



CAUSALITY IN HISTORICAL EXPLANATION

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Abstract: Based on the relevant works of historical methodology and Islamic history, this library research concludes that historical explanation is a scientific effort to seek historical reconstruction and explain causality linkages in various historical occurrences. The causality analysis is similar to the rule of regularity in historical explanation. The monocausal analysis seeks to find the ultimate cause of all causes by hierarchically arranging some causes and determining the most dominant cause. On the other hand, the multicausal analysis seeks to find the diversity of causes by placing all causes in an equally important position. The conflict between the Umayyad Dynasty and the Abbasid Dynasty (supported by the *Mawali* or non-Arab society) was monocausal because of rampant injustice due to oppression and discrimination by the Umayyads. The conflict between Abu Bakr's caliphate and the perpetrators of *riddah* after the Prophet PBUH died was multicausal due to various factors behind their dispute.

Keywords: *Historical Explanation, Causality, Abbasid Revolution, Riddah war.*

INTRODUCTION

Historical explanation is one of the essential focuses of any discussion of historical methodology. The issue of the explanation or interpretation of historical events is often an arena for a cross-section of opinions among experts in the field of historical philosophy because it deals with controversial differences of views on logical analysis in understanding the relationships that connect various historical phenomena have occurred. In this article, explanation has a broad meaning and usually gets the designation from historians as a causality or causation, as well as various forms of connections used by chroniclers in synthesizing historical events.¹

At the beginning of his last work entitled *Penjelasan Sejarah (Historical Explanation)*, Kuntowijoyo explained that historical explanation is an attempt to make the unit of history intelligible or understood intelligently. According to him, the word

¹ Helius Sjamsuddin, *Metodologi Sejarah* (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2007), 190.

"analysis" is also used interchangeably with "explanation", such as by Marc Bloch in his book *The Historian's Craft*, especially when historians analyze causal relationships between historical phenomena. But since the word "explanation" is more appropriate for history in general, while the word "analysis" is not entirely following the nature of historical science, the word "explanation" is used here. However, in Kuntowijoyo's view, historians can still use the word "analysis" if they wish.²

According to Helius Sjamsuddin, the terms "description" and "explanation" are often equated because they are synonymous. However, the meaning of the two terms can be distinguished as well. Historical facts are descriptions of the past. For example, the statement "The Proclamation of independence was declared in Jakarta on 17 August 1945 at 10 am by Ir. Soekarno." This sentence is a description of facts that mention historically "what" (Proclamation of independence), "where" (Jakarta), "when" (17 August 1945 at 10 am), and "who" (Soekarno). The "what", "where", and "who" questions are descriptive questions, and the answers given are also factual.

Historians are not satisfied, nor do they stop at descriptive questions with factual answers alone. They wanted to find out more and more deeply about the different things behind these facts by asking the following questions, such as "why" and "how" Sukarno delivered the proclamation of independence. "why" and "how" questions are critical analytical questions that demand critical analytical answers that ultimately lead to an explanation historical synthesis. Though necessary, factual answers are not history itself but are still chronicles.

The "real" or "authentic" history is if it can explain or provide an answer to the question "why". History is a description, explanation, or interpretation of the past. Why or how the proclamation of Indonesian independence was delivered (why-how), why Sukarno proclaimed it (why-who), not Mohammad Hatta, or the representatives of the youth, or the entire Indonesian nation; why the proclamation of Indonesian independence was delivered on 17 August 1945 (why-when), not before, or after; and why the place of the proclamation of Indonesian independence was in Jakarta (why-where), not in Bandung, Surabaya, Padang, or Makassar. Thus, all these explanatory

² Kuntowijoyo was born in 1943 and died in 2005. His book entitled *Penjelasan Sejarah (Historical Explanation)* published by Tiara Wacana Publisher, Yogyakarta, in 2008 and the foreword in the book was written by Joko Suryo, as mentioned in pages xi-xiv and 1-2.

