

REVIEWING THE ROLE OF THE COORDINATING BOARD FOR CAMPUS DA'WAH INSTITUTIONS (BKLDK) IN SPREADING RADICALISM

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abstract: *This paper discusses a driving factor that contributes to the rising of radicalism on major campuses around Bandung. The research focuses on the Coordinating Board for Campus Da'wah Institutions (BKLDK), a sub-organization of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) campaigning Khilafah ideology around campuses in the Bandung area, West Java. The research deploys a qualitative method with data collection through participant observation ories in BKLDK activities, interviews with key informants, and document review. Referring to the circulation of Khilafah ideology carried out by BKLDK, this study argues that the rising of a narrative on radicalism among campuses is due to the absence of differentiation in understanding and handling radicalism itself. Focusing on the role of BKLDK, considered a radical movement, this organization and on spreading ideas without violence, precisely succeeded in mainstreaming Khilafah discourse among students on campuses around Bandung through a strategy of distributing leaflets as reading material and public discussions. Meanwhile, a government and campuses strategy to counterbalance the discourse of radicalism tends to generalize between the radicalism of ideas and radicalism as a violent movement*

الملخص: تناقش هذه الورقة العوامل التي تؤدي إلى تعزيز سرد التطرف في دوائر الحرم الجامعي. يركز هذا البحث على الدور الذي تلعبه منظمة جناح حزب التحرير الإندونيسي (ITH) ، أي مجلس التنسيق لمؤسسات الدعوة في الحرم الجامعي (KDLKB) في الحرم الجامعي في منطقة باندونغ ، جاوة الغربية. يستخدم البحث الأساليب النوعية باستخدام

تقنيات جمع البيانات من خلال المشاركة والمقابلات ومراجعة الوثائق. بالإشارة إلى انتشار الأفكار التي نفذتها KDLKB في الحملات من أجل أيديولوجية الخلافة ، تجادل هذه الدراسة بأن تعزيز سرديّة التطرف بين الجامعات يحدث لأنه لا يوجد فصل بين التطرف كفهم والراديكالية كحركة عنيفة. أدى هذا إلى ولادة معالجة عامة للراديكالية نفسها. من خلال فحص دور KDLKB كمنظمة مصنفة على أنها حركة راديكالية ، على الرغم من أن هذه المنظمة تعتمد على استراتيجية لنشر الأفكار دون استخدام العنف والتي نجحت بالفعل في تعميم خطاب الخلافة بين الطلاب في منطقة باندونغ من خلال إستراتيجية توزيع منشورات مواد القراءة وأنشطة المناقشة العامة. وفي الوقت نفسه ، فإن التعامل مع الحكومة والحرم الجامعي في موازنة انتشار الأفكار الراديكالية يكون أكثر عمومية بطبيعته ، دون تمييز بين الراديكاليين كفكرة والراديكاليين كحركات عنيفة. ساهم الفهم العام والتعامل معه في التعزيز المستمر لأفكار وحركات التطرف في دوائر الحرم الجامعي.

Abstrak: *Tulisan ini membahas tentang faktor penyebab menguatnya narasi radikalisme di kalangan kampus. Penelitian ini difokuskan pada peran yang dijalankan oleh organisasi sayap Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), yakni Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (BKLDK) di kampus-kampus wilayah Bandung, Jawa Barat. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan menggunakan teknik pengumpulan data melalui kajian dokumen, partisipasi berperan serta dan wawancara. Dengan mengacu pada penyebaran gagasan yang dilakukan oleh BKLDK dalam mengkampanyekan ideologi Khilafah, penelitian ini berargumen bahwa menguatnya narasi radikalisme di kalangan kampus terjadi karena tidak adanya pemilahan antara radikalisme sebagai pemahaman dan radikalisme sebagai gerakan kekerasan. Hal ini melahirkan penanganan yang bersifat generalis terhadap radikalisme itu sendiri. Dengan mengkaji pada peran BKLDK sebagai organisasi yang dikategorikan sebagai gerakan radikal, padahal organisasi ini mengandalkan strategi penyebaran ide tanpa menggunakan kekerasan (violent) yang justru telah berhasil mengarusutamakan wacana Khilafah di kalangan mahasiswa di wilayah Bandung melalui strategi penyebaran selebaran bahan bacaan dan kegiatan diskusi publik. Sementara itu, penanganan dari pemerintah dan pihak kampus dalam mengimbangi penyebaran ide-ide radikal tadi, lebih bersifat general, tanpa membedakan antara radikal sebagai*

sebuah gagasan dengan radikal sebagai gerakan kekerasan. Pemahaman dan penanganan yang generalis tadi, berkontribusi pada tetap menguatnya ide dan gerakan radikalisme di kalangan kampus.

Keywords: Khilafah, radicalism, campus, moderate Islam.

INTRODUCTION

The trend of religious radicalism in the campus environment has attracted the attention of many parties. This can be seen in President Joko Widodo's statement that alludes to the issue of radicalism at least twice. The first opportunity was at a meeting in Bali on September 26, 2017, when the President asked the chancellors at universities to play a more significant role in overcoming religious radicalism among students, especially the threat from radical religious groups that target students as recruits. President Joko Widodo also conveyed the second opportunity before the Indonesian Chancellor's Council on September 13, 2021, by reminding the chancellor at universities to remain vigilant against individuals or groups introducing and attaching radicalized ideas among students.¹

The former head of the BNPT, Suhardi Alius, warned of the threat of religious phenomena on campus, where the target for recruiting members of radical terrorists is students. Usually, they carry out mentoring schemes for entering universities, providing foster homes, and becoming members of their groups. This concern is not without reason.² In 2017, the Alvara Research Center conducted a survey and provided comprehensive data on the rise of religious radicalism among university students. Hasanuddin Ali, chairman of the Alvara Research Center, revealed that the study found data that 19.6 percent of the total 1,800 students in the survey supported the Sharia regulation, 17.8 percent supported the establishment of an Islamic caliphate as a form of government in Indonesia, and 23.4

¹ Dewi Nurita, "Jokowi Ingatkan Rektor: Hati-Hati Ada Yang Mendidik Mahasiswa Jadi Radikal," *Tempo.Co*, 2021, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1506168/jokowi-ingatkan-rektor-hati-hati-ada-yang-mendidik-mahasiswa-jadi-radikal>.

