el Barka: Journal of Islamic Economics and Business
Vol. : 6 (1), 2023, 168 - 192
DOI : 10.21154/elbarka.v6i1.6265
p-ISSN : 2657-1153
e-ISSN : 2657-1862

BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND STOCK LIQUIDITY

Rahmat Setiawan[1], Annisa'ush Shafiyah Azzahrah[2], Setia Dwi Ratna Rahmawati[3]
Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis Universitas Airlangga
[1]rahmatsetiawan@feb.unair.ac.id
[2]annisaush@gmail.com
[3]setiadwiratna22@gmail.com

Abstract: This study aims to examine the impact of gender diversity on the board of commissioners and the board of directors on stock liquidity in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research employs a multiple linear regression model. Data were obtained from the companies' financial statements published between 2014 and 2016, as well as from stock trading publications on Yahoo Finance. The independent variables used are gender diversity on the board of commissioners, measured by the ratio of female members on the board of commissioners, and gender diversity on the board of directors, measured by the ratio of female members on the board of directors. The dependent variable in this study is stock liquidity, measured using the Illiquidity Ratio. The results of the study indicate that both gender diversity on the board of commissioners and the board of directors has a significant positive effect on stock liquidity.

Keywords: Gender Diversity, Board of Commissioners, Board of Directors, and Stock Liquidity

INTRODUCTION

Liquidity is a critical consideration for investors, especially short-term investors, when allocating capital in the financial market. This is because the more liquid a stock, the easier it is to trade. Persaud (2003) and McCoy (2003) argue that investors value liquidity, preferring stocks with predictable liquidity to better anticipate transaction costs. Unpredictable stock liquidity tends to be less attractive, as it makes it difficult for investors to mitigate potential losses.

Levine and Zervos (1996) suggest that companies strive to enhance liquidity and minimize disruptions that could affect it, given that liquidity influences capital flows and the market development of their stocks. Due to the significance of stock liquidity for companies and investors, it is essential to explore the factors influencing it. Several empirical studies have found that corporate governance mechanisms, such as board size, ownership structure, and board composition, are key determinants of stock liquidity (Ali et al., 2016; Attig et al., 2006; Chung et al., 2010).

In Indonesia, corporate governance is governed by Law No. 40 of 2007 on Limited Liability Companies and the 2006 General Guidelines on Good Corporate Governance (GCG) by the National Committee on Governance Policy (KNKG). Sound corporate governance strengthens control mechanisms, reduces opportunistic behavior, and minimizes information asymmetry. It also serves as a tool to address agency problems, curbing actions that could harm investors and other stakeholders. Effective governance aims to

safeguard shareholders' interests by ensuring they receive accurate corporate information.

The structure of the board of commissioners and the board of directors plays a pivotal role in the implementation of good corporate governance. Both bodies are essential in managing the company, and one of the critical aspects of their function is diversity. Board diversity refers to the variety of individuals on these boards, encompassing differences in gender, race, ethnicity, and age. Research by Carter et al. (2007) shows that board diversity has a significant positive impact on company performance. A more diverse board of commissioners and board of directors instills greater confidence that company decisions will optimize performance (Rose, 2007).

Gender diversity has recently garnered attention, reflecting the growing presence of women in the workforce and in career advancement (Omar and Davidson, 2001). Corporate boards, traditionally dominated by men, are increasingly open to female participation. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the presence of female commissioners and directors, as well as gender diversity trends within the boards of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2014 to 2016.



Source: Manufacturing Company Annual Report 2014-2016 (processed data)

Figure 1: Female Commissioners and Directors in Manufacturing Companies (2014-2016)



Source: Manufacturing Company Annual Report 2014-2016 (processed data)

Figure 2: Gender Diversity in the Boards of Commissioners and Directors in Manufacturing Companies (2014-2016)

Figure 1 shows an upward trend in the number of female commissioners and directors, while Figure 2 indicates a growing number of companies with women in these roles. This trend reflects the increasing recognition of the value that female perspectives bring to the boardroom.