questions demand in-depth interpretation, explanation, or analysis, which can produce a thick book if written, while factual answers are no longer than descriptive questions. But it must be noted that without these factual descriptions, it is also impossible to make a historical explanation because analysis without facts is a fantasy. The relationship between factual description and historical explanation is like building materials and the building itself. Bricks, cement, concrete, wood, nails, and so on are described as descriptions of facts. At the same time, buildings are likened to history that without building materials (or historical descriptions) and buildings are impossible to build. Therefore, buildings are a mixed and whole combination (synthesis) of various building materials. The proclamation of Indonesian independence (likened to a building) as a significant event in the history of the Indonesian nation's journey cannot be given an in-depth explanation or interpretation if historians do not know the factual components of 17 August 1945, in Jakarta, and Soekarno. In the form of a more straightforward statement, it can be said that by stringing the components together in a synthesis, the historian will explain the "why" and "how" of the events of Indonesian national history that occurred.³

The rules of historical explanation, according to Kuntowijoyo include the following essential things. First, regularity or consistency, which explains causal relationships between events. For example, if event C occurs, then event E related to event C will necessarily occur. Second, the generalization or similarity of specific characteristics. For example, there are characteristic similarities in scientific concepts to understand historical events. Third, using statistical inference or statistical methods in quantitative historical explanations. Fourth, the division of time in history is written in historical periodization. Fifth, narrative history tells the sequence of past events. Sixth, understandings that are multi-interpretable or contain subjectivism and relativism, although historians must be honest and should not hide their historical data.⁴

³ Sjamsuddin, *Metodologi*, 191-193.

⁴ Kuntowijoyo, *Penjelasan*, 10-18.

DISCUSSION

Leopold von Ranke declared that historians should write *wie es eigentlich gewesen* (as it happened). Historians must submit to historical facts, have integrity, understand objectively or impartially, and not take sides unfairly. The dictum was stated by Leopold in the 19th century when the influence of the philosophy of Positivism was dominant. The point of his statement is that history is equally objective with the natural sciences. However, the problem of impartiality poses a problem for historians. According to Marc Bloch, there are two problems: the question of impartiality and the state of history as a reproduction of history that cannot be separated from the analysis. For historians, impartiality is limited to observation and explanation. If it has already been implemented, then the task is completed. First, impartiality for historians is not the same as for judges who, after observing witnesses and analyses, there is still a tool available to be impartial; that is, they can see the statutory guidelines for deciding cases. If his decision follows legal guidelines, then he has been impartial. Second, the historian has no "legal guideline" that makes it impartial, so he is obliged to make a reproduction (reconstruction) of history based on his own understanding. Thus, the historian understands while the judge adjudicates. Therefore, it should not be considered a shortcoming if the analysis (explanation) of history is not the same as one another. Thus, the analysis of causality is multi-interpretable. In the causality analysis, the historian must analyze two things: the case (event) and the change. Cases are processual without change, while there is a change in quality in changes.⁵

The historian in the change study must determine the unit of analysis, that is, the choice between the study of structures (one part) or the study of systems (comprehensive). The structure study is political, economic, social, and cultural. The study of this structure can certainly be reduced to the study of structural elements, such as health, banking, sports, shops, advertising, agriculture, and textiles. The study of systems discusses system change as a whole or systemic change and system evolution). It may be about small social units like cities, communities, and villages. Structure and systems studies are not limited by their scope and period. In the study of change,

⁵ *Ibid.*, 35-37.

causality or agent of change can be a rapid process (such as revolution) or a long process (such as liberalization, democratization, industrialization, and dissemination of ideas. An example of structural studies is Clifford Geertz's book entitled *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia*,⁶ while an example of the study of systems is the work of W.F. Wertheim entitled *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change*.⁷