² Endang, "BNPT Apresiasi Pesantren Tempat Pembinaan Eks Teroris," *Antaranews.Com*, 2017, <https://sumut.antaranews.com/berita/164472/bnpt-apresiasi-pesantren-tempat-pembinaan-eks-teroris>.

percent “ready to carry out jihad in upholding the Islamic caliphate in Indonesia.”³

However, so far, studies on radicalism have looked at the tendency of radicalism in violent movements and tend to equate existing patterns and forms of radicalism. For example, the study of Zulkarnain and Purnama,⁴ sees the ISIS movement as a pioneer for radical movements in Indonesia; then another study by Chalmers,⁵ Kafid,⁶ Mufid,⁷ Saini⁸ and Sumbulah,⁹ who both concluded that the orientation of the radical movement on violent behavior. There are radical movements that are only centered on the level of ideas, such as the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) movement. This movement focuses on the concept of a *Khilafah* without resorting to violent means such as attacks and using weapons in carrying out its plan.¹⁰ So far, observers tend to generalize all forms of action as radicalism. In this case, there is a generalization between one particular movement and another radicalism movement. The result of this generalization is the formation of excessive stereotypes and can even accuse a certain group of being a radical group without using clear indicators. Another impact is in terms of handling radicalism itself, where the handling is not based on the level of radicalism, but is generalized.

³ Hasanuddin Ali, *Radicalism Rising Among Educated People? Research Findings on Professionals, College and High Schools Students* (Jakarta: Alvara Research Institute, 2017).

⁴ Fisher Zulkarnain and Tata Septayuda Purnama, “The ISIS Movement and the Threat of Religious Radicalism in Indonesia,” *Mimbar: Jurnal Sosial Dan Pembangunan* 32, no. 1 (2016): 31–39.

⁵ Ian Chalmers, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Bringing Back the Jihadists,” *Asian Studies Review* 41, no. 3 (2017): 331–51.

⁶ Nur Kafid, “Dari Islamisme Ke ‘Premanisme’: Pergeseran Orientasi Gerakan Kelompok Islam Radikal Di Era Desentralisasi Demokrasi,” *MASYARAKAT: Jurnal Sosiologi*, 2016, 57–79.

⁷ Fatkhul Mufid, “Radikalisme Islam Dalam Perspektif Epistemologi,” *Addin* 10, no. 1 (2016): 61–82.

⁸ Muhammad Saini, “Islam Dan Radikalisme (Diskursus: Perilaku Kekerasan Atas Nama Agama Di Indonesia),” *JURNAL LENTERA: Kajian Keagamaan, Keilmuan Dan Teknologi* 14, no. 1 (2016): 55–72.

⁹ Umi Sumbulah, “Agama, Kekerasan Dan Perlawanan Ideologis,” *Islamica* 1, no. 1 (2006): 1–11.

¹⁰ Syamsul Arifin, “Gerakan Keagamaan Baru Dalam Indonesia Kontemporer: Tafsir Sosial Atas Hizbut Tahrir,” *Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 14, no. 1 (2014): 117, <https://doi.org/10.21154/al-tahrir.v14i1.80>.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as an Islamic organization was officially disbanded by the Indonesian government on July 19, 2017. Known organizations wishing to establish the return of the *Khilafah* in Indonesia was formally dissolved by the government through the revocation of their organizational permit through the issuance of Government Regulation instead of Law (PERPPU) concerning Social Organizations Number 2 of 2017.¹¹ In the PERPPU, it is stated that an organization that is a legal entity is prohibited from standing and carrying out activities in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) when it adheres to an ideology other than Pancasila. Meanwhile, HTI, in its organizational statutes, does not include the basic idea of Pancasila but uses another principle, namely the doctrine of the Islamic *Khilafah*. For this reason, the government finally dissolved HTI and banned all its activities in Indonesia.¹²

However, even though it has been banned, the activities of the HTI movement are still ongoing in Indonesia. Their movement's actions after being denied were through their wing organization, the Coordinating Board for Campus Da'wah Institutions (BKLDK). BKLDK has a role in spreading the idea of the *Khilafah* and is tasked with recruiting prospective HTI members on campuses in Indonesia, such as in Jakarta,¹³ Malang, Yogyakarta, South Kalimantan, and North Sumatra.¹⁴ Researchers rarely know these two roles, so they have missed this study on the BKLDK.

This is evidenced by several types of research on radicalism in the campus environment that skip studies on the HTI wing organization, namely BKLDK. So far, studies of radicalism in campus circles have focused on the organization Liberation Student Movement (Gerakan

¹¹ Hasbi Aswar, Danial Bin Mohd Yusof, and Rohana Binti Abdul Hamid, "Hizb Ut-Tahrirs Fight Back: The Responses of Hizb Ut-Tahrir Indonesia To The State Repression," *Jisiera: The Journal of Islamic Studies and International Relations* 5, no. 1 (2020): 1–23.

¹² Imam Mahdi, "Pembubaran Ormas 'Radikal' Dalam Persepektif Perundang-Undangan (Kajian Khusus Perppu No. 02 Tahun 2017)," *Nuansa* 10, no. 2 (2017): 132–44.

¹³ Izan Ihwan, "Aliansi Pemuda Dan Mahasiswa Turun Ke Jalan Tolak Perppu," *Media Umat.News*, 2017, <https://mediaumat.id/aliansi-pemuda-dan-mahasiswa-turun-ke-jalan-tolak-perppu/>.

¹⁴ Media Umat, "Empat Alasan Mahasiswa Sumut Tolak Permendikbudristek 30/2021," *Media Umat.News*, 2021, <https://mediaumat.id/empat-alasan-mahasiswa-sumut-tolak-permendikbudristek-30-2021/>.

Mahasiswa Pembebasan-GP) and the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI). These two organizations are considered dominant because GP is a wing of the HTI organization. At the same time, KAMMI is a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood movement.¹⁵ On the other hand, another active movement in the campus environment, namely BKLDK. Therefore, this study examines the HTI wing organization, namely the Coordinating Board for Campus Da'wah Institutions (BKLDK). This organization has the same mission and agenda as HTI, centered on spreading the *Khilafah* ideology without carrying out violent activities.

The idea of establishing an Islamic caliphate brought by HTI is considered extreme in most circles, including government officials, ulama, and students.¹⁶ Proponents of this idea actively declare their goal of replacing the current Indonesian state based on Pancasila with an Islamic state led by a global Muslim caliph that need not be found in Indonesia or Southeast Asia.

