

THE HIDDEN RESOLUTION APPROACH BY MADURESE ULAMA AS A COMMUNITY- BASED MODEL OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION

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Abstract: *This study aims to describe the role of the Madurese Ulama in preventing and resolving religious conflicts. The depiction of the part of the Madurese ulema in organizing the socio-religious system can be used as an example of religious conflict resolution at local and even global levels. This research is qualitative with a descriptive analysis approach, an approach that explores socio-religious phenomena. The data were obtained directly from Ulama (clerics), congregations or members of religious sects, and leaders of religious organizations using interview and documentation methods. This research found several essential things. First, a form of religious conflict in the Madura region in the form of an internal conflict of followers of Islam which has three conditions; 1) socio-economic based religious conflict, 2) community-based religious sect conflict, and 3) sectarian religious conflict based on institutional authority. The conflict resolution model that the scholars are fighting is 1) the hidden resolution), 2) the hidden reconciliation model, 3) the hidden filtered. This finding has implications for three things: 1) We can suppress the construction of conflict resolution, the roots of sensitivity to religious conflicts through secure means; 2) causality between religion, economy, and society gives rise to the ideal construct of conflict resolution; 3) religious authorities are more effective in acting as closed mediators in conflict reconciliation.*

المخلص: تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى وصف دور علماء المادوريين فضلا في منع النزاعات مع الفروق الدينية وحلها. يمكن استخدام دور علماء المادوريين في إدارة النظام الاجتماعي

والديني كمثال على حل النزاعات الدينية محليا وعالميا. هذا البحث نوعي بمنهج التحليل الوصفي ، وهو منهج يستكشف الظواهر الاجتماعية لدرجة تشبع العلماء والتجمعات الدينية ورؤساء المنظمات الدينية من خلال تقنيات المقابلة والتوثيق. وتوصل البحث إلى عدة أمور مهمة ، أبرزها الشكل الأول للصراع الديني في منطقة مادورا على شكل صراع داخلي بين أتباع الإسلام له ثلاثة أشكال ؛ (١) صراع الطوائف الدينية على أساس اقتصاديات اجتماعية ، (٢) صراع الطوائف الدينية على أساس المجتمع ، (٣) صراع الطوائف الدينية على أساس السلطة المؤسسية. أما نماذج حل النزاع التي يلعبها العلماء هي: (١) نموذج مقنع مغلق (قرار مخفي) ، (٢) نموذج مصالحه مغلقة (تسوية خفية) ، (٣) تصفية مغلقة (تصفية مخفية). هذه النتيجة لها آثار على ثلاثة أشياء: (١) بناء حل النزاع ، يمكن قمع جذور الحساسية للنزاعات الدينية من خلال وسائل مغلقة. (٢) تؤدي العلاقة السببية بين الدين والاقتصاد والمجتمع إلى تكوين البنية المثالية لحل النزاع ؛ (٣) السلطات الدينية أكثر فاعلية في العمل كوسطاء مغلقين في تسوية النزاعات.

Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menggambarkan secara detail tentang peran ulama Madura dalam mencegah dan menyelesaikan konflik bernuansa agama. Penggambaran peran ulama Madura menata tatanan sistem sosial keagamaan dapat dijadikan contoh resolusi konflik agama baik di tingkat lokal bahkan global. Penelitian ini bersifat kualitatif dengan pendekatan deskriptif analisis, suatu pendekatan yang menggali fenomena sosial sampai jenuh dari para ulama, jemaah aliran keagamaan dan ketua organisasi keagamaan melalui teknik wawancara dan dokumentasi. Dari penelitian tersebut ditemukan beberapa hal penting, yaitu pertama bentuk konflik keagamaan di wilayah Madura berupa konflik internal penganut agama Islam yang memiliki tiga bentuk; 1) konflik aliran keagamaan berbasis pada sosio-ekonomi, 2) konflik aliran keagamaan berbasis komunitas masyarakat, dan 3) konflik aliran keagamaan berbasis pada otoritas kelembagaan. Model resolusi konflik yang diperankan ulama adalah: 1) model persuasif tertutup (hidden resolution), 2) model rekonsiliasi tertutup (hidden reconciliation), 3) filterasi tertutup (hidden filtered). Temuan ini berimplikasi pada tiga hal: 1) konstruk resolusi konflik, akar sensitifitas konflik keagamaan dapat diredam melalui cara-cara tertutup; 2) kausalitas antara agama, ekonomi dan sosial memunculkan konstruk ideal resolusi

konflik; 3) otoritas agama lebih efektif berperan sebagai mediator tertutup dalam rekonsiliasi konflik.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Madurese Ulama, Religious Conflict, Community.

INTRODUCTION

The clash of conflicts between religions has worried many parties in recent years. Almost all ethnic groups, ethnicities, religions, groups, and regions are affected by religious strife. The conflict between Christians and Muslims in North Sumatra between ethnic Chinese and indigenous tribes seems beyond logic. The authority's failure to maintain the socio-religious balance is apparent, namely allowing psychological hatred and anger to be ignited.¹ The Sunni-Shia conflict that occurred in Sampang-Madura was caused by the failure of religious authorities to form political and economic conflicts.² This reality is inversely proportional to the ideals of society and the government who crave religious, social harmony. In the end, what happened was a conflict between ideality and reality.

The prolonged saturation of religious conflicts and alternate between generations implies that the roots of the conflict are not uprooted. The resolution target misses the shot. Some studies assume that influential stakeholders in socio-religious conflicts are the authority of Ulama, religious leaders. The research conducted by Triana Rosalina Noor reveals that the disintegration of the nation (religious conflicts) that has occurred so far is due to the failure of religious authority, and the expertise of religious authorities has also spearheaded the success of stemming religious conflict.³ However,

¹ Marsudi Utoyo, "Akar Masalah Konflik Keagamaan Di Indonesia," *Lex Librum: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 8, 2016, 369, <https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.1257747>.

² Masdar Hilmy, "The Political Economy of Sunni-Shi'ah Conflict in Sampang Madura," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 53, no. 1 (June 15, 2015): 27–51, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2015.531.27-51>.

³ Triana Rosalina Noor, "Meneropong Indonesia: Sebuah Analisis Sosiologis dan Psikologis Atas Konflik Benuasa Keagamaan Di Indonesia," *Journal An-Nafs: Kajian Penelitian Psikologi* 3, no. 2 (December 11, 2018): 146, <https://doi.org/10.33367/psi.v3i2.499>.

Rosalina's research yielded flat findings of the role of religious authorities, namely mediation, and deliberation.