Previous research has primarily examined the impact of gender diversity on financial performance (Carter et al., 2010; Erhardt et al., 2003; Wang and Clift, 2009). However, fewer studies have explored the relationship between gender diversity and non-financial aspects, such as stock liquidity. While earlier studies have linked corporate governance to stock liquidity (Ali et al., 2016; Chung et al., 2010),

gender diversity on the boards has rarely been considered an essential governance mechanism in this context.

Ahmed and Ali (2017) found a positive relationship between board gender diversity and stock liquidity in a study involving 944 Australian companies listed on the ASX. Notably, Australia operates under a one-tier board system, where both oversight and executive functions are performed by the board of directors. In contrast, Indonesia follows a two-tier system, with oversight by the board of commissioners and executive functions carried out by the board of directors. This structural difference motivates further research into the influence of gender diversity on the boards in the Indonesian context.

Gender diversity on the board of commissioners has a positive impact on stock liquidity. A more diverse board strengthens oversight functions, reducing information asymmetry between managers and investors (Lei et al., 2013). Women's risk-averse and cautious nature, balanced by men's more aggressive and confident approach, fosters improved decision-making and oversight (Milliken and Martins, 1996). Enhanced oversight mitigates managerial opportunism, curbing selective disclosure and fraudulent reporting practices, which in turn increases investor confidence. Higher investor trust drives greater stock trading activity, leading to improved liquidity.

Furthermore, gender diversity on the board of commissioners promotes an objective, independent, and open environment (Cohen et al., 1998; Abbott et al., 2012). Female commissioners tend to foster teamwork, ensuring all opinions are considered. Their meticulous, disciplined, and empathetic traits enhance the board's commitment to transparency and disclosure (Gul et al., 2011). Better disclosure

practices create an informative environment between managers and investors, encouraging investment decisions that boost trading activity and stock liquidity (Gjerde et al., 2013).

Implementing gender diversity also signals that a company adheres to sound governance practices, reducing information asymmetry and mitigating agency conflicts between managers and investors. This, in turn, increases the company's perceived value, leading to higher stock liquidity (Chung et al., 2010).

Ahmed and Ali (2017) concluded that board gender diversity positively affects stock liquidity. Gul et al. (2011) found that diversity on the board of commissioners improves information disclosure. Moreover, Gjerde et al. (2013) and Lei et al. (2013) demonstrated that better disclosure enhances stock liquidity. Thus, gender diversity on the board of commissioners contributes positively to stock liquidity.

The Influence of Gender Diversity on the Board of Commissioners on Stock Liquidity

Gender diversity on the board of commissioners enhances the supervisory function of management (Lei et al., 2013). Differences in characteristics—where women tend to be more risk-averse and cautious, and men are generally more aggressive and confident—lead to better decision-making and oversight (Milliken & Martins, 1996). Improved oversight reduces information asymmetry between managers and investors (Jurkus et al., 2011). Opportunistic managerial behavior, such as selective information disclosure or fraud in reporting, can be minimized. This strengthens investor confidence in their investment

decisions, which positively impacts trading activities and improves stock liquidity.

Ahmed and Ali (2017) found that gender diversity in corporate boards has a positive effect on stock liquidity. Similarly, Gul et al. (2011) concluded that gender diversity on the board of commissioners enhances the quality of information disclosure. Gjerde et al. (2013) and Lei et al. (2013) emphasized that improved information disclosure positively affects stock liquidity. Thus, gender diversity on the board of commissioners contributes positively to stock liquidity.

H1: Gender diversity on the board of commissioners positively affects stock liquidity.

The Influence of Gender Diversity on the Board of Directors on Stock Liquidity

Gender diversity on the board of directors adds diversity in knowledge, creativity, and innovation (Watson et al., 1993). Differences in thinking styles between men and women improve market understanding (Robinson & Dechant, 1997) and provide broader insights into evaluating investment opportunities (Adams, 2011). These varied characteristics and backgrounds enrich the perspectives of the board of directors, leading to better corporate decision-making and enhanced firm performance. Enhanced performance signals "good news" to the market, encouraging companies to disclose more transparent information (Owusu-Ansah, 2000). Transparent firms reduce information asymmetry, allowing investors to make informed trading decisions and lowering their risk aversion. Furthermore,

transparency narrows information gaps, attracting more investors and increasing stock liquidity.