In the case of studies, there are simple cases and complex cases. A single case is called simple if historians find that the cause is only one (monocausal), while a single case is called complex if the causes are multiple (multicausal). Descriptions of monocausal analysis are contained in statements such as "a vacuum of authority leads to anarchy", "political regimes facing difficulties are always looking for scapegoats", "governments appoint virtual or real enemies to rally solidarity", "injustice breeds resistance", and "political crises invite militarism to rule". An example of the application of monocausal analysis is John Ingleson's book entitled *Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement 1927-1934*, which has pointed out the theme that "injustice breeds resistance".⁸

The monocausal analysis is usually deterministic, considering one factor as a single factor and negating the others. Since the 19th century, the term geographical determinism has been known that location is a factor that determines the situation or development of a nation. Nations in cold climate countries generally develop because their ecological conditions demand personalities who can adapt and cope with the harsh natural environmental conditions. Conversely, in tropical countries, nature greatly facilitates life so that it does not pose many severe challenges. The term racial determinism emphasizes biological factors as determinants of progress achieved by a nation. The term economic determinism, often identified with Karl Marx's theory, considers that economic factors are determinants of the structure and development of society. All social, political, and cultural institutions are determined by general economic processes and the system of production in particular.⁹

⁶ *Ibid.*, 46-47.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 37-38.

⁹ Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Pendekatan Ilmu Sosial dalam Metodologi Sejarah* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1993), 94.

In the realm of multicausal analysis, historians look at the case in multifaceted, processual, structural, and complex causality. For example, Sartono Kartodirdjo's book entitled *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1988: Its Condition, Course, and Sequences (A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia)* uses a multidimensional approach to analyzing economic, social, political, and cultural aspects of the peasant uprising in Cilegon district, Anyer, Banten, in 1988.¹⁰ Multicausal analysis can be matched with the perspective approach that the complexity of the problem can only be explored through various perspectives, including economic, social, political, cultural, and so on. Perspectivism is closely related to the systems approach, which implicitly views that there are interdependencies and interrelationships in the elements, so the analysis must also describe all the elements.¹¹

In other words, the monocausal analysis seeks to find the ultimate cause of all causes by hierarchically arranging some causes and determining the most dominant cause. On the other hand, the multicausal analysis seeks to find the diversity of causes by placing all causes in an equally important position.¹² This causality analysis is closely related to the rule of regularity in historical explanation.¹³

Examples of the Application of Causality in Islamic Historical Analysis

Anyone who examines Islamic history often encounters the transfer of power from the Umayyad Dynasty (which had ruled for about 90 years) to the Abbasid Dynasty in 750 or the *riddah* war (which faced apostasy or rebellion) during the reign of Abu Bakr from 632 to 633 after the death of the Prophet PBUH. Then how does the historian explain the cause of the two events in the context of historical explanation? The author in this paper uses social theory as an aid tool to analyze these historical facts.

According to Kuntowijoyo, the advocate of cooperation between history and social sciences has been Sartono Kartodirdjo since 1967.¹⁴ Sartono Kartodirdjo emphasized that the process of approaching each other between the two sciences was

¹⁰ Kuntowijoyo, *Penjelasan*, 42.

¹¹ Kartodirdjo, *Pendekatan*, 95.

¹² Sjamsuddin, *Metodologi*, 199-200.

¹³ Kuntowijoyo, *Penjelasan*, 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 118.

due to the following considerations. First, descriptive narrative history is no longer satisfactory for explaining complex problems or phenomena. Second, a multidimensional or social scientific approach can be used to analyze historical problems. Third, the social sciences have developed so rapidly that they can provide highly relevant theories and concepts for historical analysis. Fourth, the study of history is not limited to the study of informative matters about the "what", "who", "when", "where", and "how", but also seeks to trace the various structures of society, patterns of social behavior, and trends in historical processes.¹⁵ The effort of a mutual approach between historical science and social science, according to Helius Sjamsuddin, is related to the dissatisfaction of historians with old forms of historiography whose scope is very limited so that the new historiography is considered to be able to open a broader scope.¹⁶