This research is necessary considering the role of students in the continuation of Indonesia's future. The education and training they receive during their higher education will determine their role in the future, both in their position in the private sector, public sector, and political sector.¹⁷ In 2018, there were between 80 and 107 million people in the age group between 19 and 23 (the age group in which young people typically pursue a bachelor's degree); however, in that year, only 7.5 million of the total population studied at universities throughout Indonesia.¹⁸

In addition, students often play a significant role in shaping discourse in various aspects of life, from politics and culture to religion. Students also played a decisive role in Indonesia's two major social upheavals in 1966 and the reforms in 1998. In 1996 student

¹⁵ A. R. Arifianto, "Islamic Campus Preaching Organizations in Indonesia: Promoters of Moderation or Radicalism?," *Asian Security* 15, no. 3 (2019): 323–42.

¹⁶ Novan Ardy Wiyani, "Prevention of Radicalism for Alpha Generations in Raudhatul Athfal by Fatayat NU Cilacap Central Java," *Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 19, no. 2 (2019): 279–98.

¹⁷ Toto Suharto and Ja'far Assagaf, "Membendung Arus Paham Keagamaan Radikal Di Kalangan Mahasiswa PTKIN," *Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 14, no. 1 (2014): 157–80.

¹⁸ Ani Nursalikah, "Jumlah Mahasiswa Indonesia Masih Sedikit," *Republika Co.Id*, 2018, <https://republika.co.id/berita/pi2o7r366/jumlah-mahasiswa-indonesia-masih-sedikit>.

involvement paved the way for Suharto to assume leadership as President. In 1998, student involvement in the Reformasi movement marked the end of Suharto's rule for more than thirty-two years.¹⁹

This paper discusses two things: *first*, the factors causing the strengthening of the radical narrative among campuses, played by BKLDK. *Second*, revealing counter-radicalism efforts carried out by the government, campus institutions, and moderate extra-campus organizations.

The research in this article uses qualitative methods.²⁰ This qualitative method is based on the need to obtain raw data and information. In this study, data collection was carried out through three techniques: first, document review; second, participation; and third, interview. Technically, this research begins with a study of documents as secondary data, such as findings from a survey that discusses why Muslim students embrace radical Islam. The authors also collected similar data from media reports, books, and journal articles.

Furthermore, the author participated in the organizational activities of the Coordinating Board for Campus Da'wah Institutions (BKLDK) at six campuses in Bandung, namely UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung (UIN Bandung), Indonesian Education University (UPI), Bhakti Kencana University (UBK), Institute of Technology Bandung (ITB), Welfare Polytechnic Social Bandung (POLTEKSOS), and the Indonesian Computer University (UNIKOM). The author chose Bandung as the research location because this city became one of the centers of activity for the HTI movement after the government banned them. After being denied, HTI is known to have carried out its big agenda in Bandung. For example, the timetable of the Bandung City Ulama and Leaders Forum in 2017,²¹ Multaqa Ulama and People's Leaders in 2019,²² commemorating the 2019 Hijri

¹⁹ Doreen Lee, *Activist Archives: Youth Culture and the Political Past in Indonesia* (Duke University Press, 2016).

²⁰ Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, *Qualitative Research*, Third Edit (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2005).

²¹ Media Umat, "Forum Ulama Dan Tokoh Sekeloa Kota Bandung: Tolak Perppu Ormas," *MediaUmat.Id*, 2017, <https://mediaumat.id/forum-ulama-dan-tokoh-sekeloa-kota-bandung-tolak-perppu-ormas/>.

²² Media Umat, "Multaqa Ulama Dan Tokoh Umat Dayeuhkolot Bandung: Serukan Umat Agar Bersatu Dalam Naungan Rayah Dan Liwa' Sebagai Kemuliaan Islam!," *MediaUmat.Id*, 2019, <https://mediaumat.id/multaqa-ulama-dan-tokoh-umat->

New Year,²³ celebrating the liberation of Constantinople 1453 in 2020 with the presence of thousands participants,²⁴ demonstrations student in 2021,²⁵ and Expo Rajab 1443 Hijri in 2022.²⁶ In addition, Bandung is also in the history of HTI as the initial expansion area of the spread of the HTI movement in Indonesia after Bogor and DKI Jakarta.²⁷ In this city, the author has studied, witnessed, and followed HTI's agendas for three years, from February 2019 to August 2022. During that time, the author also looks at the strategies used by HTI, especially their wing organization, BKLDK, in spreading the idea of the *Khilafah* in Bandung.

In addition, the author conducted interviews with ten BKLDK activists from the six universities in Bandung mentioned above. They are student members of the BKLDK who actively campaign for the idea of the *Khilafah* and are rarely known by many people. They are also always behind the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK), which is considered an institution that is clean from the practice of campus radicalism. The interview process was then conducted with three campus officials and a BNPT official to find out the government's and campus institutions' efforts in dealing with campus radicalism. In addition, interviews were also conducted with three leaders of extra-campus organizations moderate groups, namely the Indonesian Islamic Student Association (PMII), the Islamic Student Association (HMI), and the Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM) based

dayeuhkolot-bandung-serukan-umat-agar-bersatu-dalam-naungan-rayah-dan-liwa-sebagai-kemuliaan-islam/.

²³ Media Umat, "Semarak Kibaran Bendera Tauhid Sambut Tahun Baru 1441 Hijriah Di Berbagai Kota," *MediaUmat.Id*, 2019, <https://mediaumat.id/semarak-kibaran-bendera-tauhid-sambut-tahun-baru-1441-hijriah-di-berbagai-kota/>.

²⁴ Media Umat, "Ribuan Muslim Bandung Generasi Penakluk Roma Di Abad Ke-21 Memperingati Pembebasan Konstantinopel 1453," *MediaUmat.Id*, 2020, <https://mediaumat.id/ribuan-muslim-bandung-generasi-penakluk-roma-di-abad-ke-21-memperingati-pembebasan-konstantinopel-1453/>.

²⁵ Media Umat, "Sambangi DPRD, Mahasiswa Islam Bandung Tuntut Cabut Permendikbud 30/2021," *MediaUmat.Id*, 2021, <https://mediaumat.id/sambangi-dprd-mahasiswa-islam-bandung-tuntut-cabut-permendikbud-30-2021/>.

²⁶ Media Umat, "Suksesnya Acara Ekspo Rajab 1443 H Di Koporaya Bandung Selatan," *MediaUmat.Id*, 2022, <https://mediaumat.id/suksesnya-acara-ekspo-rajab-1443-h-di-koporaya-bandung-selatan/>.