Ahmed and Ali (2017) showed that gender diversity in boards has a positive impact on stock liquidity. Erhardt et al. (2003) and Liu et al. (2014) found that gender diversity on the board of directors improves firm performance, while Kusumastuti et al. (2007) highlighted its positive effect on information disclosure. Gjerde et al. (2013) and Lei et al. (2013) confirmed that better disclosure enhances stock liquidity. Therefore, gender diversity on the board of directors positively influences stock liquidity.

H2: Gender diversity on the board of directors positively affects stock liquidity.

The Influence of Independent Commissioners on Stock Liquidity

Independent commissioners are board members who are unaffiliated with management, other board members, or controlling shareholders, and are free from business relationships that may compromise their ability to act independently in the company's interest (KNKG, 2006). Their presence ensures that oversight mechanisms operate effectively and in compliance with laws and regulations, safeguarding stakeholder interests and supporting good governance. Effective oversight reduces agency problems, particularly in firms with concentrated ownership (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Independent commissioners play a crucial role in minimizing information asymmetry, especially where blockholders have privileged access to insider information compared to external investors. This fosters

positive investor sentiment, leading to increased trading activity and improved stock liquidity.

H3: Independent commissioners positively affect stock liquidity.

The Influence of Board Size on Stock Liquidity

A larger board of commissioners enhances the effectiveness of managerial oversight (Dalton, 1999). With more members, oversight becomes more comprehensive, ensuring managers align with shareholder interests. Additionally, larger boards enable task specialization, allowing members to focus on areas of expertise (Chtourou et al., 2001). Specialized oversight reduces agency problems and information asymmetry by promoting more transparent corporate disclosure. Improved access to relevant corporate information helps investors evaluates the firm accurately, lowering their risk aversion and increasing trading activity, which ultimately enhances stock liquidity.

H4: Board size positively affects stock liquidity.

The Influence of Leverage on Stock Liquidity

This study defines leverage as financial leverage, which arises from the use of fixed-cost debt financing (Sudana, 2015). Debt financing is used to amplify shareholder returns. Increased leverage reduces agency costs between shareholders and managers, as managers are compelled to meet fixed interest and principal payments, promoting greater managerial discipline (Sudana & Intan, 2008). However, higher leverage also increases default risk, motivating managers to pursue optimal investment decisions to avoid insolvency. This reduces

information asymmetry between managers and investors, generating positive investor responses that improve stock liquidity.

H5: Leverage positively affects stock liquidity.

The Influence of Firm Size on Stock Liquidity

Larger firms tend to have higher stock liquidity. Large firms typically have higher market capitalization and more stable earnings than smaller firms. To sustain their stock value, larger firms often disclose more comprehensive information about their performance and growth (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Such disclosures enhance investor confidence, encouraging them to invest in the firm, which in turn boosts trading activity and improves stock liquidity.

H6: Firm size positively affects stock liquidity.

METHODS

This study employs a multiple linear regression analysis model, hypothesis testing, and classical assumption tests to explore the relationships and effects among research variables. Based on the type of data, this study uses quantitative data (in numerical form). In terms of data sources, the data utilized are secondary data (obtained from third parties, not directly from primary sources). The data were collected from financial reports and annual reports of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2014–2016 period. This research utilizes IBM SPSS Statistics 25 for Windows as the statistical analysis tool.

The dependent variable, **illiquidity ratio**, is calculated using the following formula:

$$LIQ_{i,t} = -\ln(ILLIQ_{i,t}) \quad \text{.....(1)}$$

Variabel independen diversitas gender dewan komisaris dihitung dengan rumus:

$$WCOM_{i,t} = \frac{\text{Jumlah perempuan di dewan komisaris}_{i,t}}{\text{Jumlah anggota dewan komisaris}_{i,t}} \quad \text{.....(2)}$$

The gender diversity of the board of commissioners has a maximum value of 0.5 and a minimum value of 0. A calculation result closer to 0.5 indicates a more balanced gender composition within the board of commissioners, while a value further from 0.5 suggests a more imbalanced composition. The more balanced the gender composition of the board of commissioners, the higher its diversity.