The benefits of social science assistance for historical studies, according to Kuntowijoyo, can be classified into four types. First, concepts (*conceptus* in Latin means idea). That's because historians often use social science concepts for their analysis. Second, theory (*theoria* in Latin means the rules that underlie a phenomenon through scientific verification). Third, social problems because there are so many social science problems that can be raised as historical research topics. Fourth, the approach because all historical writing involves the study of a historical phenomenon over a relatively long period (diachronic aspects) and involves research on economic, societal, or political aspects (synchronic aspects) must also use a social science approach.¹⁷

Because this paper focuses on finding the causes of the two events, conflict theory is used here to analyze them. Conflict theory arose as a reaction to the theory of structural functionalism. Conflict theory comes from various sources, such as Marxian theory and Georg Simmel's social conflict thinking. In the 1950s and 1960s, conflict theory provided an alternative to structural functionalism but was later replaced by various neo-Marxian theories. One of conflict theory's significant contributions was providing a foundation for theories that benefited from Marx's

¹⁵Kartodirdjo, *Pendekatan*, 120.

¹⁶Sjamsuddin, *Metodologi*, 300.

¹⁷Kuntowijoyo, *Pengantar Ilmu Sejarah* (Yogyakarta: Bentang, 1997), 107-115.

thought.¹⁸ According to conflict theory, society is always in a change process characterized by continuous opposition between its elements. Many factors have led to conflict—for example, factors caused by differences in views, beliefs, cultures, and interests. Differences in views or beliefs can result in attempts to eradicate opponents or their thoughts. Different cultural patterns then give rise to different patterns of behavior that cause conflict. Differences in interests encourage each party to fight for opportunities and mean for particular interests.

Although conflict tends to have negative consequences (e.g., dominating the stronger over the weak and resulting in suffering victims), conflict can also have positive consequences (e.g., increasing solidarity in society).¹⁹ The earliest thought about the function of social conflict came from Georg Simmel, but it was later expanded upon by Lewis Coser, who asserted that conflict could strengthen group bonds. A society that is disintegrated or in a state of conflict with another society can renew the cohesiveness of its integration. Conflict with one group can also help create cohesion through alliances. For example, the conflict with the Arabs led to an alliance between Israel and America.²⁰

The overthrow of the Umayyad Government by the Abbasids

The mention of *al-Dawlah al-Umawiyyah* or the Umayyad Dynasty is attributed to Umayyah ibn ‘Abd Syams ibn ‘Abd Manaf (a figure who lived during the *jahiliyah* period), although this government was founded by Mu’awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan ibn Harb ibn Umayyah ibn ‘Abd Syams (so the name Umayyah was not involved in establishing such political power at all). The same is done in *al-Dawlah al-‘Abbasiyyah* or the Abbasid Dynasty attributed to al-‘Abbas ibn ‘Abd al-Muththalib, but the political government was established by Abu al-‘Abbas al-Saffah ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abbas.²¹ The descendants of al-‘Abbas claimed themselves to be more entitled to succeed the Prophet as leader of the

¹⁸ George Ritzer and Douglas J. Goodman, *Teori Sosiologi Modern*, trans. Alimandan (Jakarta: Prenada Media, 2004), 153.

¹⁹ Siti Norma “Proses Sosial” in *Sosiologi: Teks Pengantar dan Terapan*, (ed.) J. Dwi Narwoko and Bagong Suyanto (Jakarta: Kencana, 2007), 68-69.

²⁰ Ritzer, *Teori Sosiologi*, 159.

²¹ Ahmad Syalabi, *Mawsu’ah al-Tarikh al-Islami wa al-Hadharah al-Islamiyyah*, vol. 3 (Kairo: Maktabat al-Nahdhah al-Misriyyah, 1985), 49.