²⁷ Paelani Setia, "Membumikan Khilafah Di Indonesia: Strategi Mobilisasi Opini Publik Oleh Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Di Media Sosial," *Journal of Society and Development* 1, no. 2 (2021): 33–45.

in Bandung to explore their potential in countering the narrative of campus radicalism.

RELIGIOUS RADICALISM: A PROBLEM DEFINITION

The difficulty in conducting a study on radicalism is defining the term radicalism itself. This is because individuals and groups have different tendencies. According to the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), as stated by R. Ahmad Nurwakhid, radicalism is an idea or ideology that aims to change the social and political order established or agreed upon by the community through extreme or violent means.²⁸ BNPT then provides several indicators determining whether a person is radical or revolutionary. Government officials use this indicator to categorize individuals or groups indicated as extremists. *First*, individuals or groups who are anti-Pancasila, the state ideology that regulates the way of life in Indonesia. *Second*, the individual or group wants to overthrow the legitimate government by building public distrust of the government through hate speech and hoaxes. *Third*, they are intolerant of religious diversity by labeling people with different beliefs as apostates (*kafir*). *Fourth*, they openly reject local religion, local culture, and traditional culture.²⁹

The government uses the indicators mentioned above to formulate anti-extremism policies in Indonesia. They are mainly used to identify individuals or organizations that target deradicalization programs. However, these four indicators cannot be used to prosecute people or groups who adhere to extremist views. For example, as long as they hate *tahlilan*, they cannot be charged by law because hate cannot be categorized as an act of blasphemy. Or another example, people who are anti-Pancasila and will not plan an attack cannot be tried.³⁰

²⁸ Gita Irawan, "BNPT: Radikalisme Dan Terorisme Mengatasnamakan Agama Adalah Musuh Agama Dan Musuh Negara," *Tribunnews.Com*, 2021, <https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2021/04/02/bnpt-radikalisme-dan-terorisme-mengatasnamakan-agama-adalah-musuh-agama-dan-musuh-negara>.

²⁹ CNN Indonesia, "BNPT Keluarkan Ciri-Ciri Penceramah Radikal Usai Sindiran Jokowi," *CNN Indonesia*, 2022, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220305154627-12-767166/bnpt-keluarkan-ciri-ciri-penceramah-radikal-usai-sindiran-jokowi>.

³⁰ G. Isya Marjani, Interview, November, 2022.

The problem is that the community does not approve of many of the indicators made by BNPT. People who feel they are victims of government labeling also oppose this indicator. Moreover, if you apply all hands of radicalism among students, this can lead to over-generalization. For example, politicians from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) conveyed criticism of radicalism indicators because the government practiced excessive stereotypes of devout Muslims in carrying out Islamic religious orders such as memorizing the Qur'an. This criticism is based on a statement by the Minister of Religion, Fachrul Razi, who warned government agencies to be careful with civil servants who are "handsome" and have good-looking religion who become teachers of the Koran or religion teachers in education centers or those who like to become imams of prayers in various mosques within government agencies.³¹

As a result, the understanding of the definition of radicalism is over-generalized. One of the efforts made by Wibisono, Louis, and Jetten³² defines radicalism into four dimensions: theological, ritual, social, and political. They argue that a Muslim can be extreme in one size but moderate in another. For example, Salafi groups are known to be ritually severe but politically moderate. Or Hizbut Tahrir, which is known to be radical in ideas, but average in movement. In addition, Ronald Wintrobe³³ mentions that extremism has two dimensions, namely, the dimension of struggle (*tariqah*) and the extent of ideology (*fiqrah*). These two dimensions are further explained into three groups or organizations: *First*, groups with non-extreme ideologies and extreme methods of struggle. *Second*, groups with radical ideologies and practices of work are also powerful. Third, groups with extreme ideologies, and their methods of struggle are not extreme.

The purpose of differentiating this definition of radicalism is to describe the orientation of radical religious movements and formulate policies for dealing with radicalism in a targeted manner.

³¹ Henny Rachma Sari, "Fraksi PKS Kritik Pernyataan Menag Soal Good Looking Sebar Radikalisme," *Merdeka.Com*, 2020, <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/fraksi-pks-kritik-pernyataan-menag-soal-good-looking-sebar-radikalisme.html>.

³² Susilo Wibisono, Winnifred R Louis, and Jolanda Jetten, "A Multidimensional Analysis of Religious Extremism," *Frontiers in Psychology*, 2019, 2560.

³³ Ronald Wintrobe, "Extremism, Suicide Terror, and Authoritarianism," *Public Choice* 128, no. 1 (2006): 169–95.

Therefore, the author outlines two critical reasons why it is necessary to distinguish between a radical understanding of violence and non-violence, namely:

First, nonviolent radicalism needs to be studied separately from violent radicalism because not everyone with radical ideas resorts to violent acts (see statements by terrorism expert Sydney Jones).³⁴ For example, although Hizbut Tahrir fully believes in the idea of the *Khilafah*, they refuse to use violent means such as forcing Islamic law to be enforced in Indonesia. All they do is propaganda the idea of the *Khilafah* to the public so that people realize that the absence of the *Khilafah* has harmed Muslims worldwide. This is different from radical movements that use violent methods, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which openly carries out military attacks on the government in power and controls several areas of the country by force. Thus, the handling of these two radical organizations requires a different approach. Applying a security approach to radicalize ideas is wrong, and vice versa; counter-narrative handling of violent radical movements is incorrect.

Second, radicalism is caused not only by a single factor, namely religion but by many social, economic and political factors, so its manifestations vary according to the causal factors.³⁵ The radicalism that uses violent means manifests religious characteristics by using textual interpretations of the Koran, such as jihad, which are interpreted with the meaning of war. That is what violent radicalized movements like ISIS practice. Meanwhile, there is another radical movement that is a manifestation of disappointment in the social system, politics, and economic issues, so they carry out a signal by criticizing the ongoing government system because it is considered unable to provide welfare and a sense of security for its citizens. This is one of the activities carried out by the Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir

³⁴ Chris Angus, *Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses* (Parliamentary Research Service (NSW), 2016); Gunnar Stange, "The Danger of Intolerant Above-Ground, Non-Clandestine Organizations Is Bigger for Indonesia Than Violent Extremism: An Interview with Sidney Jones on Religious Extremism, Political Violence and Conflict Dynamics in Indonesia," *ASEAS-Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies* 12, no. 2 (2019): 267–74.

³⁵ Vedi R Hadiz and Richard Robison, "Competing Populisms in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," *International Political Science Review* 38, no. 4 (2017): 488–502.