Zainuddin Syarif stated in his research that he has already made the same finding, that the cause of less religious conflicts in Madura is because of the role of the Ulama in maintaining the balance of cultural and structural groups in the social system. Likewise, Ihsan and A. Umar confirmed that the existence of Ulama plays a role in all aspects of the subsystem in society, from the embodiment of generations (*santri*) to the formation of national identity through education.⁴ Both of these studies have similar hypotheses with the author, which lies in the contribution of religious authorities in resolving conflicts. Still, the authors are more comprehensive, starting from conflict resolution in social subsystems to spiritual, social reality.

Because the role of the Ulama is very strategic in sowing the resolution of conflicts with religious backgrounds, this study seeks to uncover the veil of steps of Ulama in resolving and maintaining social and religious stability amid the threat of disintegration. So far, previous research has not touched the psychological areas of religion, did not go to the spiritualistic emotional basis, and combed through the skin. The presence of this research thoroughly explores the strategies of ulama starting from the subsystem of religious communities, socio-spiritual to emotional persuasion based on religious sects.

The authority of the Ulama in the context of the social system of society holds a strong position from all the subsystems. Ulama are not only considered as the heirs of the prophets (*warasah al-anbiya'*) but also a familiar figure with the existence of society, therefore in any matter whether it concerns the application of religion, social, political and even economic, the starting point lies in the role of the Ulama. The existence of Ulama, from the past up to now, indeed maintains the spirit of harmony and socio-religious harmony in society. Not surprisingly, the ulama are positioned as religious authorities in mediator, arbitrator, and *tahkim*. The perception of conflict is rooted in the condition of an unbalanced social subsystem that is expressed by some circles and has become a consensus of global observers. Like

⁴ Ihsan Ihsan and A. Umar, "Kiai As Al-Qudwah Al-Khasanah: The Role Of Kiai In Shaping Religious Culture In Islamic Education Institution," *Al-A'raf: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam Dan Filsafat* 17, no. 2 (December 23, 2020): 330, <https://doi.org/10.22515/ajpif.v17i2.2995>.

Lewis A Coser in his article, Limas Dodi said that social conditions that have the potential for conflicts are more difficult to resolve than violent conflict in general because the potential for conflict starts from the lowest root, namely the subsystem.⁵ Therefore, fixing the roots of the conflict as a preventive measure is better than resolving it after the conflicts occur. This requires an authority figure standing in the subsystem, either religious authority or other influential aspects.

Besides Coser, this assumption is strengthened by another observer of global conflict, Ralf Dahrendorf, in his theory as quoted by Ikrom, describing that the social system in the form of interests, customs, knowledge, thoughts, submission as well as being part of other social subsystems, is the root of the conflict so that Dahrendorf's theory examines the characteristics of social interaction rather than religious phenomena.⁶ This makes a stronger opinion by Edmund Husserl, as quoted by Isa Anshori, that a social subsystem that causes conflict to emerge is authority.⁷ In the sociology of Indonesian society, it is called religious figures (*kiyai*, *ulama*, cleric, or *ulama*) in religious conflicts.

In Indonesia, the most persuasive authority is dominated by religious figures as - to borrow a term from Clifford Geertz - cultural broker, a figure of the social subsystem that controls the direction of cultural change, belief, and conflict. In line with Geertz, Wahid has the same thoughts about the position of the Ulama in a social subsystem.⁸ In that sense, the role of these ulama has explored many spheres of life, such as religion, politics, and economics. The Ulama's authority closed the room for other leaders who wanted to seek positions in the social system.

⁵ Limas Dodi, "Sentiment Ideology: Membaca Pemikiran Lewis A. Coser Dalam Teori Fungsional Tentang Konflik (Konsekuensi Logis Dari Sebuah Interaksi di Antara Pihak Jamaah LDII Dengan Masyarakat Sekitar Gading Mangu-Perak-Jombang)", *Jurnal Al-Adl* 10, no. 1 (2017): 104–124, <http://dx.doi.org/10.31332/aladl.v10i1>.

⁶ Ikrom, "Konflik Prita Vs RS. Omni Pembacaan Teori Dahrendorf: The Dialectical Conflict Theory," *Jurnal At-Taqaddum* 3, no. 2 (n.d.): 270, <https://103.19.37.186/index.php/attaqaddum/article/view/500/449>.

⁷ Isa Anshori, "Melacak State of The Art Fenomenologi Dalam Kajian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial," *Halaqa: Islamic Education Journal* 2, no. 2 (December 31, 2018): 165–81, <https://doi.org/10.21070/halaqa.v2i2.1814>.

⁸ Mohammad Takdir Ilahi, "Kiai: Figur Elite Pesantren," *IBDA': Jurnal Kajian Islam dan Budaya* 12, no. 2 (January 1, 1970): 140, <https://doi.org/10.24090/ibda.v12i2.442>.

From the various arguments above, both an archipelago and a global perspective confirm that the roots of religious conflicts that have hit global issues so far stem from the breakdown of the subsystem that was formed. The authority that influences, experiences systemic failure, or goes with the flow of one of the interests, thus creating a significant imbalance. Authority between one sect and another, or the authority between certain religions, cannot maintain stability and harmony, so that conflict embryos are born that flare up at certain times.

This research is descriptive qualitative, where the researcher photographed the role of Madurese clerics in resolving conflicts from object approach to conflict resolution carried out in-depth. The researcher places himself directly as a critical instrument, namely the data is extracted through the assumptions and knowledge of the researcher as the data holder.⁹ The research was designed through multi-sites involving all investigation elements, namely ulama, congregations, symbols, rituals, and conflicts. To explore the data, the researcher used to interview and observation methods. Interviews were guide to Madura clerics, congregations, and some members of the Sumenep community.¹⁰ However, it was analyzed thoroughly using descriptive analysis techniques, namely looking at the results of extracting data from informants processed through two illustrative patterns; compatibility and accuracy.¹¹ In the final stage, the data obtained from data collection is carefully sorted through 1) data reduction. The data is selected according adjusted to the category, and discarded to match the question. 2) data presentation. The reader can see that the relationship between one informant and other informants is in the same category. 3) concluding, namely valid data that has been passed through data analysis. Once presented, the data is matched again through the validity of the data through triangulation, which looks for the controversial and ambiguous side of the data.

⁹ John W. Creswell, *Research Design, Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*, Trans (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2016), 105.

¹⁰ Lexy J. Moleong, *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif* (Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2014), 158.

¹¹ Sugiyono, *Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif Kualitatif Dan R & D* (Bandung: Alfabeta, 2014), 246.