Muslimin than the descendants of ‘Ali ibn Abi Thalib (cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) because if the uncle still existed, then the inheritance should fall to the uncle of the Prophet (al-'Abbas), not to the uncle's son (‘Ali), although genealogically al-'Abbas and ‘Ali both belong to the family of Banu Hasyim. Likewise, the offspring of a daughter is not entitled to inherit as long as the ‘*ashabah* (or paternal descendant) is alive.²²

The idea of transferring the caliphate among the 'Abbasids did not arise when the Prophet died. This thought came to the fore in the last moments of the life of Abu Hasyim bin Muhammad bin al-Hanafiyah, grandson of ‘Ali bin Abi Thalib²³ and also the leader of al-Shi’ah al-Kaysaniyyah, the largest group of descendants of ‘Ali who fought against the Umayyads. During the time of Caliph Sulayman bin ‘Abd al-Malik in 98 AH or 716 AD, Abu Hasyim was invited to his palace. However, Abu Hasyim was poisoned while on his way home.

Therefore, he turned his destination to Humaymah and testified to Muhammad bin ‘Ali after knowing his death was near. At that time, Abu Hasyim revealed the secrets of al-Hasyimiyyah's resistance movement, gave up the caliphate (*imamah*) right, and revealed the names of his missionaries (du’at) in Kufah and others, and handed over his letters to be sent to the Abbasids. Muhammad ibn ‘Ali was chosen because the relationship between the descendants of ‘Ali and al-'Abbas had always been good, while Abu Hasyim could not find anyone capable of continuing his political struggle.²⁴

At first, the Abbasids were merely underground opposition to the rule of the Umayyad dynasty from 718 to 744. Then from 745 to 750, their pattern of struggle developed into an overt resistance movement that dared to oppose the rule of the Umayyad Dynasty and finally succeeded in seizing power through coercion and violence and then established a successor power.²⁵ The resistance movement was caused because the Umayyad Dynasty was considered unable to run a government

²² Ahmad Syalabi, *Al-Tarikh al-Islami wa al-Hadharah al-Islamiyyah* (Kairo: Maktabat al-Nahdhah al-Mishriyyah, 1978), 19.

²³ Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyah (21-81H / 642-700M) was son of ‘Ali ibn Abi Thalib and his wife, Khawlah. See Ferdinand Tawtal et al., *al-Munjid fi al-A'lam* (Beirut: Dar al-Masyriq, 1995), 524.

²⁴ Hasan Ibrahim Hasan, *Tarikh al-Islam*, vol. 2. (Kairo: Maktabat al-Nahdhah al-Mishriyyah, 1976), 10-11.

²⁵ Al-Khudhari, *Muhadharat*, 15 and Hasan, *Tarikh al-Islam*, 13.

following the Islamic religion and the wishes of the Muslim people. Even they tended to be considered to have behaved arbitrarily and beyond the limits of humanity, especially to the *Mawali* or non-Arabs who suffered oppression and discrimination during the rule of the Umayyad Dynasty.²⁶ Then it is not strange that the Abbasids evoked Messianism (Mahdiism) in their propaganda by using flags, battle banners, and all-black clothing as a sign of the coming savior (Messiah or al-Mahdi).²⁷

The political movement for the overthrow of the Umayyad Dynasty by the Abbasids was essentially a significant revolution followed by the majority of Muslims as it was ignited by deep disappointment after being maltreated by the Umayyad government. However, the discriminatory feelings felt by most people at that time briefly subsided due to the populist policies implemented during the reign of Caliph ‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (from 717 to 720), which followed the aspirations of all Muslims.²⁸ Then strenuous efforts were made by the rulers of the Umayyad dynasty to subdue the resistance movement of the oppressed people, but the rulers' attempts at the opposition failed. The weakness of the Umayyad government eventually led to their power being forcibly overthrown by the forces of mass rebellion after being mobilized in a planned manner by the actors of the Abbasid movement to usurp the power of the Umayyads.

