>.

<sup>60</sup> Du MARoc, 'Bulletin Officiel'.

<sup>61</sup> décret n° 2-07-544 du 23 octobre 2007 fixant les attributions et l'organisation de l'Instance Centrale de Prévention de la Corruption.

corruption, as well as supporting the national integrity and ethics regime. To this end, legal instruments relating to the declaration of assets and the activation of the ICPC were implemented as a matter of urgency. The period of this government was particularly marked by the program of the Ministry for the Modernization of Public Sectors (MMSP). This program was based on three procedural pillars: monitoring the establishment of the ICPC, activating the government program and drawing up a periodic plan on the LCC.

In short, a brief rereading of the various procedural tools implemented throughout the three government mandates highlights Morocco's strong desire to put an end to, or at least deal with, the impact of corruption on economic development. The battle against corruption has been waged on all fronts, motivated by the desire to eradicate the scourge of corruption. However, not all procedures have been successful, and the phenomenon persists. This prompts us to constantly ask ourselves why?

### *1.3.7 From 2011 to the present day*

In the aftermath of the February 2011 social movement, Morocco resigned itself to a qualitative as well as quantitative commitment to tackling corruption. The need to strengthen a multitude of mechanisms has become more pressing, with the aim of guaranteeing the link between responsibility and accountability, the moralization of public life and the constitutionalization of good governance institutions. The government seems determined to eradicate corruption and is working hard to do so, particularly following the renewal of the constitution in July 2011<sup>62</sup>. On the one hand, the government institution is attempting to apply the royal guidelines in terms of the LCC. On the other, it is obliged to meet the constraints of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which Morocco signed in 2003 and ratified in 2007.

As a result, several operational measures have been implemented to this end. At the international level, Morocco took part in various conferences of signatory states to the UN Convention. It also chaired the MENA initiative on governance and investment for development, under the sponsorship of the OECD. It also signed up to the Arab Anti-Corruption Network.

At national level, all components of Moroccan society have mobilized to participate in the eradication of corruption. A number of procedural measures have been introduced. A toll-free number and a website have been launched to denounce corruption. A strategy aimed at: (1) updating legislation to protect public assets and

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<sup>62</sup>The preamble to the 2011 Constitution states that Morocco undertakes to: "grant international conventions duly ratified by it, within the framework of the provisions of the constitution and laws of the kingdom, in respect of its immutable national identity, and as soon as these conventions are published, primacy over the country's domestic law, and harmonize the relevant provisions of its national legislation accordingly".

combat illicit enrichment, and (2) promoting the participation of all sections of society in drawing up the national anti-corruption charter.

The government program for 2012 focused on a triadic strategy aimed at updating legislation to protect public assets and combat illicit enrichment<sup>63</sup>, strengthening control institutions and promoting the participation of all components of society in the finalization of the national anti-corruption charter. At institutional level, it is worth highlighting the development of the central body for the prevention of corruption through the creation of the Instance Nationale de la Probité, de la prévention et la lutte contre la corruption<sup>64</sup>. Diwan Al Madhalim was modified by the creation of the Mediator<sup>65</sup>. A Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (UTRF)<sup>66</sup> was also created. Morocco has thus developed a system of access to information by adopting the right of access to information<sup>67</sup> for greater compatibility with international partners. The United Nations Convention against Corruption stipulates that the right of access to information is a lever for national and international integrity.

However, it has to be said that the best anti-corruption strategy remains the one adopted by the government, which is spread over 10 years from 2015 to 2025 in three phases: from 2015 to 2016, from 2017 to 2020 and from 2021 to 2025<sup>68</sup>.

Morocco has deployed an arsenal of initiatives to curb the scourge of corruption. These initiatives include the creation of specialised institutions such as the ICPC and the ANLC, the adoption of laws and regulations such as Law 43-05 on the fight against money laundering and Dahir 1-07-13 creating the ICPC, and the implementation of awareness-raising programmes.

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<sup>63</sup> This principle has been enshrined in all Moroccan constitutions, and is enshrined in article 23, paragraph 1 of the 2011 Constitution, which states: "No one may be arrested, detained, prosecuted or convicted outside the cases and forms provided for by law", and in article 3 of the Penal Code, which states: "No one may be convicted of an offence not expressly provided for by law, nor punished by penalties not provided for by law".

<sup>64</sup> Bill n°12.133 relating to the Instance Nationale de la Probité, de la Prévention et de la Lutte contre la Corruption (National Authority for Probity, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption)

Law no. 113-12 creating the new body was promulgated on June 9, 2015 and published in the Official Bulletin on August 20, 2015.

<sup>65</sup> The Ombudsman institution will be responsible for protecting the rights of users of public services. It will have regional ombudsmen to bring it closer to citizens. The idea is to defend their rights, against administrative acts tainted by abuse of power.

<sup>66</sup> The Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (Unité de traitement du renseignement financier - UTRF) is responsible for collecting and processing information relating to money laundering, ordering investigations and proposing any legislative reforms it deems necessary. It must determine the rules for identifying money-laundering operations (minimum amounts, conditions of application, etc.), set up a database of identified offences Decree no. 2.08.572 of December 24, 2008 creating the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (B.O no. 5700 of January 15, 2009).

<sup>67</sup> Law 31-13 on the right of access to information has been promulgated and published in the Official Bulletin: - Official Bulletin No. 6670 of May 3, 2018

These initiatives have produced positive results, with a fall in the number of reported cases of corruption and an improvement in Morocco's ranking in international corruption indices.