The independent variable, gender diversity of the board of directors, is calculated using the following formula:

$$WDIREC_{i,t} = \frac{\text{Jumlah perempuan di dewan direksi}_{i,t}}{\text{Jumlah anggota dewan direksi}_{i,t}} \quad \text{.....(3)}$$

Similarly, the gender diversity of the board of directors also has a maximum value of 0.5 and a minimum value of 0. A value closer to 0.5 indicates a more balanced gender composition within the board of directors, whereas a value farther from 0.5 reflects greater imbalance. A higher degree of gender balance implies greater diversity on the board of directors.

The control variables include independent commissioners, the size of the board of commissioners, leverage, and firm size, which are measured using the following formula:

$$INDCOM_{i,t} = \frac{\text{total komisaris independen}_{i,t}}{\text{total anggota dewan komisaris}_{i,t}} \quad \text{.....(4)}$$

$$\mathbf{COMSIZE_{i,t}} = \ln\left(\mathbf{jumlah\ anggota\ dewan\ komisaris_{i,t}}\right) \quad \text{.....(5)}$$

$$\mathbf{LEV_{i.t}} = \frac{\mathbf{total\ liabilitas_{i,t}}}{\mathbf{total\ aset_{i,t}}} \quad \text{.....(6)}$$

$$\mathbf{FSIZE_{i,t}} = \ln\left(\boldsymbol{close\ price_{i,t}} \times \boldsymbol{outstanding\ shares_{i,t}}\right) \quad \text{..... (7)}$$

Analytical Model

The analytical model employed in this study is multiple linear regression analysis, formulated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} LIQ_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 WCOM_{i,t} + \beta_2 WDIREC_{i,t} + \beta_3 INDCOM_{i,t} \\ + \beta_4 COMSIZE_{i,t} + \beta_5 LEV_{i,t} + \beta_6 FSIZE_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned}$$

Keterangan :

$LIQ_{i,t}$ = Stock liquidity of company *i* in year *t*

$WCOM_{i,t}$ = Gender diversity of the board of commissioners of company *i* in year *t*

$WDIREC_{i,t}$ = Gender diversity of the board of directors of company *i* in year *t*

$INDCOM_{i,t}$ = Percentage of independent commissioners in the board of commissioners of company *i* in year *t*

$COMSIZE_{i,t}$ = Size of the board of commissioners of company i in year t

$LEV_{i,t}$ = *Leverage of company i in year t*

$FAGE_{i,t}$ = Size (age) of company i in year t

ε = Error term for company *i* in year *t*

α = Constant

βn = Coefficients of the regression model variables

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Research Results Description

The companies analyzed in this study are manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2014–2016 period. The publicly traded manufacturing companies are grouped into the following sectors: basic and chemical industries, miscellaneous industries, and consumer goods industries. In this study, the data selection and sample determination were conducted using **purposive sampling**. After the sampling process, a total of **203 observations** were obtained over the three-year research period.

A detailed description of the research variables from each sampled company can be found in **Table 1**.

Table 1, Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
LIQ	203	0,0780	16,5100	6,458133	3,9921949
WCOM	203	0,0000	0,5000	0,096355	0,1436115
WDIREC	203	0,0000	0,5000	0,104729	0,1387187
INDCOM	203	0,1667	0,7500	0,389306	0,0903962
COMSIZE	203	0,6931	2,4849	1,345765	0,3898129
LEV	203	0,0413	0,9280	0,455201	0,2035269
FSIZE	203	23,2451	33,7118	27,892005	2,1404011
Valid N (listwise)	203				

Source: SPSS Statistics 21 Output

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables for manufacturing companies in Indonesia during 2014–2016. The variables used in the multiple regression analysis model include the

number of observations (N), minimum value, maximum value, mean, and standard deviation of each variable. The dependent variable in this study is stock liquidity **(LIQ)**. The independent variables consist of gender diversity of the board of commissioners **(WCOM)** and gender diversity of the board of directors **(WDIREC)**. Control variables include independent commissioners **(INDCOM)**, board size **(COMSIZE)**, leverage **(LEV)**, and firm size **(FSIZE)**.