THE FIGURES OF ULAMA IN SOCIETY

In a social system, we always find a group or individual who influences the direction of life and change in society. As quoted by Zainudin Maliki, the term Laswell is that a group or individual is called an elite. Namely, those who own and get more than what other people have and get, some holding power (governing elite) some are outside power (non-governing elite).¹²

Etymologically, the word Ulama comes from the Javanese language, which refers to three titles, (1) ulama is a term for heirlooms or rare items (ancient), such as Pleret ulama, which is the name of a spear in the Surakarta palace, (2) the title of Ulama is addressed to parents or community leaders as respected figures and recognized by society. The title is given as a person who is an expert in science or a person who has "more value" in a particular field, (3) the community provides the title of Ulama to an expert in Islamic religious sciences.¹³

Responding to Dhofier's categorization, according to Hiroko Horikoshi, scholars are not only the leaders of the Islamic Center and teach the book of turāth, but they also play a significant role in carrying out the social transformation of the pesantren world and surrounding communities. The most critical part of the Ulama is to play traditional orthodoxy, namely as an enforcer of the faith by teaching religious doctrines and maintaining orthodox spiritual practices among Muslims.

For some people, the element called the elite is the Ulama. Because of their expertise in religious knowledge and their services in fostering people, those who become role models in society. Kuntowijoyo describes it as "the island of a thousand Islamic boarding schools,"¹⁴ namely having many scholars; tarekat clerics, violation scholars, pesantren scholars. Each of them has various societal influences depending on their genealogical origins (descent), knowledge, personality, supports of the people, and other supporting factors.

The existence of Ulama goes beyond the influence of other leading institutions. Ulama enters all social elements, from religious

¹² Zainudin Maliki, *Agama Priyayi* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2012), 15.

¹³ Achmad Patoni, *Peran Kiai Pesantren Dalam Partai Politik* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2012), 21.

¹⁴ Muthmainnah, *Jembatan Suramadu: Respon Ulama Terhadap Industrialisasi* (Yogyakarta: LKPSM, 2011), xi.

affairs, medical care, the livelihood of fortune, marriage partners, building houses, social conflicts, careers, politics to ulama blessings. Ulama serves the experiences of the people with great patience, and the people feel satisfied spiritually. The relationship between Ulama and society is known as paternalism, where the relationship between the leader and the leader is like the relationship between a father and his child.¹⁵ Thus, the position of the Ulama in the system elements of society is at the top compared to other components, especially in creating system and cultural changes. This also occurs in the implementation of marriage, which is a religious matter. Ulama are the givers of blessings and implementers of contracts in marriage.

RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

There have been many scientists or observers who define religious conflict as a whole or partially. However, the author agrees more with the definition put forward by Louis Coser as quoted by Bertrand Jacques, as quoted by Nanang Wijaya, religious conflict is "*a struggle over values and claims to secure status, power, and resources a struggle in which the main aims of opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals*".¹⁶ This interpretation illustrates that religious conflicts are more appropriate to be approached with political-economic motives and prioritize the rationality of social phenomena based on the actions of religious communities.

Every understanding of religious conflicts can be seen from various forms because the assumption of knowledge is why a form of spiritual conflict arises under certain conditions. In contrast, other forms of conflict emerge with different requirements. To answer such questions, it is necessary to distinguish what type of security issue has been a source of conflict. Thus, a new understanding of religious conflict appears a dispute concerning claims, values, and identity involving religious specific problems framed in a religious slogan.

Umi Sumbulah confirmed that the meaning of religious conflict is not that important in a discussion. More importantly, it indicates the

¹⁵ MM. Billah, *Pergolakan NU Dan Kelompok Islam* (Jakarta: Lakpesdam NU, 2012), 53.

¹⁶ Nanang Wijaya, "Resolusi Konflik Berbasis Budaya Oleh Masyarakat Kabupaten Poso," *Jurnal Kolaborasi Resolusi Konflik* 2, no. 1 (April 22, 2020): 58., <https://doi.org/10.24198/jkrk.v2i1.27048>.

phenomenon of conflict in the realm of social integration. According to Safri, religious conflict arises because of the involvement (order) in a community system consisting of interrelated and united parts to balance. Therefore, the structure of the social system will disappear by itself if it is not based on its respective functions.¹⁷

Based on the above arguments, there is a correlative proposition between religious conflict and social integration. First, the social system is a combination of collective cultural values institutionalized into norms to become religious motivation. In this case, religious phenomena can control each other to create peace. In phenomenology, it is called inter-subjectivity (*alter ego*). Second, social realities form social systems that function for conflict resilience and balance maintenance.

Third, the type of religious community has an overall system consisting of components that are connected (interdependence). This means, even though different religions, ethnicities, tribes, and the like, still need each other. Fourth, every communal entity in society consists of a structure composed of solid and relative elements.¹⁸ So that they can mutually maintain social resilience from conflict attacks, this power factor can be maximized positively, not in the direction of religious arrogance or egoism.

From this correlation, socio-religious conflict is the last option among the existing paths. And if all social functions run in the realm they should be, then there will be no more threat of disintegration, religiosity usually runs, and the social system is harmonious. At this moment, it lies the harmony of religious adherents if all social functions can run well.

THE ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT

The reality is that Indonesia's plurality is not the only country that is religiously plural. Many other countries are also diverse in religion, ethnicity, language, and race. However, the level of sensitivity of the plural faith is yet thicker in Indonesia. The story of religious

¹⁷ Arif Nuh Safri, "Tatkala Agama Berubah Jadi Bencana", *Nizham: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 4, no. 01 (2015): 157., <https://e-journal.metrouniv.ac.id/index.php/nizham/article/view/887>.

¹⁸ Saihu Saihu, "Pendidikan Pluralisme Agama: Kajian tentang Integrasi Budaya dan Agama dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik Sosial Kontemporer," *Jurnal Indo-Islamika* 9, no. 1 (February 26, 2020): 69., <https://doi.org/10.15408/idi.v9i1.14828>.

plurality in Indonesia is very complex, with the largest population and number of tribes, languages, and ethnicities. In a specific position, the potential for plurality can strike back as a disintegration of the nation. Potential conflicts can arise from all sources (race, religion, ethnicity, language, etc.) and various aspects (economic, political, social, etc.).¹⁹ Therefore, the potential for this religious conflict needs to be removed from the root as the source of the conflict.