The Umayyad government's tyranny was widely perpetrated against non-Arabs or *Mawali* people. It must be admitted that some *Mawali* people gained high social status during the rule of the Umayyad Dynasty. Still, their number was tiny compared to most *Mawali* who were discriminated against by the government. Among the fortunate *Mawali* were Sarjun ibn Manshur who worked at *Diwan al-kharaj* for Caliph Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, and Thariq ibn Ziyad who became the warlord conquering Andalusia during the time of Caliph al-Walid ibn ‘Abd al-Malik. There were also scholars whose initial status came from the *Mawali* class, for example, ‘Ikrimah (*mawla* for ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abbas), al-Hasan al-Bashri (whose father was *mawla* for Zayd ibn Thabit). But most *Mawali* were treated more discriminatively than the

²⁶ Hasan, *Tarikh al-Islam*, 14-15.

²⁷ Hasan al-Basya, *Dirasat fi Tarikh al-Dawlah al-‘Abbasiyyah* (Cairo: Dar al-Nahdhah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1975), 10.

²⁸ Hasan, *Tarikh al-Islam*, 8-9.

average Arab society, as suffered by the Khorasan community. These oppressed people were mobilized by the people of Banu Hasyim in the resistance movement against the Umayyad Dynasty, and finally, they succeeded in overthrowing the government during the Abbasid revolution.²⁹ Thus, it has been proven monocausal that injustice will always lead to resistance from the oppressed.³⁰

The War of *Riddah* after the Prophet PBUH Died

The *Riddah* war from 632 to 633 AD during the reign of Caliph Abu Bakr is often used as one of the arguments in the study of fiqh (or Islamic law) to apply the death penalty to apostates who left Islam because this war was seen as a religiously motivated war. However, the historical analysis does not show the truth of the fiqh statement.

Previously, it should be explained that the meaning of *riddah* understood by Muslims then was broader than that of *riddah*, which only had religious connotations as usually stated in the explanation of Islamic fiqh. The definition of *riddah* has expanded its meaning outside the religious context, which is related to state political problems. The justification that someone has committed *riddah* is directed at those who have renounced Islam and those who commit treason, defiance, opposition, resistance, or rebellion against the Islamic rule held by Caliph Abu Bakr al-Shiddiq at that time.³¹

The causes that prompted the perpetrators of *riddah* after the Prophet PBUH died are as follows:

First, the rejection of the perpetrators of *riddah* against the obligation to pay zakat. The refusal to pay *zakat*, for example, was carried out by 'Abs, Dzubyman, Banu Kinanah, Ghathafan, Fazarah, and Banu Tamim.³² They believed that *zakat* was

²⁹ Ali Muhammad al-Shallabi, *al-Dawlah al-Umawiyyah*, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 2008), 578-581.

³⁰ Kuntowijoyo, *Penjelasan*, 37-38.

³¹ Ilyas Shawfani, *Hurub al-Riddah: Dirasah Naqdiyyah fi al-Mashadir* (Beirut: Dar al-Kunuz al-Adabiyah, 1995), 136.

³² Muhammad Husayn Haykal, *al-Shiddiq Abu Bakr* (Cairo: Mathabi' al-Hay'ah al-Mishriyah al-'Ammah li al-Kitab, 1982), 49-52.

another form of tax or tribute that showed their submission and inferiority to their status³³ before the government of Caliph Abu Bakr in Medina.³⁴

Second, the political attitude of the perpetrators of *riddah* who did not recognize the authority of the government of Caliph Abu Bakr. The perpetrators of *riddah* consider that their relationship with the Prophet PBUH ended after the Prophet PBUH died. The obligations they had fulfilled during the time of the Prophet PBUH could not be automatically transferred to the next government, namely Caliph Abu Bakr.³⁵ Some rebels blatantly denigrated Abu Bakr's personality and refused to pledge allegiance to Caliph Abu Bakr.³⁶