Regression Model Analysis

The following section presents the results of the analysis and hypothesis testing using the multiple linear regression model. This model assesses the impact of **gender diversity on the board of commissioners** and **gender diversity on the board of directors** on the dependent variable, **stock liquidity**. The results of the regression model are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2, Summary of Regression Analysis Results

Variabel Dependen	**Variabel Independen**	**Model Regresi**		
		Koefisien	**Sig. T**	**Kesimpulan**
Likuiditas Saham	Constant	-30,713	0,000*	-
	WCOM	2,686	0,041*	Signifikan
	WDIREC	4,589	0,001*	Signifikan
	INDCOM	4,589	0,031*	Signifikan
	COMSIZE	1,632	0,006*	Signifikan
	LEV	-1,061	0,264	Tidak signifikan
	FSIZE	1,181	0,000*	Signifikan
	R Square	0,584		

Source: SPSS Statistics 21 Output

*) Significant at the 5% Level

Based on Table 2, the regression analysis results indicate that gender diversity of the board of commissioners (WCOM) has a significant positive coefficient. This implies that gender diversity on the board of commissioners significantly and positively affects stock liquidity. Since the independent variable's significance value is below the predefined significance level, H1 is accepted. The regression analysis also shows that gender diversity of the board of directors (WDIREC) has a significant positive coefficient, indicating that diversity within the board of directors also significantly enhances stock liquidity. With a significance value below the threshold, H1 is accepted.

The independent commissioner (INDCOM) variable has a significant positive coefficient, meaning independent commissioners significantly improve stock liquidity. The board size (COMSIZE) variable also shows a significant positive coefficient, indicating that a larger board of commissioners positively influences stock liquidity. Conversely, leverage (LEV) has an insignificant negative coefficient, suggesting it does not significantly impact stock liquidity. Meanwhile, firm size (FSIZE) has a significant positive effect, indicating that larger firms experience higher stock liquidity.

The coefficient of determination (R^2) measures how much the independent variables influence the dependent variable. As shown in Table 4.4, the R^2 value for stock liquidity is 0.584, meaning 58.4% of the variability in stock liquidity is explained by the gender diversity of the board of commissioners (WCOM), gender diversity of the board of directors (WDIREC), independent commissioners (INDCOM), board size (COMSIZE), leverage (LEV), and firm size (FSIZE). The

remaining 41.6% is attributed to other variables not included in this research model.

Discussion

The Effect of Gender Diversity of the Board of Commissioners on Stock Liquidity

The regression results indicate that gender diversity on the board of commissioners has a significant positive effect on stock liquidity. In other words, higher gender diversity within the board leads to increased stock liquidity. These findings align with the research of Ahmed and Ali (2017), which concluded that gender diversity positively influences stock liquidity. A more diverse board enhances the monitoring function over management (Lei et al., 2013) due to the differing characteristics of male and female members. Women tend to be more risk-averse and cautious, while men are often more aggressive and confident, fostering a more effective oversight function. Enhanced monitoring reduces information asymmetry between managers and investors (Jurkus et al., 2011), minimizing managerial opportunism such as selective disclosure and fraudulent practices. As a result, investors gain confidence in their decisions, leading to increased stock trading activity and improved stock liquidity.

Moreover, gender diversity fosters a more objective, independent, and open decision-making climate (Cohen et al., 1998; Abbott et al., 2012). Female commissioners tend to encourage participation from all board members, facilitating teamwork. Additionally, female board members are often more meticulous, disciplined, and committed to their tasks, with a greater focus on others' needs (Gul et al., 2011). This encourages companies to disclose

more transparent information, creating a positive information environment between managers and investors. With improved transparency, investor confidence rises, boosting stock liquidity.

Furthermore, gender diversity reflects the implementation of good corporate governance, reducing information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and investors. This governance mechanism enhances the company's value in the eyes of investors, further improving stock liquidity.