Frithjof Schuon mentioned that the root of the conflict must be explored deeply because the existence of religion, daily rituals, interfaith communication, religious interaction, and tolerance are essential “outside” of a religious pluralism concept. Even though the “outer layer” is fixed in such a way, the potential source aspect is experiencing cracks everywhere. This is what triggers the potential for religious conflict, which keeps on coming and going. Schuon, with his theory, asserts that even though religion is different at the superficial level, humanity has a unity that is at the transcendent level.

In humanitarian terms, outside the “outer layer” of religious pluralism, Schoun was stated that human life has several hierarchical levels. The position of God is at the highest level, in which there is a meeting point relationship between various religions. At the lowest level, there is the pluralism of different faiths, each conical to the highest-level point in the form of an upright pyramid triangle. This model of unification of intersections is called the theory of esoteric and exoteric. Because all religions are essentially the same (God esoteric), and form and ritual are different (exoteric).

The nature of exoteric is related to external matters. In this aspect, all religions have a dogma, rules, rituals, beliefs, concepts of God, etc., which are different and seemingly contradictory. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the essence of esotericism, playing a role in the inner realm where all other religions can be brought together.²⁰ This is where religious conflicts can be reduced, at the root of faith itself. Therefore, the level is exoteric analogous to a “physical body,”

¹⁹ Tabrani Za and Warul Walidin, “Hak-Hak Non Muslim dalam Pemerintahan: Konsep Dien wa Ni'mah dan Pluralisme Agama di Indonesia,” *Al-Ijtima'i: International Journal of Government and Social Science* 3, no. 1 (October 30, 2017): 15-28., <https://doi.org/10.22373/jai.v3i1.435>.

²⁰ Zaenuddin Hudi Prasajo and Mustaqim Pabbajah, “Akomodasi Kultural Dalam Resolusi Konflik Bernuansa Agama Di Indonesia” 5 (2020): 1-28., <http://dx.doi.org/10.30984/ajip.v5i1.1131>

while esoteric is the “heartburn” of the direction of different religious movements.

Thus, the root of the religious conflict lies in the “inner layer,” which is called esoteric. If the root part can be balanced, then religious conflict on the “outside” that is exoteric can be prevented by itself. However, even if the “outside” aspect is fixed, while the “inside” part is allowed to have the potential for conflict, the conflict will come and go with the same or different forms. So, it is true that the root of the conflict stems from the failure to fix its esoteric level, and so far, it has been more focused on its level of aesthetics.

SOCIETY, ULAMA AND TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT IN MADURA

Madura is the name of the island. Madura is a dry area because, besides a hot climate and limestone soil conditions, there is also a forest area of at least 6% of the island's site. The location of Madura is 5,304 km², with an average population density of 561.8 per km².²¹ The high level of population density and barren land conditions have caused the socio-economic life of the Madurese people to depend on agricultural activities. From the social aspect, this geographical existence affects the character and character of the Madurese people, including how they practice religion.²²

The social stratification aspects of Madurese society are divided into three classes; (1) *orang kene'*, i.e., a group of people in society who commonly work as farmers, fishermen, and laborers, (2) the middle social class or *ponghebe* including employees working in government bureaucracy, (3) the nobility, descendants of kings, Kyai and prominent social classes. This classification illustrates that the most persuasive authority is the descendants of Kyai or ulama in the Madurese social-religious system. Therefore, below is described the idealism of religious understanding of the Madurese community as an illustration of their spiritual way, the role of the authority of the Ulama in guarding this religious understanding as well as the typology

²¹ Mochmoed Effendhie, *Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Madura: 1850-1940* (Yogyakarta: Matabangsa, 2012), 27.

²² Muhammad Dzofir, *Relasi Sosial Kiai Dan Blater Di Madura* (Jember: Universitas Jember, 2016), 3.

of religious conflicts that emerged in Madura as an effect of spiritual awareness and the power of the Ulama.

RELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING AND THE AUTHORITY OF MADURA ULAMA

The Madurese are a militant type of society towards religious rituals.²³ The ritual tradition that has thickened since our ancestors are still being carried out today. Even though these rituals are no longer relevant to the times and are not supported by the passages of the Koran and Hadith, they are still considered sacred because of ingrained ancestral beliefs.

Like burning frankincense on Friday night and making offerings, this ritual fanaticism is based on religious beliefs as a part of the sacred way of the Madurese people who are fanatic about the traditional belief system of their ancestors. Therefore, it can be said that the source of religious understanding of the Madurese community the first is a tradition that has been carried out from generation to generation, where this tradition, if thoroughly investigated, is rooted in the remnants of Hindu rituals. This conclusion is obtained from the results of the interview, that is:

*When the Maghrib call to prayer is heard, it is common for people here to burn the oil every Friday night. It has been from the elders first. On Friday night, the spirits of our parents, great-grandparents, came here to visit their grandchildren. We burn the oil so that their souls will be happy. While then read basmalah, prayer the Prophet, verse chairs, and other readings that are memorized. We believe that the spirits take care of their grandchildren, avoid calamities, suffering, and other unseen things.*²⁴

When being asked whether the ritual is Islamic or not, Munawar answered:

Yes, I was taught by the Sunan-Sunan, the teachers first. Gulu violations have long been introduced. He said that the spirit must

²³ Abd Hannan and Kudrat Abdillah, "Hegemoni Religio-Kekuasaan Dan Transformasi Sosial" 16 (2019): 9-24., <http://dx.doi.org/10.24014/sb.v16i1.7037>

²⁴ Interview, Sa'iti (Sumenep, 11 January 2021). Sai'iti is an inhabitant in Sumenep Regency who yet has been preserving the burning incense up to now, she said that this is a part of her belief in spirits who are also part of God's creatures. Providing offerings is of good value to Islam, because it has been practiced for a long time.

*be glorified by burning incense, giving offerings, and the like. If not, they usually rebel so that our family is either crazy or crazy. It has become a tradition. We ask Allah for protection through this (ritual).*²⁵

Furthermore, secondly, the religious understanding of the Madurese community is influenced by the authority of the Ulama as a figure or symbol of Islamic scholarship. The existence of the Ulama is not only positioned as a religious expert figure, but more than that, the cleric becomes the dependent actor on the way society understands religion. Every change, shift, or development of knowledge lies in its territory as a religious authority. Ulama are the primary source in understanding faith, filtering, accepting, and rejecting all new knowledge. On the one hand, the Ulama put themselves on the side of filterers, and the other of the position of religion makers.