Third, the political attitude of the perpetrators of *riddah* to break away from the rule of Caliph Abu Bakr. Among the perpetrators of *riddah* were groups of people who felt that they had great power to overthrow the government of Medina. They were the Banu Hanifah, a large and relatively powerful tribe.³⁷ Thus, the leaders of the *riddah* essentially wanted political power, as held by Caliph Abu Bakr.³⁸ The same seems to be done by al-Mundzir ibn al-Nu'man ibn al-Mundzir in Bahrain³⁹ and Laqith ibn Malik in Oman.⁴⁰

Fourth, the attempt of the perpetrator of *riddah* to take over the prophetic status. During the time of the Prophet PBUH, there was a false prophet named al-Aswad al-'Ansi who managed to rule Yemen, although eventually, he was killed through the tactics of Muslims who were around him and did not like him.⁴¹ After the death of the Prophet PBUH, there were also other false prophets, namely Thulayhah ibn Khuwaylid al-Asadi in Najd, Sajah binti al-Harits al-Tamimiyah among Banu Tamim, Musaylimah al-Kadzdzab in the midst of Banu Hanifah in Yamamah, and Laqith ibn Malik in Oman. After the death of the Prophet PBUH, the false prophets saw a prophetic void that had to be filled. The prophetic position is a very honorable position

³³*Ibid.*, 69-73.

³⁴ Rajab Muhammad 'Abd al-Halim, *al-Riddah fi Ma'fhum Jadid* (Cairo: Dar al-Nahdhah al-'Arabiyah, 1985), 100.

³⁵ Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, *Freedom of Religion, Apostasy, and Islam* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), 65.

³⁶ Al-Halim, *al-Riddah*, 97-98.

³⁷ Shawfani, *Hurub al-Riddah*, 113.

³⁸ Al-Halim, *al-Riddah*, 110.

³⁹ Shawfani, *Hurub al-Riddah*, 117.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁴¹ Muhammad Ridha, *Abu Bakr al-Shiddiq: Awwal al-Khulafa' al-Rasyidin* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 1983), 51.

among the people. In the view of the false prophets, the power and glory held by the Prophet of PBUH come from prophetic status alone.⁴²

Fifth, there are tribal disputes in the power struggle. For example, an uprising took place in Yemen. At that time al-Aswad al-Ansi, whose power was later continued by Qays ibn ‘Abd Yaghuts (from the Arab tribe) was involved in a dispute with Fayruz and Dadzawayh (from Persia). They are fighting each other for political power over the people in Yemen.⁴³

Sixth, there are bad influences and provocations from foreign nations outside Islam. For example, the rebellion of Bakr ibn Wa'il in Bahrain was carried out at the instigation of the Persian Kishra who supported al-Mukhariq ibn al-Nu'man or al-Mundzir ibn al-Nu'man ibn al-Mundzir al-Gharur.⁴⁴ Similarly, Sajah who came from northern Iraq because of the encouragement of the Persians and their officials in Iraq to stir up rebellions in the Arabian Peninsula so that it was hoped that their movement could succeed in restoring Persian power in some places that had begun to decline after the power of Muhammad PBUH became stronger.⁴⁵

Some references suggest that the fundamental considerations taken by Caliph Abu Bakr to carry out military policy towards *riddah* perpetrators tended to be influenced by religious aspects, which according to him, did not require separation between zakat and other Islamic religious teachings. In the religious view of Caliph Abu Bakr, the separation of zakat from other Islamic teachings was highly unjustified by religion.⁴⁶ According to him, Islam has no bargaining or compromise to fulfill desires and pleasures. In this regard, Caliph Abu Bakr followed the attitude of the Prophet PBUH, who did not want to compromise when the Meccan polytheists wanted to offer worldly temptations on the condition that the Prophet PBUH should abandon his da'wah activities that invited the people of Mecca to embrace Islam.⁴⁷

In addition to these religious considerations, another analysis explains why Caliph Abu Bakr firmly refused to exempt zakat payments. The reason is related to the financial significance of zakat for the smooth running of the Islamic government in

⁴² Saeed, *Freedom*, 65-66.