The Effect of Gender Diversity of the Board of Directors on Stock Liquidity

The regression analysis also reveals that gender diversity on the board of directors significantly impacts stock liquidity. Higher diversity within the board enhances the company's stock liquidity. This finding is consistent with Ahmed and Ali (2017), who found that board diversity positively affects liquidity. Diversity brings a broader range of knowledge, creativity, and innovation (Watson et al., 1993). The distinct thinking styles of men and women enrich the board's understanding of market opportunities and improve investment evaluation.

Such diversity broadens the board's perspectives, leading to better decision-making and enhanced company performance. Improved performance is considered good news, encouraging companies to provide greater transparency. A transparent environment reduces information asymmetry, enabling investors to make more informed decisions, which reduces their risk aversion and encourages trading, thus enhancing stock liquidity.

The Effect of Independent Commissioners on Stock Liquidity

The results show that independent commissioners significantly positively influence stock liquidity. A higher proportion of independent commissioners leads to better stock liquidity. These findings align with Ahmed and Ali (2017), who demonstrated that independent commissioners positively impact liquidity. Independent commissioners enhance the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms, ensuring fairness and the achievement of company goals.

Effective oversight reduces agency problems, especially in companies with concentrated ownership. By minimizing information asymmetry, the risk of opaque information decreases, fostering positive investor reactions and encouraging stock trading, which ultimately improves liquidity?

The Effect of Board Size on Stock Liquidity

The analysis indicates that board size has a significant positive effect on stock liquidity. A larger board of commissioners enhances stock liquidity. As Dalton (1999) argued, a larger board improves the monitoring function by distributing oversight responsibilities across more members. This encourages managers to act in the best interests of shareholders.

Additionally, larger boards allow for **specialization**, where members focus on specific oversight areas, leading to more effective monitoring. With improved governance and transparency, agency problems and information asymmetry are reduced, promoting positive investor reactions and enhancing stock liquidity.

The Effect of Leverage on Stock Liquidity

The results indicate that leverage does not significantly affect stock liquidity. This finding contrasts with Ahmed and Ali (2017), who found a significant positive relationship between leverage and liquidity. High leverage can reduce **agency conflicts** and information asymmetry, potentially improving liquidity. However, companies with high leverage also face higher debt burdens and difficulties in meeting interest payments.

If a company fails to meet its obligations, it risks bankruptcy, which triggers negative investor reactions, deterring investment in the company's stock. Therefore, leverage has an insignificant impact on stock liquidity.

The Effect of Firm Size on Stock Liquidity

The analysis shows that firm size significantly positively affects stock liquidity. Larger companies experience higher stock liquidity. This finding aligns with Ahmed and Ali (2017), who concluded that firm size positively impacts liquidity. Larger firms typically have greater market capitalization and generate more stable profits than smaller companies.

These companies tend to disclose more information to demonstrate their growth and performance, helping maintain their stock value in the market. Such transparency enhances investor trust and attracts more investments, ultimately increasing stock liquidity.

CONCLUSION

Based on the results of multiple linear regression analysis on the sample of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2014–2016 periods, the following conclusions were drawn:

Gender diversity of the board of commissioners has a significant positive effect on stock liquidity. This indicates that the higher the gender diversity of the board of commissioners, the greater the company's stock liquidity.

Gender diversity of the board of directors also has a significant positive effect on stock liquidity. This suggests that increasing gender diversity in the board of directors enhances the company’s stock liquidity.

Recommendations for company shareholders: When determining the composition of the board of commissioners and the board of directors, gender diversity should be taken into consideration, as the findings of this study show that gender diversity in both boards significantly improves stock liquidity.

For investors: In making investment decisions in the capital market, investors should consider the gender diversity of both the board of commissioners and the board of directors, as these factors are found to positively influence stock liquidity.

For future research: Further studies should examine the effect of gender diversity in the board of commissioners and board of directors on stock liquidity using a broader sample that includes non-financial

companies, not just manufacturing firms. This will provide more comprehensive and generalizable results.

REFERENCES

Adams, R. B., & Fereira, D. 2004. Gender Diversity in the Boardroom. ECGI Finance Working Paper 57(2004). Retrieved from http://ssrn.com

----------. 2009. Gender Diversity in the Boardroom. *ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance*, Stockholm: 1-19.