Ulama can control the flow of changes in religious dogma and embellish with new understanding as a result of their learned knowledge. According to researchers' observations, what the ulama practice, whether through lectures or exemplifying the attitude of action, is described as a form of religion itself. Everything related to scholars, ranging from perspectives, speech, advice, is considered a manifestation of the condition of belief. Therefore, Madurese people choose to be stagnant and passive in religious matters. Static in the sense that they do not dare to make reforms but preserve what is already there is their religion. Meanwhile, what is meant by passive is allowing previous religious rituals to be carried out without making a little input.

Therefore, the role of the Madurese people themselves is more about *taqlidiyah* or handing over all religious affairs to the scholars without protesting at all. Being *taqlid* in the sense of following whatever is taught by scholars with the principle of *sami'na wa atho'na* or *sam'an wa atho'an* (we listen and we obey to do it). The way of worshipping with such a principle has long been alternating with each age, without being influenced by time. The authority of scholars as role models and religious, social actors have been intertwined for

²⁵ Interview, Munawar (Sumenep, 11 January 2021). Muanwar is a community leader in Sumenep Regency, who has followed Islamic patterns from the past, respected traditional leaders and become a source of knowledge.

generations. With this position, the scholars play an essential role in filtering all the currents of sacred knowledge that come and at the same time instill the right religious way to the Madurese people. The position of the Ulama is as a *muqallid* (actor of religious knowledge) and society as *taqlidiyah* (followers of the Ulama).

As revealed by Rizkiyah, a trader in implementing zakat on trade.

*Yes, zakat fitrah, usually, is delivered to teachers or poor neighbors. Every year we give zakat before Eid. Besides, there is no zakat. We do not know if there is another zakat. Only following the orders of the many kyai here, if they are not told (to be said), then it is not obligatory. We are ordinary people. We don't know anything. If the kyai says we are obliged to do so, then we don't. Kyai is our pilot. Our religious rituals depend on the Kyai. In religion, we are the same here. There is no conflict. Likewise, if there are not Muslims, we are told to respect, so we follow.*²⁶

The words of the scholars are very influential on rituals with religious nuances in the Madurese society. They are willing to sacrifice everything for what has been recommended. As stated by Anshori, one of the citizens of Madura:

*That is true that every molot month (the month of Rabi'ul Awwal on the Hijri calendar, we celebrate the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. Kyai-kyai (Islamic leaders) often deliver during talks in the mosque or kompolan whether the Prophet will come to the house of the person who celebrates the Prophet's birthday. He will be given his intercession and blessings. Who does not want the Prophet to come? Every year I celebrate mawlid even in small ways. Almost all houses celebrate gold. Sometimes a day can be 3-4 invitations that come. Alhamdulillah, kyai here has informed.*²⁷

The figures of Ulama are not only limited to the spiritual aspect but also broader social life. In other words, the role of the Ulama is not only as a mediator of legal issues or Islamic doctrine but also as

²⁶ Interview, Rizkiyah (Sumenep, 01 February 2021). Rizkiyah has a food stall which has been exist since 1998, has many branches and has income up to zakat nisab.

²⁷ Interview, Anshori (Sumenep, 01 February 2021). Anshori is an inhabitant of Sumenep-Madura who annually celebrates the birthday of the Prophet (Maulid Nabi).

an agent of social change and changes in religious culture.²⁸ Thus, it is clear that the role of Ulama for the Madurese community can explore all spaces in life. Even the existence of the Ulama trumps other authorities such as the government and aristocrats. For the Madurese people, the ulama are likened to kings, where the ulama are the ultimate source of social power and religion (power and social authority of religion). Like people in rural areas, they place ulama as social, political, and economic elite. As a result, the ulama are placed as the most influential authorities in social and religious life.

The impact of this fanatical assumption of ulama figures impacts the religious patterns or ways of the Madurese people. Even though along with the development of knowledge, socio-politics, culture, and economy, some of the attitudes of the ulama are "counterproductive," that is, to filter as tight as possible to fortify the entry of negative dogmas in religion. In general, Ulama's strategy for maintaining religious understanding is carried out in many ways, such as filling out studies in women's organizations, youth organizations, community organizations, and the community itself, through lectures in these communities and courses on the pulpit.

Third, intellectual figure. The scholarships achieved in tertiary institutions also influence Islam in Madurese society, even in rural areas. Although the research results, interviews, and observations, say that intellectuals do not have an essential role in society. All the places of the social subsystem have been in business by the Ulama and with community support. Indirectly, only intellectuals are considered the same as the regular class of society—however, the community appointed intellectuals who have *trah Ulama* or previously established figures as their successors.

TYPES OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN MADURA

The researchers observed that the only violent conflict that occurred in the Madura region with religious ideals was the Sunni-Shia conflict in Sampang from 2006 to its peak in 2012. Besides causing one victim, it also resulted in the relocation of Shia.²⁹ After this opaque conflict,

²⁸ Mohammad Masrur, "Figur Kyai dan Pendidikan Karakter di Pondok Pesantren" 01 (2017): 273, <https://doi.org/10.32332/tarbawiyah.v1i01.1022>.

²⁹ Masdar Hilmy, "Akar-akar Transnasionalisme Islam Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)," *ISLAMICA: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 6, no. 1 (January 22, 2014): 27-51., <https://>

the Madura region is a clean, safe, and peaceful archipelago between religious communities. In addition to upholding the thickness of customs, culture, morals, character, principles, it also has a high sense of brotherhood towards others or adherents of other religions.

This moral and brotherhood development cannot be separated from the historical roots of the spread of Islam in Madura. In introducing Islam, the scholars are done by cultivating morals and religious knowledge as the primary foundation. The process can create a favorable climate for the community's character continuously, refreshing the spirit who is experiencing turmoil in life.³⁰ This basis of knowledge and morality creates goodness, raises enthusiasm, and strengthens brotherhood. This religious character is cultivated generatively (gradual, hereditary), planted, and guarded by Ulama until it becomes a habit.

Besides, the duties and responsibilities of ulama are getting more prominent because of the dynamic development of Madurese thinking. Thus, the scholars updated every preventive measure to protect the people, such as teaching religious harmony orally, by modeling and formal education. The teaching model of spiritual knowledge combines divine theology, religious knowledge, and morals or attitudes. These elements are integrally wrapped in aspects of culture, customs, formal and informal education, and interactions in social life where the ulama act as the sole authority.

Besides the general principles of resolving religious conflicts, the researcher also found several religious disputes that had emerged in the Madura region and the Sunni-Shia conflict in Sampang. However, in this study, researchers took samples in one of the most peaceful areas with the most Islamic boarding schools, full of religious scholars and types of society with royal nuances. Some of the religious conflicts found by researchers are:

First, religious conflicts are based on economic assets. Since 2002, several ethnic Chinese have visited communities in coastal areas with tourism potential and business development. The conversion of community land as the only support is being taken without realizing it. This phenomenon creates pros and cons in the community itself. Differences lead to divisions between the blater and

doi.org/10.15642/islamica.2011.6.1.1-13.