(HTI) movement. Thus, the handling must be different according to the type of radicalism.

ABOUT THE COORDINATING BOARD FOR CAMPUS DA'WAH INSTITUTIONS (BKLDK)

Researchers generally mention Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as a radical organization because it aspires to establish a *Khilafah* state as a substitute for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) with the ideology of Pancasila. To realize these goals, HTI formed a wing organization called the Coordinating Board for Campus Da'wah Institutions (BKLDK). This organization is an extra-campus organization that was initiated on 20-24 February 2004 in East Java and inaugurated on 28-29 August 2004 in Bogor, West Java. In December 2005, BKLDK agreed on the Vision, Mission, Program, and expansion to other regions.³⁶

The programs offered by the BKLDK are coaching members of the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK), disseminating opinions, contacting institutions and figures, and internal studies. These programs are carried out in collaboration with BKLDK members on campuses and with the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK) affiliated with HTI. Not infrequently, the BKLDK program is implemented by LDK so as not to arouse suspicion among students. As a result, the characteristics of the BKLDK are closed and do not show the HTI symbol in their activities. This differs from other HTI wing organizations, such as the Liberation Student Movement (GP), which are open and often use the HTI symbol when carrying out their activities.

According to the results of interviews with BKLDK leaders in Bandung, BKLDK is here to provide protection and assistance to Campus Da'wah Institutions (LDK) on various campuses, in the form of outside help, especially in fostering new membership to *syabab* (HTI members).³⁷ Its role is more or less similar to that of the Campus Da'wah Institution Gathering Forum (FSLDK) by overseeing LDKs in campus circles.

³⁶ BKLDK, "Selayang Pandang BKLDK Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus," *BKLDK Jawa Tengah*, 2016, <https://slidetodoc.com/selayang-pandang-bkldk-badan-koordinasi-lembaga-dakwah-kampus/>.

³⁷ MUS, Interviews, November 2022.

Just like Liberation Student Movement (GP), which is affiliated with HTI, BKLDK is an HTI wing organization that provides narratives on the importance of *Khilafah* to students by carrying out peaceful actions. Therefore, if using the definition of Ronald Wintrobe³⁸ definition in the previous discussion, the BKLDK is included in the category of organizations with radical ideology. Still, the way they apply this ideology is not extreme because they do not use violence.

Thus, it is incorrect to assume that radicalism always ends in violence. A generalist understanding of religious radicalism can lead to stereotypes against certain Muslim groups, which may be unfair to them. However, scientists generally agree that social actors, students, and individuals who support the establishment of the Islamic *Khilafah* and are involved in terror activities or bombings are religious radical organizations or individuals. This means that organizations such as BKLDK and HTI that only promote the *Khilafah* ideology are categorized as radical organizations.

THE ROLE OF BKLDK IN SPREADING THE IDEA OF *KHILAFAH* ON CAMPUS

Several surveys found that the increasing number of students or students who embraced radical Islam was caused by the lack of alternative discourse on campus. The 2019 Setara Institute survey at ten public universities in Indonesia found that students do not have access to alternative lessons other than Islamist discourse – which refers to people or organizations who believe that the political system must be based on Islamic law, such as Tarbiyah and the Islamic *Khilafah* movement. These movements have become increasingly popular in universities after many students were exposed to the ideology, which its activists disseminated systematically and militarily.³⁹ Similar results were found in another survey conducted by the Institute for Research and Community Service at the Indonesian Nahdlatul Ulama University (LPPM UNUSIA), between December 2018 and January 2019 at eight state universities. The survey also

³⁸ Wintrobe, “Extremism, Suicide Terror, and Authoritarianism.”

³⁹ Setara Institute, “Wacana Dan Gerakan Keagamaan Di Kalangan Mahasiswa,” *Setara Institute*, 2019, <https://setara-institute.org/wacana-dan-gerakan-keagamaan-dikalangan-mahasiswa-2/>.

found that apart from Tarbiyah and HTI, another increasingly popular movement is the Salafi movement, although, in terms of numbers, it is still a minority.⁴⁰

These radical movements seek to dominate religious discourse by taking over student organizations, such as the Student Executive Board (BEM), the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK), and campus mosques, by holding regular religious meetings in dormitories or rented houses near their respective universities. For example, BKLDK, through several of its branches in the country, actively holds discussions on various topics, including the theme of *Khilafah Islamiyah*. This discussion is categorized into several activities:

First, the Public Discussion, where the speakers presented were leaders and experts, both students and HTI leaders.

Second, the National Minbar for Indonesian Muslim Students, or discussions of experts and HTI leaders who focus on discussing government policies. This event is usually also carried out by BKLDK branches in provinces and cities:

Third, Statement of Attitude, this activity is in the form of a video showing statements of support or rejection of the issue of Muslims at home and abroad submitted by leaders, sympathizers, and administrators of BKLDK.

Fourth, Campus Da'wah Window, or special discussions held by BKLDK branches spread across provinces and cities.

Fifth, the Expert Forum, a discussion that brings HTI experts together with non-HTI experts by discussing national issues.

Sixth, *Ngabar* (*Ngabuburit* Together with BKLDK) or discussions held openly specifically in the month of Ramadan before the time of breaking the fast.

Seventh, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), a discussion involving students and high-ranking officials of various extra-campus organizations presented by discussing strategic issues.

Eighth, End of Year *Muhasabah*, a discussion between students and HTI leaders with unique themes for year-end evaluation.

The process of transmitting radical ideology takes place in these places and events. All events are open to the public, although BKLDK

⁴⁰ Fahreza Rizky, "8 Universitas Negeri Terjangkit Gerakan Islam Eksklusif," *Okezone.Com*, 2019, <https://nasional.okezone.com/%0Aread/2019/06/25/337/2070647/8-universitas-negeri-terjangkit-gerakan-islam-eksklusif>.

activists who organize these events usually enforce strict rules and complete control in providing access to participants. They always prepare a special team to select participants if the event is held in person, in a location such as an open park or mosque. And if the event is stored online, they usually don't spread the selected media code (PIN) (such as Zoom) in advance but through direct messages. All of these events resulted in many students subscribing to their ideas.