Adams, R. B., Gray, S., Nowland, J., 2011. Does gender matter in the boardroom? Evidence from the market reaction to mandatory new director announcements. Working Paper. Retrieved from <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1953152>.

Ahmed, Ammad & Ali, Searat. 2017. Boardroom Gender Diversity and Stock Liquidity: Evidence from Australia. *Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics*, Vol 13 (2017), pp. 148-165.

Amihud, Y. 2002. Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time Series Effects. Journal of Financial Markets.

Ararat, Melsa, Mine Aksu, dan Ayse Tansel Cetin. 2010. Impact of Board Diversity on Boards' Monitoring Intensity and Firm Performance : Evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange.

Attig, N., Fong, W.-M., Gadhoum, Y., Lang, L.H., 2006. Effects of large shareholding on information asymmetry and stock liquidity. *J. Bank. Finance* 30 (10), 2875–2892.

Bodie, Z. Kane, A., dan Marcus, A. (2006). Investments. McGraw-Hill. Sixth Edition.

Brigham, E. F dan J. F. Weston. 1999. Dasar-dasar Manajemen Keuangan, Edisi 9, Erlangga.

Brown, K.C and F.K. Reilly. 2009. *Analysis of Investment and Management.* (5th ed). Harbor Drive: The Dryden Press.

Carter, David A., Frank D'Souza, Betty J. Simkins, & W. Gary, Simpson. (2007). The Diversity Of Corporate Board Commitees And Financial Performance. Available At https://ssrn.com/abstrack=1106698.

Carter, D.A., D'Souza, F., Simkins, B.J., Simpson, W.G., 2010. The gender and ethnic diversity of US boards and board committees and firm financial performance. *Corp. Gov.: Int. Rev*. 18 (5), 396–414.

Chung, K.H., Elder, J., Kim, J.-C., 2010. Corporate governance and liquidity. *J. Financ. Quant. Anal*. 45 (2), 265–291.

Chtourou, S. M., J. Bedard., dan L. Courteau. 2001. "Corporate Governance and Earnings Management." http:/www.ssrn.com. 1-38.

Cohen, J.R., Pant, L.W., Sharp, D.J., 1998. The effect of gender and academic discipline diversity on the ethical evaluations, ethical intentions and ethical orientation of potential public accounting recruits. Account. Horiz. 12 (3), 250.

Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. 1999. Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. *Academy of Management Journal*, 42: 674–686.

Darmadji, T. Dan Fakhruddin, H.M. (2001). Pasar Modal Di Indonesia. Salemba Empat: Jakarta.

Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. 1991. Disclosure , Liquidity , and the Cost of Capital. *The Journal of Finance*, *46*(4), 1325–1359.

Erhardt, N.L., Werbel, J.D., Shrader, C.B., 2003. Board of director diversity and firm financial performance. *Corp. Gov.: Int. Rev*. 11 (2), 102–111.

Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. *J. Law Econ.* 26 (2), 301–325.

Fernandez-Amador, O., Gachter, M., Larch, M., Peter, G. 2003. Does Monetary Policy Determine Stock Market Liquidity? New Evidence from the Euro Zone. *Journal of Empirical Finance* Preference: A Case Study on Dhaka Stock Exchange. *Journal of Finance and Accounting*.

Ghozali, Imam. 2006. Aplikasi Analisis Multivariate dengan Program SPSS (Edisi Ke 4). Semarang:Badan Penerbit Universitas

Diponegoro.

Gjerde, T., Mahenthiran, S., Cademartori, D., 2013. Effect of ownership, governance, and transparency on liquidity – chilean evidence. *J. Contemp. Account. Econ.* 9 (2), 183–202.

Gul, F.A., Srinidhi, B., Ng, A.C., 2011. Does board gender diversity improve the informativeness of stock prices? *J. Account. Econ*. 51 (3), 314–338.

Healy, Andrew., & Offenberg, Jennifer. 2007. Overconfidence, Social Groups, And Gender:Evidence From The Lab And Field. Retreived from <http://ssrn.com/abstract=934320>

Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. *J. Financ. Econ*. 3 (4), 305–360.