³⁰ Ilahi, "Kiai," 138-140.

the local government. Then, this created a social conflict that led to the positioning of one of the schools. The riding of a particular sect was carried out by ethnic Chinese to gain sympathy and support. In the end, it is broken out from a conflict with a social background into a religious conflict.

Based on researchers' observations, the conflict with a socio-economic background was carried away by the religious domains internally. Therefore, it shapes a religious community between one community organization and another, with the role of kyai (Ulama), who are divided into several schools by taking positions as contra and pro. The depiction of this sectarian religious conflict occurred in the eastern area of Sumenep Regency and has penetrated several areas in other districts.

Second, religious conflict is based on sect. The emergence of Islamic religious traditions in the Madura region is a natural consequence of the nature of fanaticism and the number of ordinary people. Various socio-religious organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, LDII, FPI, and *tariqah-tariqah* (other sects). This sectarian religious conflict does not end in violence but creates religious tensions that make their religious rituals impact disharmony and disintegrate.

We are both Muslims, but our rituals are different, and the ways we understand are different. We have a dhikr group that we believe in together and have teachers who understand Islam. But the "neighbors" did not like it and forbade us, so we built a mosque here. This is next door, one piece of land, but there are two mosques, the congregation is different. Instead of a conflict, we better build a place of worship. However, it is uncomfortable and not pleasing. Our families all follow us, even though our neighbors are different, but never mind. We just let our relations with neighbors, relatives, and various sects go away.³¹

A deliberation was held, but no agreement was found. The village head, sub-district head, and ulama leaders have been given way out, but there is no common ground between the Ulama. Yes, finally stick to their beliefs. We provided that each other maintains

³¹ Interview, Erysyad (nick name), (Sumenep, 02 February 2021). Erysyad is a close name, not his real name, because the informant was asked to keep his name secret due to the possibility of having a conflict.

*safety and comfort. As nahdiyyin residents, we are always open to discussion, tabayyun, and deliberation.*³²

Third, community-based religious conflict. This conflict is also the same as the types of the previous conflict. That is, it does not lead to violence. Some kyai or ulama split into several sects such as FPI, NU, and other denominations. As a result of this division, the fluctuation of followers also occurred in society. This is because kyai has a community-based charisma. Every kyai who owns an Islamic Center, of course, has fanatical followers. This fanaticism is by the time have been creating chaos socio-religious conflicts.

From the three types of conflicts, a common thread can be drawn that the type of religious conflict in the Madura region is the internal division of Islam itself. The number of religions, whether sects, *tariqah*, or sempalan of the Islamic faith, can cause religious conflicts. Because most religious practices are passionate, even from the outer part they have adopted, the sects are considered to have different religions. Therefore, the potential for violence that emerges is the birth of radical currents within the religious sect. Or at least, it is non-radical but has similarities with the nature of radicalism that threatens spiritual peace.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE STRATEGIES OF ULAMA

The authority of the Ulama as actors has social and religious control become the main asset in preventive efforts and resolving religious conflicts. In Antony Giddens' structural theory, the position of the Ulama is described as a structural and a cultural agent who stands tense to guard the fortress of change while creating the adaptation itself in the body of society. Giddens illustrates that social stability and disintegration depend on the pattern of the role agents. If it can provide positive-constructive nuances, the socio-religious conditions will be harmonious, and vice versa. If the part of the agent is divided or experiencing cracks, then the entire social system will also experience conflict.³³

³² *Interview*, Sami'uddin, (Sumenep, 02 Februari 2021). Is one of the members of NU who is honoured in the area of Sumenep-Madura.

³³ Anthony Giddens, *Constitution of Society: The Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 230.

The position of the Ulama's authority for the Madurese community is the same as what Antony Giddens described as an agent of structure and culture, the same as what illustrated by Hiroko Horikoshi as an agent of social transformation.³⁴ And Clifford Geertz's opinion as a cultural broker. Ulama are far from the depths of the social system. All social aspects such as law, ethics, education, religion are oriented to the figure of Ulama. This is what breaks the public's trust because the ulama are also damaged. Thus, people who are fanatics of one of the Ulama, whether due to family relations, scientific knowledge, or love, will also follow Ulama's path.

From the various religious sects, however, they have a point of encounter. The Islamic religion's values, principles, and goals are not uprooted because of differences in ritual and thought. Essential things such as morality, justice, trust, mercy, brotherhood become human values maintained together. Thus, these values constrain and, at the same time, fortify the occurrence of violence between religious sects. From the research results, from the various religious sectarian conflicts that have been submitted, the researcher found several forms or models of conflict prevention and resolution in the Madura region, including:

First, the closed persuasion model (hidden resolution). In a sociological study, this model was first put forward by Lewis A. Coser with the theory of hidden conflict, which states that a conflict is not visible from the surface but experiences deep inner pressure. Coser does not call this term hidden conflict, but he calls it non-realistic. This theory inspires researchers to say that preventing and resolving religious disputes in the Madura region uses remote resolution. In determining the indications of religious conflict, it is carried out persuasively but hiddenly.

First of all, kyai (Ulama) conduct studies or deliberations that aim to indicate potential conflicts, things that are shown to contain several things; 1) religious figures, 2) indications of radicalism, and 3) ethnic immigrants. Several religious figures or kyai who were extracurricular activities in the community became the primary targets for damned. By taking a compelling way, the Ulama resolves conflict approaches religious figures who were indicated to be different, invited to deliberate

³⁴ Hiroko Horikoshi, *A Traditional Leader in a Time of Change: The Kijaji and Ulama in West Java USA* (USA: Urbana Champaign, 1976), 187.

and study the truth and scientific knowledge. Deliberations were held at the shown houses of religious figures. At the same time, the topic of discussion was the alignment of religious understanding with the study of texts and sanads that reached the Prophet, Muhammad. Up to we found a bright spot. In the aspect of indications of radicalism, identification was carried out in several areas that were potentially vulnerable to being visited by radical groups. One of the clerics was assigned to guard these areas. Meanwhile, in the ethnic aspect of immigrants, their movements were sterilized.