Several studies on radicalism on campuses in Indonesia conclude that radicalism is caused by the high dominance of the spread of radical narratives on campuses. One of them is carried out by the wing movements of HTI. For example, research conducted by Rita Pranawati at UIN Jakarta and the University of Indonesia (UI) by interviewing about 300 students stated that students agree with transnational movements such as the pro-*Khilafah*, which have dominated the religious discourse on the two campuses. Narratives always issued by this movement are as follows: capitalism causes the rich and the poor to be strong in the economy; Israel occupied Palestine, and the United States is the enemy of Muslims. Another finding in this research is the availability of reading materials such as bulletins and magazines distributed by the pro-*Khilafah* movement, which play a role in shaping students' mindsets. The study also mentions that at UIN Jakarta, the extreme level of students is already high due to the availability of many reading materials compared to the UI campus.⁴¹

Another study on the solid narrative of campus radicalism was conducted by Sunesti et al.,⁴² which focuses on the use of reading literature such as Islamic books and magazines distributed by transnational movements such as the *Khilafah* theme to students. As a result, literature influences students because it is increasingly popular and is widely used as reading material. This literature includes (1) Jihad literature which contains about the condition of Muslims at war by destroying the enemies of Islam; (2) *Tahriri* literature or books on Western control over Islam; (3) Salafi literature that invites

⁴¹ Rita Pranawati, *Radikalisme Di Kalangan Mahasiswa: Studi Kasus Universitas Indonesia Dan UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta* (Tangerang Selatan, Banten: UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 2012).

⁴² Yuyun Sunesti, Noorhaidi Hasan, and Muhammad Najib Azca, "Young Salafi-Niqabi and Hijrah: Agency and Identity Negotiation," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 8, no. 2 (2018): 173–98.

Muslims to return to a literal interpretation of the Quran; (4) *Tarbawi literature* that carries the *Tarbiyah* (education) movement inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood; and (5) Popular Islamism literature which contains the motivation to emphasize the purification of personal ethics (*hijrah*), ways of socializing, dressing, and other religious practices in the modern era.

This study is also in line with the conclusion of the research above that the dominance of the narrative spread by BKLDK is quite successful in attracting students' sympathy. Moreover, they often form coalitions with LDKs affiliated with HTI on campuses. LDK members can usually also double as BKLDK administrators. This means that apart from being a member of the LDK, each member has the right to vote on their membership in the BKLDK. This strategy dramatically facilitates their activities without worrying about being smelled by the campus, unlike the GP, who always "preaches" using the HTI flag directly so that its existence is easily recognized and prohibited by campus institutions. BKLDK uses a blending strategy with LDK so that its activities are the same as LDK activities.

In addition, BKLDK also cooperates with fellow BKLDK administrators at every campus in Indonesia. This collaboration between administrators is fronted by the National BKLDK (BKLDK Nasional), which establishes relationships with BKLDK administrators in provinces, cities, and every campus in Indonesia. Therefore, in every region, city, and campus, there is always a BKLDK branch office, such as the BKLDK DKI Jakarta, BKLDK West Java, BKLDK Central Java, BKLDK East Java, BKLDK DI Yogyakarta, and BKLDK South Sulawesi. At branches in the city area, there are BKLDK Bandung City, BKLDK Bogor City, BKLDK Purwakarta, and others. Meanwhile, at the campus level, there are BKLDK UIN Bandung, BKLDK UNIKOM, and BKLDK UPI Bandung. This network of relations for the National BKLDK functions to control and know every development of their movement activities in branch areas and campuses. The National BKLDK usually initiates a discussion and evaluation event called the National Symposium involving provincial, city, and campus BKLDK branches. This event was held in Bandung City on Saturday, November 14, 2020, at the Bandung City BKLDK branch office, which was also attended by BKLDK West Java, BKLDK UIN Bandung, BKLDK UNIKOM, and

BKLDK UPI Bandung. The theme of this event is “Strengthening Steps, Achieving the Victory of Da’wah.”

The relationship built between BKLDK also aims to strengthen the dominance of BKLDK on each campus, especially in spreading the idea of the *Khilafah* on campus and efforts to recruit new BKLDK as prospective HTI members. Therefore, this relationship can be seen from the cooperation between BKLDK administrators on each campus to make the *Khilafah* campaign program successful and recruit new members. In Bandung, the association was seen when members of the BKLDK Bandung City, BKLDK UPI Bandung, BKLDK UNIKOM, and BKLDK UIN Bandung united and gathered to distribute *Khilafah* opinion pamphlets and member recruitment pamphlets to new students at the Cultural and Academic Introduction to Student Affairs (PBAK) activities on campus UIN Bandung.

As a result, a systematic and structured internalization process of radicalism narratives contributes significantly to the growth of radical ideas about Islam. For example, a prominent activist in the BKLDK admitted that he joined the movement after participating in some of its discussion activities. He was attracted by the idea of establishing an Islamic caliphate and believed that Islam provides comprehensive solutions to human problems.⁴³ This is an example of how an idea is disseminated and communicated systematically and structured to appeal to students.

The dominance of the *Khilafah* narrative by BKLDK in the campus environment focuses on the strategy of distributing bulletins and magazines which are distributed directly to students. In direct observation, the authors found that BKLDK members actively distributed *Khilafah* bulletins (HTI Friday bulletins) at campus mosques at UIN Bandung, Bhakti Kencana University, UNIKOM, and UPI Bandung. This bulletin targets its readers directly from students before or after Friday prayers. In addition, they are also actively using the strategy by placing posters, pamphlets, and wall magazines (*Majalah Dinding*) in the wall magazine area of campuses in Bandung. This wall magazine is in the form of invitations to discussion events, opinion writings, interruptions, and statements of attitude. According to one of the BKLDK administrators at UIN Bandung, their wall magazine is updated every three to one week in

⁴³ YPSL, Interview, November 2022.

a very systematic and scheduled manner.⁴⁴ This strategy is also quite successful, as revealed by BKLDK activists at UIN Bandung because it can “stir” his heart to join and fight for Islam *kaffah* (entirely without exception).⁴⁵

In addition to using the wall magazine media, they also mobilize students through digital platforms, such as Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube. They are even willing to pay for an Instagram account with many followers to advertise their posters or opinions on social media. Like direct distribution, they use social media to campaign for invitations for discussion, opinions, statements of attitude, criticism, and invitations to join webinars. In the webinar, the themes are limited to issues such as the benefits of establishing an Islamic caliphate, the benefits of having Islam as a comprehensive solution to human problems, and criticism of the Joko Widodo administration as their enemy. Activists from this organization throughout Indonesia are also engaging with activists from other organizations to discuss contemporary social and political issues or the problems that are their goal, namely the caliphate *Islamiyah*. The emphasis on influencing people through ideas is a hallmark of BKLDK, which is not found in other student organizations.