Jiang, Fuxia, Yunbiao Ma, Beibei Shi. 2017. Stock Liquidity and Dividend Payout. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, Vol. 42, 295-314.

Jurkus, A.F., Park, J.C., Woodard, L.S., 2011. Women in top management and agency costs. *J. Bus. Res*. 64 (2), 180–186.

Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance (KNKG). 2006. Pedoman Umum Good Corporate Governance Indonesia. Jakarta.

Kusumastuti, S., Supatmi, dan Perdana S. 2006. Pengaruh Board Diversity Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan dalam Perspektif Corporate Governance. *Jurnal Akuntansi Dan Keuangan*, Vol. 9 No. 2 Nopember 2007. Hal 88-98.

Lang, M. dan Maffet, M. 2011. Transperancy and Liquidity Uncertainly in Crisis Periods. University of North Carolina.

Lei, Q., Lin, B., Wei, M., 2013. Types of agency cost, corporate governance and liquidity. *J. Account. Public Policy* 32 (3), 147–172.

Levine, R. Zervos, S. 1996. Stock Market Development and Long-run Growth. *The World Bank Economic Review* 10:323-339.

McCoy, C. 2003. Liquidity Black Holes: Testing the Theory's Predictions. In Persaud, A. Liquidity Black Holes: Understanding Quantifying and Managing Financial Liquidity Risk. Vol 1. *Haymarket House,* London, 139-150.

Milliken, F.J., dan Martins, L.L. 1996. "Searching for Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in

Organizational Groups", *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 21, pp. 402-433.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2004). OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004. The OECD Paris.

Omar, A. And Davidson, M.J. 2001. Women in management: a comparative cross-cultural overview. Cross Cultural Management: *An International Journal*, Vol. 8 Nos 3/4, pp. 35-67.

Owusu-Ansah.S. 2000. Timelines of Corporate Financial Reporting in Emerging Capital Market: Empirical Evidence 23 from Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. *Accounting and Bussiness Research*: 243-254.

Robinson, G., dan Dechant, K. 1997. Building A Business Case For Diversity. Academy of Management Executive, vol 11, hal 21-30.

Rose, C. (2007). "Does female board representation influence firm performance? The Danish evidence", *Corporate Governance: An International Review, Developing Economies, Vol 2(2),* 1-8.

Sarwono, J. 2015. *Rumus Rumus Populer dalam SPSS 22 untuk Riset Skripsi.* Yogyakarta: BPFE.

Sudana, I Made. (2015). Manajemen Keuangan Perusahaan. Edisi Kedua. Jakarta: Erlangga

Sudana, I Made dan Nurul Intan. 2008. Leverage Keuangna dan Likuiditas Saham Perusahaan Manufaktur yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Jakarta. *Jurnal Manajemen Teori dan Terapan.*

Trinidad, C., Normore, A.H., 2005. Leadership and gender: a dangerous liaison? *Leadership Org. Dev. J*. 26 (7), 574–590.

Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No.40 Tahun 2007 Pasal 1 ayat 5 tentang Perseroan Terbatas. Diakses tanggal 2 Oktober 2017.

Vogel, David I., Wester, Stephen R.Wester., Heesacker, Martin., Madon, Stephanie. 2003. Confirming Gender Stereotypes: A Social Role Perspective. *Sex Roles* Vol.48.

Walt, N. V. D. dan Ingley, C. 2003.Board Dynamics and the Influence of Professional Background, Gender and Ethnic Diversity of Directors *Corporate Governance An International Review*

Wang, Y., Clift, B., 2009. Is there a ''business case" for board diversity? *Pac. Account. Rev*. 21 (2), 88–103.

Watson & Michaelsen, Larry. 1993. Cultural Diversity's Impact on

Group Process and Performance : Comparing Culturally Homogenous and Culturally Diverse Task Group. *The Academy of Management Journal* 36(3):590-602 ·

Wuyts, G. (2007). Stock Market Liquidity: Determinants and Implication. *Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management* Vol. LII, 2.

Yousfi, O., Loukil, N., Yerbanga., R. 2015. Gender Diversity on Board and Stock Market Liquidity: Empirical Evidence from the French market.

www.finance.yahoo.com

www.idx.co.id