There was one kyai in the eastern part of Sumenep Regency, formerly NU, yet there was news that he had changed direction to a sect that was indicated as being radical. At that time, we went to his residence to do *tabayyun*, correcting his truth and reasons for *naqliyah*. While we were there, it turned out that he did not confess and still held the spirit of NU. But after being asked, he finally admitted. Therefore, when we straightened and reopened dialectics until we found common ground. That is how we prevent religious conflict through misconceptions like radicals.³⁵

Second, the hidden reconciliation. This form is a little different from persuasive. In fact, according to researchers, open reconciliation is a systematic development of a compelling model. If it is conceptually compelling to put the conflicting parties together, led by a mediator, negotiator, or arbitrator, to reach a common ground (*islah*), if the open reconciliation model does not gather together in one assembly, but it is more likely to look for points from both individuals and communities thought to be the leading causes of the conflicts.

For example, what was done by the Ulama, when there was a conflict between the religious sects in the city center between LDII and the denomination *of sempalan*, the Ulama did not gather them in one assembly point. Still, they encouraged “kyai of LDII” to have hidden discussions, looking for a win solution by seeing the opportunity of having *islah* to their different willingness. Kyai of LDII was chosen because they were the most active ones in protesting and being fanatics. Therefore, when the source of the main problem has been controlled, it is taken to an open space to find a way out.

³⁵ Deni Irawan and Zarul Arifin, “The Relationship Between Islamic Fundamentalism and Radicalism With Social Conflict,” *Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 21, no. 1 (May 12, 2021): 35–53, <https://doi.org/10.21154/altahrir.v21i1.2636>.

As happened in one of the sub-districts in Sumenep, we have visited each Islamic religious sect. Still, first, we approach kyai-kyai, mastering one religious' sect as the most fanatic sect and are eager to have a conflict after finding a solution. It was conducted in an open forum for a mutual agreement. There are two mosques from different sects but have agreed not to disturb and accept every ritual difference.³⁶

Third, hidden filtered. This model is a way of preventing religious conflicts, namely, by making efforts to avoid religious disputes from being ignited or the cultivation of certain radical ideologies being transferred in the minds of the Madurese people, either through lectures on the pulpit of mosques, recitations. This filtering effort is carried out securely because every open public space is strictly controlled so that the radical embryos of the flow are seriously filtered.

The meaning of hidden filtration, more precisely, is to sort out anti-radicalize and *wasathiyah kyai*. Thus, in certain areas, kyai has been assigned to guard and select kyai appropriate to preach, provide role models and solve social problems. The concept, which the researchers got from the results of interviews and observations, is that the filtration lies in three aspects: 1) the authority of the Ulama, 2) the scientific background of the Ulama, 3) the public forum in receiving da'wah.

The results of the researcher's interview showed that there were two examples of closed filtration: *first*, several years ago, there were five preachers who were strange to the area, they asked permission from the leader of the mosque, *takmir*, in one of Islamic Centers to give Islamic lectures both at the mosque's pulpit and an Islamic public speech. But then, *takmir* (mosque leader) has been asked to wait to call several ulama. After being traced, it turned out that they were a part of radical sects that had a program to build a thousand mosques. *Second*, there was an incident where one of the residents conducted the event to celebrate the Prophet's Birthday (Maulid nabi), invited the most fundamentalist and conservative kyai. Finally, to request a kyai, we have to confirm first with the local kyai.

³⁶ *Interview*, Syahid Munawar (Sumenep, January, 19 2021). Syahid Munawar is an expert in Islam (kiai) who are honoured in the area of Sumenep-Madura.

From the three models of resolution and prevention, it is clear that the efforts made by Madurese ulama are in the form of nuanced for kinship and the benefit of the people. The radical understanding of a sect becomes the main target to prevent society from being poisoned by complicated ideas that threaten social integrity and the state. The role of the Ulama is more in combing the parts of the socio-religious subsystem rather than just trying to “the only outside part.” Such as the hidden concept is promoted both on the side of persuasion, reconciliation, and filtration because the “inside” of the social system is the spirit of every religious conflict that arises.

COMPLETE CONTEMPORARY RESOLUTION MODEL

Religious conflicts are different from other social conflicts. The difference lies in almost all aspects, especially related to religious sensitivity in the area of belief. The element of religious belief contains three essential human parts at once; spiritual, emotional, and intellectual. In reality, spirituality is manifested from monotheism, where religious rituals and understandings become daily realities. Emotions embodied from fanaticism, and a sense of right (valid claim) in religion can be seen from many conflicts caused by emotional factors. At the same time, the intellectual aspect of religion lies in the knowledge of the belief that is lived. These three aspects illustrate how complete the religious conflict is.

Fazlur Rahman, in Nanda D. Sabrina’s quotation, said that religion is a unity of life entities. Humans and the universe and their components are part of religion. So religion is broad. Likewise, the conflicts that arise combine all aspects of life. So to get to the root of the conflict, it takes a total sweep of all layers. They are starting from the subsystem, psychology, social to the form of religion itself. Resolution of religious conflicts, which only peels off the social skin, has temporary implications. Conflicts keep re-emerging, both in the same or in different ways. Religious conflicts continually metamorphose, grow and threaten social integration.³⁷

³⁷ Sudarman Sudarman and Mohammad Hidayaturrehman, “RELATION OF RELIGION, ECONOMY AND POLITICS: Islamization of Malay Community through Trade and Kingdom,” *Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 20, no. 2 (June 20, 2020): 175–94, <https://doi.org/10.21154/altahrir.v20i2.2007>.

In addition to Yemen, Egypt, and Tunisia, Indonesia is included in countries that can burn religious conflict. Pluralism and multiculturalism have been the reasons for the birth of religious wars since the first. Resolving disputes with religious backgrounds in Indonesia requires a complete strategy of all socio-religious sides. This resolution approach leads to the psychology of religion, belief, knowledge, and community stigma. Some of the resolved conflict resolutions are more partial. Thus, religious conflicts re-emerge and are easily ignited.

Like Nurfitriani, Suparman, and Buchari Mengge, they found a model of religious conflict resolution based on a splinter sect, namely Ahmadiyah in Makassar. It revealed that the Ahmadiyah conflict that has been raging in the Makassar area since 1987 can be resolved by proclaiming the principles of love and anti-hate, dogmatic the conflicting parties with the concept of Rahmat li al-Alamin (Islam as a religion of compassion for all human beings).³⁸ The essence of conflict resolution offered leads to emotional faith by bringing up the values of enlivening religion. The weakness of this finding, rejected by Azyumardi Azra, is that understanding the importance of religion alone can only be felt by Muslims who are kaffah and understand Islam deeply but not by Muslims who are still taqlid. This is because religious understanding is born from the work of reason and the chain of religious figures who are believed to be.³⁹

The authors found that instilling the value of harmony (love of peace) in understanding religion is an integral part of the hidden resolution approach. Only one part of the resolution of religious conflicts, and there are other parts. Therefore, comprehensive conflict resolution is needed in eradicating forms of religious strife. Not to mention the economic motive, of course, We cannot resolve it only through the values of peace and non-violence as Nurfitriani's research above. As stated by Masdar Hilmi, the background of the religious

³⁸ Nurfitriani Nurfitriani, Suparman Abdullah, and Buchari Mengge, "Conflict and Violence among Religious People: A Case Study of Conflict and Violence Against the Ahmadiyah Congregation in Makassar City," *International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding* 7, no. 11 (January 2, 2021): 497., <https://doi.org/10.18415/ijmmu.v7i11.2280>.