⁴³ Al-Halim, *al-Riddah*, 24-29.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 118-119.

⁴⁵ Haykal, *al-Shiddiq*, 69.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 52.

Medina. So, zakat is not merely a religious command required of Muslims, but zakat is also one of the supports for the continuity of government.⁴⁸ Because zakat is one of the pillars supporting the administration of the Islamic government,⁴⁹ it can be permissible when Caliph Abu Bakr used to be very harsh and strict towards those who refused to pay zakat.

In addition to these religious factors, there were also political factors behind the policies of the government of Caliph Abu Bakr at that time. This political factor was precisely the primary consideration of Caliph Abu Bakr in implementing his decision. The firm stance of Caliph Abu Bakr should have been implemented so that the newly formed Islamic society would not become destroyed and the expansion and spread of Islamic da'wah would not stop.⁵⁰ The political situation after the death of the Prophet PBUH was very precarious and threatened the continuity of Muslim rule. Many people are self-proclaimed prophets. Not a few areas in the area of Islamic dominion were turbulent. They expressed opposition to the authority of Medina, did not want to obey the provisions set by the central government, and no longer carried out the obligations they used to perform during the time of the Prophet PBUH. Therefore, it stands to reason that Caliph Abu Bakr took a harsh and firm crackdown. The policy applied by Caliph Abu Bakr to the perpetrators of *riddah* is closely related to their actions that are openly against Islamic rule and not simply because they have apostatized (left Islam) theologically.⁵¹

From the perspective of conflict theory, the overthrow of the Umayyad government through the Abbasid revolution and the *Riddah* war shows how fierce the political conflict between the parties because of the different interests of each opponent involved. The conflict between the Umayyad government and the opposition of the Banu Abbas supported by the *Mawali* or non-Arab society was monocausal because of rampant injustice due to oppression and discrimination by the Umayyads. The victory of the opposition resulted in the emergence of a new government order under the Abbasid Dynasty. The conflict between Abu Bakr's caliphate and the *Riddah* rebels

⁴⁸ Saeed, *Freedom of Religion*, 66.

⁴⁹ Jurji Zaydan, *Tarikh al-Tamaddun al-Islami*, vol. 01 (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, nd.), 68.

⁵⁰ Saeed, *Freedom of Religion*, 66.

⁵¹ Zahid Aziz, *Islam, Peace, and Tolerance* (U.K.: Ahmadiya Anjuman Lahore Publications, 2007), 19.

was multicausal due to various factors behind the dispute. The *Riddah* war won by the government of Caliph Abu Bakr succeeded in restoring political stability to the Islamic state centered in Medina. In addition, the large number of *huffadz* (Qur'an memorizers) who died in the war of *Riddah* prompted Caliph Abu Bakr to establish a policy of collecting Qur'anic verses into one Qur'anic *mushaf* so that the Qur'an was protected from extinction.

CONCLUSION

Based on the brief description above, it can be stated that historical explanation is a scientific effort to seek historical reconstruction into intelligible or intelligently understandable. One of the rules inherent in historical explanation is regularity (i.e., the existence of ridicule, order, and consistency), which is intended to explain causality relationships in various historical events. There is a distinction between simple and complex cases in the study of historical cases causally. A single case is called simple if the historian finds that the cause is only one or monocausal. In contrast, a single case is called complex if the causative factors are multiple or multicausal.

Monocausal analysis or explanation seeks to find the ultimate cause of all causes by hierarchically arranging a number of causes and then determining the most dominant cause among them. The multicausal analysis seeks to find the assortment of causes by placing all causal factors in an equally important position.

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