However, major challenges remain. Corruption remains deeply rooted in many segments of Moroccan society, and efforts to combat it face obstacles such as a lack of resources, impunity and resistance to change. A critical analysis of these efforts highlights several key points

Morocco has implemented a strong institutional and legal framework to combat corruption, which includes specialized entities such as the National Integrity, Prevention, and Anti-Corruption Commission (INPPLC) and the Judicial Pole dedicated to corruption cases. The INPPLC has been working to prevent and fight corruption in both the public and private sectors since its establishment in 2012. In 2022, the INPPLC processed 14,000 corruption complaints, which is a notable achievement. The Judicial Pole, established in 2015, concentrates on legal proceedings related to corruption cases. In the same year, it handled 1,200 cases. This framework is supported by several laws, including Law 13-03 against corruption, which was revised in 2015 to enhance its effectiveness, and Law 31-13 of 2013, which facilitates public access to information, thereby aiding in uncovering concealed corruption. Alongside the National Authority for the Protection of Personal Data and the Competition Council, as well as legislation against money laundering and a code of ethics for civil servants, these efforts fortify the framework against corruption. Despite these measures, which have led to Morocco climbing 10 places in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index over a decade, a 2022 survey by Transparency Maroc revealed that 75% of Moroccans still view corruption as a prevalent issue.

To increase public awareness, national campaigns have been broadcast on television, radio, and social networks, targeting a wide audience. In 2022 alone, these campaigns reached over 3 million young people through social media. Educational initiatives have been integrated into school curricula to instill values of integrity and responsibility from a young age, reaching more than 5 million students by 2023. Furthermore, the INPPLC's 'Ana Ma3ak' campaign and the Ministry of National Education's 'Citizenship and Values' program highlight the significance of citizen participation and ethical values.

Nevertheless, the battle against corruption faces several obstacles, such as limited resources, as the INPPLC only has 300 investigators across the country. The effectiveness of anti-corruption measures is undermined by the persistent perception of impunity and resistance from vested interests. This is highlighted by the fact that only a small fraction of reported cases lead to convictions.



To overcome these obstacles, it is recommended to bolster the resources of anti-corruption bodies, enhance transparency and accountability within public services, and foster greater engagement from civil society. The suggested reforms to advance the anti-corruption agenda in Morocco include the call for a law protecting whistleblowers, the introduction of an asset declaration system for civil servants, and an increased role for civil society in monitoring public institutions.

Although Morocco has made significant strides in its anti-corruption efforts, the journey towards a corruption-free society is ongoing and requires continued commitment.

## CONCLUSION

Corruption, defined as "the abuse of public power and its misappropriation for private or individual gain", seems to be omnipresent in all countries, but in Morocco it is indisputably endemic. Indeed, this scourge has spared no sector of daily life. Faced with such circumstances, Moroccan citizens are perpetually distrustful of public authorities, the legal system and the economy. The consequences are harmful and devastating, both internally and externally. The alarm bells that went off some time ago remain deafening despite the various efforts made. Indeed, the fight against corruption has become one of the national priorities of successive Moroccan governments since 1999.

Various measures have now been implemented to tackle this devastating scourge, which has affected every aspect of Moroccan society. As soon as he assumed the throne, the King of Morocco issued his first directives, obliging the government to mobilize the necessary resources to tackle corruption. Indeed, the new concept of authority invoked by the monarch in his speech on October 12, 1999, constitutes a benchmark in this area.

On the occasion of the national symposium on "Supporting ethics in the public service", held on October 29 and 30 of the same year, the King once again reiterated the new concept of authority, urging the government to make greater efforts to meet the demands of the public service.

On the other hand, the royal will to establish the values of good governance and the moralization of public life was demonstrated in 2005. We should also mention the royal message addressed to participants at the 49<sup>ème</sup> Congress of the International Union of Lawyers, held in Fez from August 31 to September 4, 2005. The message underscored the Kingdom's support and commitment to implementing the UNCAC.

In its fight against corruption, Morocco has signed several international conventions, demonstrating its determination to eradicate this scourge. However, it is worth pointing out that citizens' perception of this scourge remains paradoxical, if not inexplicable. While the national consensus tends to condemn all corrupt and/or

corrupting behaviour, it continues to be accepted when it comes to personal gain. To do so, they try to cover it up with other names, such as a present, a gift, a reward, a simple gesture of gratitude. This study focuses on a description of the reality of corruption in Morocco, together with an analysis of the efforts made to curb this scourge.

## **DISCLOSURE**

### ***Conflicts of Interest***

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

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### ***Author Bionote***

I am currently a Ph.D. holder, having completed my doctoral degree in Economics. My academic journey is characterized by the publication of several articles and active participation in numerous conferences, demonstrating my dedication to research. I am also working as a part-time lecturer. Dr. Tarbalouti Essaid is a professor of higher education and a researcher in the field of institutions, employing a microeconomic approach.

### ***Authorship and Level of Contribution***

As the lead author of this research, I have clarified the contributions and levels of authorship of my co-researcher to ensure clarity and transparency. Specifically, Professor Tarbalouti Essaid made an essential contribution to the introduction of the study by providing the foundation and context of the research, as well as overseeing the work. On my part, I conducted the literature review, developed the methodology, and conducted the data collection, analysis, and interpretation. This collaboration was crucial for the development and implementation of the research, highlighting our combined skills and efforts in these areas.

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