In recruitment, BKLDK also succeeded in attracting student interest. They usually attract students who do not want to be disturbed by their lecture activities. In contrast to organizations such as HMI, PMII, and IMM, which are considered too focused on movement activities, they sometimes forget their primary obligation, studying. While the BKLDK, on the other hand, is more oriented toward discussing ideas, their activism is only carried out when there is direct instruction from HTI, which is very rare. As a result, BKLDK is a friendly extra-campus organ, does not like to spend free time (hanging out), and uses Islamic associations that will not lead to promiscuity.

This is done by BKLDK because there is a tendency to change the attitude of more pragmatic students, namely students who want to graduate as soon as possible and work. BKLDK thoughtfully observes this by adapting and is likely to be accepted by students of this model. At least the parameters of their success can be

⁴⁴ RPS, Interview, July, 2021.

⁴⁵ MI, Interview, August, 2022.

measured through the presence of a leadership relay in the BKLDK. In the recruitment strategy, the BKLDK uses a similar method to the opinion dissemination strategy, namely through the vital role behind the LDKs on campus. Their recruitment is held simultaneously with LDK recruitment on campus; later, if students are interested in joining LDK, they will also be offered to join BKLDK. The difference is that if LDK members only focus on movement activities on the campus, then BKLDK members will go on safaris to other campuses. This, for example, was admitted by a student from UNIKOM Bandung; since joining BKLDK in 2018, he prefers to be in BKLDK because he can be active and know the dynamics of the LDK movement on different campuses, such as UNPAD, UIN Bandung, ITB, POLTEKSOS Bandung, and UPI. Through the BKLDK he was also able to get to know HTI officials in Bandung and West Java more quickly because they did not only meet with activists on one campus. But the drawback is that he has to sacrifice his college time because he goes on many safaris to campus LDKs.⁴⁶

Like the recruitment process for HTI members, the BKLDK recruitment process will ultimately be directed to becoming *syabab* (HTI members). At first, they were invited to participate in *Daurah Islamiyyah* (Islamic studies) activities three times a month. They were directed to the Weekly Routine *Halaqah* Group (Halaqah Rutin Mingguan-HARUM) with 5-6 members mentored by a *mushrif* (mentor). Up to about two months. After being declared graduated by the *mushrif*, he will be inaugurated as a member of HTI. After becoming a member, he is required to attend *halaqah* every week with a different *mushrif* forever. So, his activities on campus as a BKLDK administrator will stop when he graduates from college, but his activities at HTI will not stop as long as he is a member. This strategy has also succeeded in bringing in many militant HTI activists, as recognized by a prominent young HTI figure in Bandung that the entrance of brilliant HTI cadres is not only through the GP organization but also through the BKLDK. If GP focuses on strengthening actions in the field, especially being a reliable orator, then BKLDK produces genius HTI activists in formulating criticism and other strategic studies.⁴⁷ This can be interpreted because the GP

⁴⁶ FA, Interview, July, 2021.

⁴⁷ IF, Interview, November 2022.

orientation always holds discussions in open public spaces, while the BKLDK does it in mosques, rented houses, and madrasas. BKLDK people are better known for their in-depth knowledge because they usually excel in college classes.

However, the BKLDK also feels a downward trend in its membership. What caused them to decline? Why aren't more students interested in joining this radical Islamist student organization? A 2017 Mata Air Foundation and the Alvara Research Institute survey showed that only 17.8 percent of students supported the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia. On the other hand, most of the students surveyed still keep the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The answer to this question lies in increasing economic pragmatism among students. Students want to finish their studies as quickly as possible and then join the job market as new university rules limit the study period to a certain number of years. They will be expelled from campus if they fail to meet these requirements.

This problem also causes a decrease in new activists in the BKLDK. They must feel the significant impact along with the organization above them, namely the disbandment of HTI by the Indonesian government in 2017. A policy that has affected BKLDK because various campuses strictly prohibit all activities and symbols related to HTI. For example, at ITB Bandung, where their LDK, Harmoni Amal and Titian Ilmu (HATI) was officially dissolved by the ITB Chancellor in 2018.⁴⁸ In addition, after the disbandment, many HTI members also decided to resign, including students. At UIN Bandung, for example, several potential activists withdrew from the BKLDK and returned to their hometowns after graduating from college.⁴⁹ This has disrupted the regeneration process that has been built for a long time. However, on various occasions, they are still good at guerrillas using new strategies, such as forming a coalition to establish a scholarship foundation for poor students, these houses, foster homes (Rumah Binaan-RUBIN), and Arabic language learning

⁴⁸ Tia Mariatul Kibtiah and Muthia Rahima Putri, "The Existence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Strategies for Engaging in Indonesian Politics," *Indonesian Journal of Political Research (IJPR)* 2 (2021).

⁴⁹ YPSL, Interview, August 2022.

institutions. This is done so that their condition remains undetected and they can still actively move on campuses.

HANDLING RADICALISM BY CAMPUS AND GOVERNMENT

So far, the handling carried out by the government and the campus tends to be general and uses a security approach. The government and the campus should comprehensively observe the issue of radicalism among students so that the handling can be right on target. On campuses in the city of Bandung, for example, the authors monitored the handling that was carried out, leading to two policies: *first*, holding national seminars for socialization; *second*, handling in a security perspective such as the dissolution of student organizations.

First, the national seminar policy, for example, was seen at UIN Bandung during the 2019 new student orientation, which aims to prevent new students from being seduced and persuaded by the campus to radicalize the movement. However, this policy was heavily criticized by students because the campus seemed to impose this socialization on students. The same thing was also done at UPI Bandung, and the response was the same, the campus seemed to set socialization and saw the phenomenon of radicalism as a threat to student life, even though far from that, various other socializations about campus life should be prioritized to be introduced to students. Apart from the orientation period, several campuses hold these national seminars at different times. However, the results are not significant in providing an alternative narrative to counter the history of radicalism.