³⁹ Azyumardi Azra, "Geneology of Indonesian Islamic Education: Roles in the Modernization of Muslim Society," *NUSANTARA: International Journal of Religious Literature and Heritage* 4, no. 1 (2015): 85., <https://doi.org/10.31291/hn.v4i1.63>

conflict in Sampang Madura in 2015 was not caused by differences in the ideology of Islamic schools. Still, it was motivated by social capital between religious community groups⁴⁰ From Masdar's research. We can see that the value of peace cannot be used to resolve religious conflicts.

According to him, another model of religious conflict resolution found by Fardan M. Imamah, the believer can resolve religious sensitivity as the root of religious conflict using communal unification, madhhab, or other community concepts such as tariqah. Fardan sees conflict conjunctions in Muslim-populated countries such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iraq, and eastern countries, reducing religious conflicts through community development. Finally, it is related to resolving disputes through communities in Lampung in 2019. In his research, Fardan rejects that the cause of religious conflict is differences in religion, ethnicity, race. Instead, politics, economics, and personal issues are the causes of friction.⁴¹ The resolution aims to fix the community sector to not place political and economic interests as the root of the problem.

However, Fardan forgot that every religious community must have an attitude of fanaticism and conservatism. It can be seen from how the religious community emphasizes inclusive behavior and prefers to create a new society rather than having different thoughts. As stated by Limas Dodi, religious sects were created due to their community's fanaticism and valid claims. They are based on new knowledge. Such an attitude makes it difficult for conflict resolution values to enter as a resolver.⁴² Therefore, in the author's research, hidden persuasion is the best solution because it inserts religious communities through a direct and closed approach and then ends with the concept of tabayyun after everything is conditioned. This is what is meant by community-based conflict resolution through hidden conflict resolution.

⁴⁰ Hilmy, "The Political Economy of Sunni-Shi'ah Conflict in Sampang Madura," 138.

⁴¹ Fardan Mahmudatul Imamah, "Unraveling Communal Conflict In South Lampung," *Proceeding: International Conference on Islamic Studies (ICIS) IAIN Ponorogo* 3, no. 4 (2019): 23-37., <https://prosiding.iainponorogo.ac.id/index.php/icis/article/view/3>

⁴² Limas Dodi, "Power-Based Economic Politics In Persatuan Islam (Persis) In Sapeken, Sumenep-Madura" *Madania: Jurnal Kajian Keislaman* 25, no. 1 (2021): 45-57., <http://dx.doi.org/10.29300/madania.v25i1.4226>

Abdul Fatah assessed that the religious conflict in East Java had similarities with the conflict in Egypt, which was based on religious sects. Several cases in East Java also show that the conflict is motivated by internal religious sects or communities. So it is claimed that East Java only uses the consolidation method between the community, government, and religious communities.⁴³ But on the other hand, research by M. Alie Humaedi considers that consolidation results in the failure of cultural acculturation and the potential for conflict at one time. Because consolidation requires meeting points of cultural acculturation, otherwise religious conflicts can flare-up.⁴⁴ According to Zai nuddin H. Prasajo's research, the mediator should consider cultural accommodation before deciding on consolidation. Cultural accommodation, embracing all ethnic and social status differences. However, the concept of cultural accommodation that Zainuddin and Mustaqim shouted was inclined to just cultural alignment, where religious values were not a priority.

The three studies above are not appropriate in the context of religious conflicts in Indonesia. Apart from the fact that Indonesia has a pluralistic nature of religions and religions, cultures, ethnicities, and tribes interconnected with faith. It also has a complete social system. There must be a combination of three things: the community, embodied by sects, sand, and fanaticism. Second, socio-economic, manifested by culture and ethnicity along with primary needs. Third, religious authorities, namely teachers, leaders, and figures who control the movement towards the religious understanding of the community. These three things are discussed thoroughly as a conflict resolution that the author does.

CONCLUSION

From the research and discussion above, it can be concluded that there are several essential things. *Firstly*, types of religious conflicts in the Madura region are internal conflicts of Muslims, conflicts between Islamic sects, not conflicts between followers of different religions.

⁴³ Abdul Fatah, "Konsolidasi Komunal sebagai Mitigasi Konflik Agama di Jawa Timur," *Lentera Hukum* 5, no. 1 (May 7, 2018): 115-126., <https://doi.org/10.19184/ejlh.v5i1.6636>.

⁴⁴ M. Alie Humaedi, "Kegagalan Akulturasi Budaya dan Isu Agama dalam Konflik Lampung," *Analisa* 21, no. 2 (December 30, 2014): 146-157., <https://doi.org/10.18784/analisa.v21i02.11>.

This sectarian religious conflict has three types; 1) socio-economic-based religious conflict, 2) community-based religious sect conflict, and 3) sectarian religious conflict based on institutional authority. Divisions support these three types of sectarian religious conflict in the social subsystem, namely rifts that occur on the plain of a single authority in Madura.

Second, to reduce and resolve conflicts, the efforts made by the Ulama as a model for religious conflict resolution can be concluded into three models, namely 1) a closed persuasive model (hidden resolution). This model has several stages; deliberate internally in identifying figures or persons causing conflicts, do *tabayyun* and dialogues with these figures to find brighter spots of problem, 2) model of hidden reconciliation, namely by reconciling several authorities and communities separately (not sitting together with all parties to a conflict), 3) lead hidden filtered, which is to block every possibility that can create religious strife, significantly different ideas of thought such as radical, fundamental and puritanical.

The findings of this conflict resolution model are based on the religious climate of the very religious Madurese community, the most representative Muslim area in the archipelago. Also, arguing from the theoretical nature that continues to develop, this research has shortcomings, namely the religious conflict in Madura, which is not as big as conflicts in other areas, and the role of the government is not involved. Thus, further research needs to be done by contextualizing these findings to religious communal disputes.

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