Handling from a general point of view that is socializing is also carried out by the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT). For example, BNPT has collaborated with many campuses, including four campuses in West Java, in preventing religious radicalism among students by educating students about the dangers of radicalism. One of the BNPT seminars was held with the Department of Religious Studies (Studi Agama-Agama-SAA) at UIN Bandung in 2019.⁵⁰ The agency has also progressed to “counter-propaganda” programs

⁵⁰ Safira Arsyadin, “Radikalisme Bisa Masuk Lewat Sekolah Dan Kampus,” *Metrum.Co.Id*, 2019, <https://metrum.co.id/radikalisme-bisa-masuk-lewat-sekolah-dan-kampus/>.

in thirteen provinces. Through this program, BNPT collaborates with 780 anti-radicalism youth ambassadors to promote moderate Islam. The ambassadors are primarily students who are social media activists. In West Java, the BNPT program is called the West Java Peace Ambassador, with one of its agendas being the socialization of radicalism's dangers.⁵¹

Second, a policy that uses a security perspective, for example, occurred on the ITB campus against LDK HTI, Harmoni Amal, and Titian Ilmu (HATI), which was dissolved because it was considered that they often spread the idea of the *Khilafah* on the campus. As a result, the disbandment process did not eliminate the *Khilafah* movement on the campus. Based on the author's observations, HATI ITB activists are no longer openly conducting actions on campus but are transforming into other student activity units (UKM) to recruit new members. They are also working with a unique institution that focuses on consulting assistance for learning and foster homes. This strategy was even relatively successful because HATI members could freely disseminate the *Khilafah* idea personally to students.⁵²

The ineffectiveness of the two policies issued by the government and the campus is proof that the handling of radicalism on campus is a complex issue, including understanding the ideas and movements of radicalism at the definition level. This means that the handling of radicalism does not work because understanding the definition of radicalism used to date is wrong. After all, it generalizes radicalism of ideas and radicalism of movements with violence. Whereas activities like BKLDK do not use violence at all, they are only radical in thoughts and do not impose their will, and do not carry out threats and violent attacks.

In addition, the role of other moderate student movement organizations is also very minimal. They only make efforts that are temporary and two-way. For example, at UIN Bandung, several attempts have been made by a PMII UIN Bandung official, Muhamad Herul, inviting BKLDK to discuss openly, but with no results because the BKLDK refused for reasons of time.⁵³ This is different from what HMI did, where they held open discussions several times, as

⁵¹ G. Isya Marjani, Interview, November 2022.

⁵² DK, Interview, July, 2022.

⁵³ Muhamad Herul, Interview, November, 2022.

was done by HMI UIN Bandung by having a debate entitled Student Lawyers Club (SLC) in 2019, which invited the BKLDK. Although the discussion was practical, the result ended in their respective conclusions. BKLDK refuses to stop spreading the *Khilafah* narrative on campus because, for them, it is part of the freedom of campus academic life.⁵⁴ IMM UIN Bandung then made another effort by embracing BKLDK members to change the pattern of movement and not spread the idea of the *Khilafah*. Still, this effort was insignificant.⁵⁵

Various moderate extra-campus organizations should be able to imitate the success of BKLDK in mobilizing the idea of a *Khilafah* on campus. The BKLDK successfully distributes reading materials every Friday and regularly changes its posters at student information centers. However, this is not done by other moderate extra-campus organizations. They always focus on conventional methods such as street libraries, street discussions, and convoy actions that even disturb the peaceful atmosphere of the campus. The opportunity to take advantage of social media is also not appropriately utilized due to the lack of human resources who are experts in the field of social media. Instead of counter-narratives, moderate extra-campus organizations “glorify” their success in producing reliable alumni who become national figures.

The opportunity for counter-narrative radicalism by moderate extra-campus organizations has been wide open since the Ministry of Research Higher Education (KEMENDIKTI) has opened up opportunities for extra-campus organizations to be active on campus since it was banned 19 years ago through the Minister of Education and Culture Regulation Number 55 of 2018 concerning Fostering the Nation’s Ideology in Student Activities in the Campus Environment. The Ministry of Education and Culture has again allowed extra-campus organizations that are Muslim to positively influence religious moderating for Muslim students in line with the increasing campus radicalism movement. Organizations that have existed and existed for a long time, such as HMI, PMII, and IMM, affiliated with NU and Muhammadiyah, can resume operations on campus. However, this opportunity has not yet succeeded. Some extra-student organizations are still struggling with the dynamics of their internal

⁵⁴ Sahrul, Interview, November, 2022.

⁵⁵ Ramadhan, Interview, November, 2022.

movements and are too busy getting involved in rejecting campus policies. They forget about another important issue, and it is their job to do a counter-narrative to the idea of the *Khilafah* on campus.

Thus, the government, campus institutions, and all parties must work together to solve the problem of student radicalism. *First*, the government and the campus must agree that although radicalism does not all use violence or only ideas, it still needs to be watched out for. *Second*, instead of conducting seminars on preventing radicalism on a temporal basis and using a security approach, campus institutions should cooperate with moderate extra-campus organizations to develop the quality of human resources to carry out counter-narratives. This policy may motivate moderate extra-campus organizations to be more aware of this critical issue. *Third*, campus institutions must collaborate with residents around campus, where students take shelter. Radical movements initiate activism by giving attention and control through discussions in the surrounding environment with moderate messages. *Fourth*, campus institutions must also collaborate with students' families by involving them in providing medium religious education in their respective homes.

Since religious radicalism on campus involves many stakeholders, such as students, alumni, parents, campuses, and government officials, socialization or repressive policies will not effectively deal with radicalism on campuses. A more integrated approach involving all stakeholders is needed to tackle this problem. Evidence that integrated policies have not been on the agenda in handling radicalism on campus is the tendency to take approaches that focus more on preventing radicalism internally and ignore the broader scope in the national context.

CONCLUSION

This paper concludes that the main factor in strengthening the narrative of radicalism on campuses in Indonesia is that there is no distinction between understanding and handling radicalism itself. Understanding radicalism is always equated with ideological movements that use violence without distinguishing them from activities that are only centered on ideas (ideology). As a result, the treatment carried out is generalized. So that the effects of the treatment are not right on target. That's why the narrative of radicalism on campus remains

strong. The case of the BKLDK organization, as described in this study, became an essential actor behind the strengthening of the narrative of radicalism among campuses in Bandung, West Java. They succeeded in mobilizing the idea of *Khilafah* through magazine leaflets or bulletins and discussions distributed live and online to attract students to join their movement. Their strategy is to merge into LDK-LDK institutions on campus, which has succeeded in avoiding the repressive threat of campus institutions. On the other hand, moderate extra-campus organizations such as HMI, PMII, and IMM have not sufficiently balanced the narrative of radicalism offered by the BKLDK. Likewise, the handling strategy by the government and the campus is still conventional through socialization programs and handling with a security approach.

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